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Summary of Thesis
The efficacy, consequences and ethical principles surrounding sexual reorientation therapies 
provided by health professionals has been debated in the public, professional and academic 
arenas since the first interventions were offered. This thesis applies a model for problem 
solving in bioethics to the issues raised by this debate. This in depth exploration o f the facts 
and fictions surrounding the provision of sexual reorientation interventions through the 
critical lens of bioethics will be useful to those patients, health professionals, and health 
policy makers who struggle to make sense of a highly political health care issue. Sexual 
reorientation is fraught with conflicting moral and ethical implications that impact the patient 
and the health professional on many levels. Bioethics is used to bring some clarity to a 
complex and contentious problem.
iv
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1Introduction
The past, present, and future o f sexual reorientation interventions by health professionals 
raise numerous ethical issues warranting critical analysis. Science and medicine have 
concerned themselves since the late nineteenth century with understanding and manipulating 
both sexual orientation and behavior. Sexual orientation research continues to receive 
considerable attention within the medical, mental health, philosophical, gay, lesbian, feminist, 
and queer1 areas of Western academia.
Sexual reorientation interventions include efforts to modify an individual’s sexual 
orientation or behavior through scientific, psychological, or medical means. Although 
primarily geared toward homosexual to heterosexual redirection other goals of treatment can 
be: to sustain an increased level o f heterosexual activity; to eliminate sexual orientation 
toward children or to diminish fetishes such as stimulation deriving primarily from body 
parts, erotic toys or other inanimate objects.
Fortunately, many of the interventions employed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries would today be considered unethical. This can be attributed not only to advances in 
the fields of science, psychology, and medicine but also to changes in the cultural, political, 
and religious landscape of twentieth century Western society.
First as a medical student, later as a physician and for many years now as a practicing 
psychiatrist, I have witnessed this phenomenon. The institutions that academically or 
clinically define Western sexual custom and its derivations have issued numerous policy 
statements and ethical guides regarding the diagnoses and treatment of sexual orientation over 
the past twenty years. Such groups as: the American Psychiatric Association; the American 
Psychological Association; the American Psychoanalytic Association; the National 
Association of Social Workers (U.S.A.); the American Counselors’ Association; the 
American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy o f Family Physicians have not 
only provoked confusion within the lay community by the inconsistent and frequently 
contradictory stances each has presented but these professional bodies have also created a 
problematic setting for individual practitioners seeking authoritative guidance in patient 
treatment.
1 Queer in academic circles has come to refer to socially marginalized sexuality.
Within the literature of medicine and psychology, some of the ethical issues 
surrounding sexual reorientation are raised, but are often not critically analyzed. Within the 
literature o f gay, lesbian, and queer studies - as is also the case with most o f the medical and 
psychological literature - ethical issues are often raised only insofar as they support large 
political goals or specific agendas. The future o f sexual reorientation interventions in 
medicine is far from certain. With the recent mapping of the human genome, advances in 
neuropsychopharmacology and genetic pharmaceuticals, as well as increased access to 
reliable prenatal testing and screening, it becomes clear that our understanding o f human 
sexuality will change dramatically throughout the twenty-first century and beyond. The 
future promises a much clearer and more scientific understanding of the origins and 
determinants of sexual orientation. As our understanding grows, it is reasonable to assume 
that the efficacy o f sexual reorientation interventions will do likewise.
Changes in medical practice (whether from the past to present or from the present to the 
future) cannot help but influence profoundly the way in which ethical issues surrounding 
sexual orientation interventions are formulated, whether the individual ethics o f the patient- 
physician interaction or the communal ethics o f policy development and community standards 
of care (Loewy, 1996). Loewy asserts that learning about the ethics o f yesterday and 
considering ethics as they are expressed in various cultures today can help to both predict and 
shape the ethics o f tomorrow. Given what the fixture is likely to hold for the field o f human 
sexuality and our understanding of sexual orientation, it seems prudent to consider 
tomorrow’s ethics today.
3Section I: ETHICS
Medicine and ethics are inextricably tied to each other by virtue o f the unique relationship 
between physician and patient. This section examines health care ethics and bioethics.
4Chapter 1: A Methodology for Ethical Analysis
In 4th century BC Hippocrates’ oath enabled the development o f medicine. With the 
creation o f his code of ethics, Hippocrates steered the superstition-riddled art of healing into 
real science. His ethical guidelines o f observation, diagnosis and treatment eventually 
overruled blame of the gods for illness. Today medical ethics still derive from the 
Hippocratic precepts.
Bioethics is the 20th century descendant o f Hippocratic ideas. Van Rensselaer Potter, an 
American biologist, is described by Calahan as first to use the term ‘bioethics’, in his text 
Morals and Medicine, which was published by the theologian Joseph Fletcher in 1954 
(Calahan, 1997). Calahan describes the focus o f traditional medical ethics as being the 
expected professional standards o f the physician within the doctor-patient relationship. 
Bioethics, however, has come to refer to the broader field of all the Life Sciences, 
encompassing medicine, biology, and some aspects o f the environmental, population and 
social sciences. Calahan notes that, while earlier medical ethics focused on the domain o f 
physicians (although with considerable reference to theological interests) bioethics 
encompasses the work of many disciplines. After its inception in the 1950s, bioethics 
accelerated development in the 1960s and by the 1970s had begun to assume worldwide 
importance (Calahan, 1997). This thesis will examine the issues of the medical ethics 
surrounding sexual reorientation interventions from the broader perspective of bioethics.
The dramatic biotechnological advances in the 1960s fostered growth in the new field. 
According to Calahan, small groups o f professionals and lay people (particularly in Great 
Britain and the United States) began focusing on the emergent morals during that period.
By the end of the 1970s, bioethics had spread to all the developed nations of the world. In 
addition to the variety of private and university efforts, various government agencies and 
commissions have been formed over the past two decades to help set public policy and 
educate the general public (Calahan, 1997). By the 1990s, bioethics was established as a 
strong force in the Life Sciences and in general policy deliberations (Calahan, 1997). This 
thesis will examine the issues o f the medical ethics surrounding sexual reorientation 
interventions from the broader terrain o f a bioethics perspective.
Scientific methods that can be reviewed retrospectively from a bioethical perspective were 
applied in an organized exploration o f human sexuality during the middle and late nineteenth
century. Many intervention practices were developed, some of which exist today. Initial 
medical ethics issues arose from the importance of the doctor-patient relationship and took the 
form of issues surrounding consent and confidentiality as regarded specific medical concerns. 
Social, political, and theological sexual orientation ethics were not viewed by the medical 
establishment as relevant to the ethics of the doctor-patient relationship. Prior to this surge of 
interest, sexuality was considered to be in the realm of theology and politics as much as 
medicine. The realm o f bioethics could encompass much more in the field o f human 
sexuality.
The evolution o f human sexuality into a subject for medical and scientific investigation 
and intervention occurred at a time when social and political views surrounding gender and 
sexuality were - as they continue to be - in a state of conflicted transition. The twentieth 
century saw a dramatic shift in Western politics and societal views towards issues such as 
equality and the rights afforded an individual on the grounds of gender, race, or membership 
in a socially marginalized group, as well as the balance between individual autonomy and 
societal morals. Many academic fields, with a rich and varied collection o f philosophies, have 
emerged during the course of the last century to organize and understand the changing value 
system of the West. Cultural diversity, feminism, and queer theory originate from a variety of 
fields including philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science, and 
literature, all o f  which comment on sexuality and the evolution of the Western value system in 
the last century. Bioethics is the discipline that integrates these philosophical systems with 
health care and health science, providing discussion and direction for patients and health 
professionals.
Ethical Systems
Regarding the development o f what would become the bioethics model, Boyd (1997) 
asserts that traditional ethical codes (from ancient to modem) derive authority from custom, 
the commands of the gods, or the leaders o f the group. He notes, though, that such codes do 
not necessarily reflect a coherent set o f principles. Boyd further observes that in the evolution 
of ethics, various precepts may not have been consistent, either internally or systemically. 
Boyd describes the core philosophy as defending traditional authority (e.g. by arguing that it
6embodies self-evident moral intuitions) in constructing more coherent foundations for 
morality. According to Boyd:
... philosophical systems of ethics tend to focus either on achieving what is 
considered to be good (consequentialist or eudeomonistic systems) or on 
achieving what is considered to be right (deontological systems). The highest 
human good (if such a thing can be said to exist per se) has generally been 
considered to be happiness. This can be interpreted, in hedonistic systems, as 
pleasure (and the avoidance of pain), either for the individual, or for everyone (or 
the greatest number possible), in utilitarian systems. Both hedonistic and 
utilitarian systems are consequentialist. Happiness can also be interpreted 
eudeomonistically, as the kind of human flourishing that involves the realization 
of one’s highest ideals, finding the golden mean and living in harmony with others 
and one’s deepest self. Variations on this theme are found in ethical systems from 
Confucius, Plato, and Aristotle to Jung and modem virtue ethics. A key tenet is 
that being determines action - you do what you are; a good person who flourishes 
has clear moral vision and is disposed to act accordingly. (Nobody does wrong 
willingly - Socrates; The just man justices - G. M. HOPKINS). Agapeistic ethics 
is similar (Love God, and what you will do - St. Augustine). Kant’s deontological 
ethical system, based on the moral law within, has affinities with the above, but 
sees a need to spell moral law out in axioms with which (because of their clear 
implications for everyone) one must reasonably agree, and on which duties and 
rights can be based. Reason played a similar role in Spinoza’s system, albeit with 
a more positive emphasis on the emotions. Agreement on principles and 
procedures is also central to ethical systems that reach it from the consideration of 
historical or hypothetical contracts among equals (John Rawls’ system of justice 
or fairness is a notable contemporary example) (pp. 102-103).
In modem bioethics, the most familiar ethical system is still the deontological — the root of 
ethics—which is centered around the four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
respect for autonomy and justice. However, determining the scope of their applications 
requires recourse to consequentialist or eudaemonistic considerations. In applied ethics 
generally, each type of system has valid insights to contribute. The same can be said of 
skeptics since the days of Hume, and for existentialists, when they question the objectivity o f 
all such systems. No one ethical system commands universal agreement, but each contributes 
pertinent questions to the moral spectrum to which reason must be applied before reaching a 
judgement (p. 104). Clearly Boyd is citing a need for a broader ethical tool than traditional 
medical ethics.
7A Framework for Ethical Analysis
Although unproblematic moral issues can reasonably be detected within a situation at first 
glance, in contemporary health care they are usually forced center-stage because of conflict, 
actual or anticipated, leading to discussion (Higgs, 1997). Unlike most scenarios in which it 
is usually up to the individual patient or clinician to initiate an ethical discussion, the subject 
of sexual reorientation has generated commentary from a diverse range of philosophers, 
professional groups, political groups, and theologians. Institutions often engage professionals 
with philosophical expertise to stimulate and shape the discussion of complex ethical issues. 
However, the subject o f sexual reorientation appears to generate critical commentary from 
very divergent groups, all o f which have strong opinions and little interest in discussion.
This thesis follows the framework presented by Campbell and Higgs (1982) for the 
organization of an ethical analysis at the systems level. Campbell and Higgs examine two 
principlist models for ethical analysis for each clinical scenario. The Campbell and Higgs 
model is summarized as follows:
• Identification of the issues at stake, whom they effect, and in what way.
• Further exploration of morally relevant facts with a reasonable attempt to assess the 
perspectives and purposes o f all involved.
• Clarification of the concepts and arguments used in interaction and dialogue in order 
to air feelings, share points of view, and make sure that everyone is heard.
• An analytical synthesis o f the different points of view and concomitant arguments in 
order to create a response or way forward.
Campbell and Higgs note that a number o f additional questions may need to be asked, 
including:
• Whether the person or group that stimulates the debate is actually the one with the 
problem?
• Whose point of view has been least heard (whether o f a group or an individual) and 
what this group or individual might say?
• What role individuals played, who they are working for, or what ‘system’ they 
were actually involved in?
• Whether any person or group was distorting the discussion by manipulation, misuse 
of language, or distortion of concepts and arguments?
The flow of such debate depends on the circumstances, especially with respect to 
whether they are real and immediate (as in the clinical problem) or theoretical and extendable
(as in the philosophical or educational setting) (Higgs, 1997). The field o f sexual 
reorientation includes both varieties, which will be explored further.
9Chapter 2: The Stakeholders and their Issues
The first step towards an organized exploration of an ethical conundrum requires not only 
the identification of the issues at stake but whom they effect and how. This chapter examines 
the specific medical ethics and bioethics issues surrounding sexual reorientation interventions 
from the perspective o f those groups involved and those who report they speak on behalf of 
those involved.
The issues identified in this chapter are derived from a series of small group discussions 
and web-based discussion groups conducted between 1999 and 2001. These discussions 
focused on both the ethical and bioethical issues surrounding our topic, as well as a review of 
popular and academic literatures. The following groups have been identified as having a 
stake in sexual reorientation interventions:
• Gay, lesbian, and bisexual (lesbigay) adults.
• Lesbigay adolescents.
• Non-heterosexual non-lesbigay adults.
• Non-heterosexual non-lesbigay adolescents.
• Gender-identity disordered children.
• Parents and potential parents.
• Healthcare providers.
• Non-healthcare and religious providers.
• Non-heterosexual political activists.
• Professional organizations for health providers.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual (Lesbigay) Adults
Lesbigay adults constitute individuals over the age of majority who identify (at least 
to themselves) as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Irrespective o f whether their status is out, they are 
associated with their sexual orientation behaviorally or psychologically and have little or no 
interest in changing their sexual orientation or behavior at the present time. This group 
engages the health care system because of health concerns arising from sexual behavior 
(venereal infections and infestation, hepatitis, and the risk o f contracting HIV, etc.) or because 
of emotional difficulties arising from coming out or because of relational issues.
10
Lesbigay adults report they are best served by the clinician who can discuss issues relating 
to sexuality without prejudice and without the application of pressure to change orientation or 
unsafe behavior. When members o f this group are encouraged by a clinician to change their 
behavior or sexual orientation, they often experience the suggestion as homophobic, 
prejudiced, or bigoted.
A direct contrast to sexual reorientation interventions, gay-affirming psychotherapy is the 
preferred approach by this group o f adults. Self directed (internalized) homophobia is viewed 
by therapists practicing gay affirming psychotherapy as central to the coming out crisis. It has 
been postulated that homophobic self-loathing often persists after coming out and persistent, 
internalized homophobia accounts for recurring depression and addictive disorders.
Several gay and lesbian writers of the late twentieth century have argued that sexual 
reorientation interventions implicitly or overtly reinforce homophobic views within society. 
These writers postulate that false beliefs such as “sexual orientation is a choice and that 
behavior can be reformed accordingly” and “non-heterosexuality is an illness or disease” are 
the precepts o f such interventions. They level at professionals providing sexual reorientation 
the accusation of perpetuation of prejudice in society and loathing within the self o f both 
closeted and out non-heterosexuals.
Gay and lesbian politics in America provides an inescapable backdrop for theories of 
sexual reorientation. The political movement began by bucking a societal framework that 
viewed non-heterosexual behavior as sin. Christian values o f the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries emphasized man’s freedom to choose either vice or virtue, with a clear identification 
of non-heterosexual behavior as unnatural and wicked. It remains commonplace for regional 
and local governments in America to legislate punishment for marginal sexual activity. Early 
gay and lesbian politicians fought against a society that criminalizes non-heterosexual 
behavior.
Early non-heterosexual political groups did oppose medicine’s depiction o f non­
heterosexual behavior as constituting pathology. They countered that if non-heterosexual 
behavior is the result o f a medical or psychological disorder, then an enlightened society 
should respond with research and treatment, not punishment and social excommunication.
The consequence o f choosing the label o f ‘medically ill’ over the label o f ‘morally 
despicable’ however was that gays and lesbians believed themselves ‘diseased’ and
11
‘disordered’. As heterosexuals began to shift their view of homosexuals from morally ill to 
medically ill at least the interest in punishing homosexuals began to wane.
Gays, lesbians and bisexuals, as well as other non-heterosexuals have at times been 
actively coerced into sexual reorientation interventions by clinicians that promised relief from 
a variety of nervous and mental conditions following the resumption or adoption of a ‘normal’ 
sexual orientation. In the past non-heterosexual behaviors or orientations were viewed by 
most clinicians as de facto evidence of a mental disorder.
In earlier times, some institutionalized adult patients were forced into participating in 
sexual reorientation interventions. Today, coerced and involuntary treatment o f adults is 
contraindicated by the bioethical principle of respect for autonomy and, in most communities, 
legal statutes or legal precedence. In most cases, to override patient autonomy a clinician 
must demonstrate a medical or psychiatric emergency involving imminent serious risk to 
oneself or others. Sexual orientation may precipitate a patient crisis although alone it rarely, 
if  ever, produces such imminent danger.
There are no ‘emergent’ sexual reorientation interventions currently available, although the 
future may bring biotechnology that could permanently or temporarily reorient an individual’s 
sexual orientation with a subsequent marked change in their sexual behavior. Gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals reasonably fear that, were such biotechnology to become available, it would be 
used aggressively to destroy their culture and institutions by a homophobic social majority. 
The hearing-impaired community has recently become embroiled in a similar discussion 
generated by biotechnological developments used to restore hearing and speech to children 
who would have previously been taught sign language to communicate. To the hearing 
parents of such children, the question of whether or not to make this biotechnology available 
is uncontroversial, but to the hearing-impaired parents o f such children, the prospect o f using 
biotechnology to restore hearing and speech can be problematic. The hearing-impaired 
community has expressed concern that such technology will result in the slow death o f their 
culture as the numbers o f hearing-impaired individuals in the population dwindle.
Lesbigay Adolescents
A less visible but even more vulnerable group invested in this issue are adolescents aware of 
their sexual orientation and identifying to self or others as gay, lesbian or bisexual. The most
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significant problem for them is that, despite their awareness of their own sexual orientation 
and their identification with gay and lesbian cultures, parents, guardians, and other adults in 
the community wield control over their lives to varying degrees, depending on the cultural 
and social environment.
It is no longer uncommon for adolescents to ‘come out o f the closet5 prior to their first 
sexual encounter. Recently, a thirteen year old boy made the newspaper headlines and 
evening news in Marin, California when he ‘came out5 to his family and classmates at school. 
More often, adolescents are ‘out5 initially with select peers but remain ‘closeted5 with their 
family until they have left home. Others may delay ‘coming out5 until during or after their 
college education, or once their career path is well established. The route chosen by the 
adolescent or young adult often reflects their personality as well as the environment in which 
they find themselves (tolerant vs. hostile).
Numerous accounts have been published about an ‘underground railroad5 of runaway teens 
who make their way to San Francisco and Los Angeles to hide out in ‘safe houses5 until they 
are o f the age o f majority, in order to avoid being returned to parents or institutions that are 
openly hostile towards the youth's lesbigay identity. Many are reported to have escaped from 
long-term treatment facilities where they were forced to participate in sexual reorientation 
interventions.
Barbara Walters o f ABC News and Dateline fame popularized the plight o f these teenagers 
in a one hour, prime-time documentary that ran twice in two consecutive seasons (ABC News 
20/20; 1996, 1997). Ms. Walters interviewed a young lesbian who, upon coming out, was 
forced by her mother into long-term residential psychiatric care. The young woman describes 
in graphic detail a reorientation intervention composed of repeated exposure to pornography 
coupled with electric shocks. She eventually escaped from the institution, became a runaway, 
relocated to San Francisco and successfully convinced a court to have her mother removed as 
guardian to ensure that she would never be institutionalized and subjected to sexual 
reorientation therapy against her will again.
Nations, states, regions, and communities vary considerably with respect to the amount of 
control adolescents retain over their sexuality. The case popularized by Barbara Walters 
highlights the fact that, despite local laws, parents can often find ways to circumvent liberal
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community standards by moving the child or adolescent to another locale that gives the parent 
almost limitless power and authority over them.
The American Academy of Pediatricians and the American Academy of Family Physicians 
have both issued policy statements condemning the use of sexual reorientation interventions 
with minors. Despite their clinical power and the reverberations on the psyche of the patient 
and society these policy statements carry little or no legal weight.
The gay and lesbian community as advocates for gay, lesbian and bisexual youth view the 
availability o f any sexual reorientation interventions to adult patients as a potentially 
problematic because o f the potential for inappropriate application to children and adolescents. 
The defenders have also argued that, even if it were illegal or deemed unethical for health 
providers to employ sexual reorientation interventions with children or adolescents, it would 
remain likely that some religious groups would continue to use the techniques to try to 
extinguish non-heterosexual thoughts and behavior from children and adolescents in their 
congregations.
If biotechnology looms as a real or potentially real threat to these young people and the 
risk of being forced into treatment increases, so shall the anxieties associated with ‘coming 
out’ and therefore burden the child with more reasons for remaining closeted.
It is good that the last decade in America brought the establishment of gay-affirming 
community resources for non-heterosexual youth in most larger metropolitan areas. Many 
college and university campuses also now have resources for non-heterosexual youth to 
dealing with sexual identity and coming out issues.
Non-heterosexual Non-lesbigay Adults
This is the group of adults that recognizes its own non-heterosexual orientations and/or 
behavior patterns, but identifies as other than gay, lesbian or bisexual. Unlike the closeted 
lesbigay, members o f this group do not necessarily view their sexuality as personally 
acceptable or fulfilling. They often invert homophobia towards themselves and display it 
overtly towards others. Often this group would choose heterosexuality as their orientation 
and behavior if the choice were readily available. Also often, these people subscribe to strong 
religious or cultural values and assess the appropriateness of their desire and behavior 
accordingly. They may fully resolve the conflicts between their individual sexuality and their
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cultural and religious expectations themselves, or the conflicts may smolder for years and 
ultimately either die quietly or erupt in crisis.
Members o f this group may engage the medical system or their religious system when in 
crisis, or the unresolved issues may come to the surface in the course of dealing with an 
unrelated problem. While gay-affirming therapists are likely to view strong attachment to 
religious or cultural values as a symptom of internalized homophobia, counseling or 
reorientation interventions with a religious basis rarely acknowledge the existence of such.
The optimal referral for these patients would seem to be the ‘neutral’ counselor or therapist 
who can facilitate a process o f self-exploration and self-discovery without overtly or covertly 
substituting the therapist’s value system for the patient’s. Following a thorough assessment, 
the neutral therapist or counselor should be in a position to refer the non-heterosexual non- 
lesbigay patient to either a gay-affirming mental health resource or for sexual reorientation 
intervention as indicated by the individual patient’s needs and desires.
Unfortunately, therapists and counselors cannot always achieve neutrality with respect to 
patient values and morals. Some subscribe to the theory that neutrality is harmful and 
contraindicated. While others formulate it as an unattainable ideal and miss the opportunity 
o f trying it. A few erroneously believe that they bring such neutrality to every encounter.
Professional organizations develop policy statements and ethical guides in part to facilitate 
practitioners in having good boundaries when dealing with controversial, value-laden subject 
matter. Recently published professional guidelines clearly favor gay-affirming interventions 
over sexual reorientation interventions and often fail to address the needs of those patients 
who do not desire to develop a gay or lesbian identity, beyond offering them counseling and 
therapy intended to change their decision.
Options for this population are limited. Community resources for the non-heterosexual 
with identity issues tend to be funded either by lesbigay or religious groups and so the advice 
available tends to be colored by the values o f the funding group. Many community resources 
are housed or affiliated with what would appear to be relatively value-neutral institutions such 
as schools, colleges, and municipal departments. However, on deeper scrutiny these 
resources often offer advice that is strongly slanted towards a particular view o f sexual 
orientation and identity. The website o f a prominent state university in the American 
Midwest reports that current sexual reorientation interventions include brain surgery,
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prefrontal lobotomy and electroshock treatments. In actuality, nowhere in America do any 
physicians or hospitals perform brain surgery, lobotomies or electroconvulsive therapy for 
sexual reorientation.
Non-heterosexual Non-lesbigay Adolescents
This group is composed of adolescents who recognize their non-heterosexual orientations 
and/or behavior patterns, but choose not to identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. Unlike the 
closeted lesbigay adolescent, members of this group do not view their sexuality as personally 
acceptable or fulfilling, often display overt homophobia towards themselves and others, and 
would choose heterosexuality as their orientation and behavior if the choice were readily 
available.
These adolescents share the same difficulty in accessing value-neutral resources as non- 
lesbigay non-heterosexual adults. The lesbigay community views this group’s heterosexist 
value system as both morally and intellectually weak and assumes it to be strongly tied to 
internalized homophobia, which must be exorcised. In the absence of access to lesbigay 
resources, these adolescents must look to religious groups and the mental health system for 
assistance with sexual identity issues, or abandon their heterosexist value system.
As with lesbigay adolescents, members o f this group often struggle to decide to whom and 
at what time they will share information about their sexual orientation. Some will eventually 
abandon or modify their value system so as to tolerate or even embrace a lesbigay identity.
For many in the arenas o f mental health and academia this is assumed to be the natural 
evolution o f a lesbigay identity. It is presumed that all lesbigays start out as non-heterosexual 
non-lesbigay heterosexists and evolve through the ‘coming out’ process to establish a lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual identity. Of course, the view that non-lesbigay non-heterosexual identity is 
simply arrested or incomplete lesbigay identity development sounds remarkably like the 
Freudian theory that hypothesizes homosexual orientation as just arrested or incomplete 
heterosexual orientation development (Freud, 1962).
It is the non-heterosexual non-lesbigay adult and adolescent population that is most 
inclined to seek out sexual reorientation interventions voluntarily. Currently, reorientation 
interventions are available from select mental health practitioners and certain religious 
groups. The process of making an informed clinical decision is complicated by an
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overwhelming amount o f political and religious propaganda masquerading as scientific data. 
While the adult can readily investigate the options for sexual reorientation and seek out 
assistance from religious and mental health professionals in making informed clinical 
decisions, the adolescent often has the additional burden of disclosure to parents prior to 
obtaining the assistance they seek. Also burdensome is that the American Academy o f 
Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family Physicians have specifically opposed sexual 
reorientation interventions, thus making a request for referral from the adolescent’s primary 
care provider likely to be ignored (AAP, 1993; AAFP, 1994). It is notable that neither 
organization comments on the ethics or morality of gay-affirming psychotherapies.
Gender Identity Disordered Children
Gender-identity disordered children are considered by many medical as well as lay 
individuals to be ‘pre-homosexual’, and indeed there is some evidence that gender-identity 
disorder in children is associated with an increased incidence of homosexual orientation in 
adolescence and adulthood. Gender dysphoria, both in children and adults, warrants treatment 
by the mental health system with the goal o f improving the patient’s quality of life.
Treatment o f gender-identity disordered children for the purpose of preventing subsequent 
homosexual orientation has questionable clinical motives.
Children with gender-identity disorders may or may not be distressed by their identity. 
When a disordered gender-identity creates or perpetuates emotional distress, or impairs social 
functioning, it is universally considered clinically appropriate to intervene (Nicolosi, 1991). 
However, intervention with a child solely for the purpose o f preventing homosexual 
orientation later in life raises many questions.
As children are not expected to participate in the informed consent process, consent falls to 
parents or guardians. Health providers must raise the issue of the ‘goal’ of therapy with GID 
children. When intervention continues despite normalized mood and social functioning, the 
goals o f treatment become an ethical issue. Interventions applied to children with the 
intention of preventing non-heterosexual behaviors or orientations in adolescence or 
adulthood have not been specifically addressed by professional organizations, but sexual 
reorientation interventions in adolescents (both voluntary and involuntary) have been
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condemned by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family 
Physicians (AAP, 1993; AAFP, 1994).
The prevention of homosexuality through intervention with gender disordered children 
resembles in many ways the issue o f restoring hearing to children who would normally be 
deaf, and learn sign language and lip reading as members o f the deaf community. However, 
only a small percentage of adult homosexuals would have met the diagnostic criteria for 
gender-identity disorder during childhood. Clearly, even if all gender disordered children 
were successfully treated to prevent future homosexuality, the impact on the number o f adult 
homosexuals would be minimal. The argument that such interventions are equivalent to 
genocide perpetrated against homosexuals appears to be exaggerated.
There are some similarities between the status of homosexuals in Western culture and that 
of women in India. Given the low social status o f women and undesirability o f daughters, the 
abortion o f female fetuses has grown commonplace. Prenatal ultrasounds to determine the 
sex of the fetus in order to facilitate the abortion of daughters were outlawed in several Indian 
states as a step towards improving the status of women. The rationale for this decision is two­
fold: if men substantially outnumber women, the status o f women will never improve, and a 
society that allows the destruction of females in utero must tacitly endorse the unacceptably 
low social status o f women in society, and be an active agent against change (Weeks, 1977).
These arguments have also been applied to the situation of Western homosexuals. It has 
been said that a society that permits the prevention of homosexuality or reorientation o f non- 
heterosexuals must tacitly support the lower social status of non-heterosexuals (Weeks, 1977). 
Minimizing the percentage of non-heterosexuals in a society through prevention and 
reorientation directly decreases the power that non-heterosexuals can exert, perpetuating a 
heterosexist status quo.
It is conceivable that there may be prenatal screening technology in the future to predict 
sexual orientation. If and when such technology becomes available, its use in conjunction 
with abortion might have the effect o f eliminating non-heterosexual behavior and orientation 
in the upper and middle classes o f society (the groups most likely to afford and participate in 
prenatal screening) resulting in economic discrimination against non-heterosexuals. Were 
prenatal or neonatal screening able to predict future non-heterosexual orientation or behavior 
once the time limit for safe abortion had passed, children that screen positive for being at risk
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might receive very different upbringings - either intentionally or unintentionally - resulting in 
unpredictable outcomes. Similarly, there are those who object to screening and subsequent 
abortion for disabilities on the grounds that the process devalues those already living with the 
condition.
Parents and Potential Parents
Parents o f children and adolescents must make clinically informed medical decisions. 
Access to consultation and referrals for sexual reorientation may be withheld by primary care 
providers, according to the stated positions o f the American Academy o f Pediatrics and the 
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAP, 1993; AAFP, 1994). In some regions, 
consultation may only be available through religious organizations. It seems likely that 
parents will weigh the emotional and social burdens o f potential or evident non-heterosexual 
orientation in their children and decide that prevention or reorientation is appropriate. This 
decision occurs most often when the family or parents are strongly tied to heterosexist 
religious or cultural values. Such parents may find an erosion o f their control over the sexual 
lives of their children. The fact that the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American 
Academy o f Family Physicians has come out against sexual reorientation interventions with 
adolescents may mark the beginning of a trend whereby policy makers actively address issues 
o f parental consent and control over the sexual destiny of adolescents - a trend already in 
process, as a result o f the debate over adolescent access to birth control and abortion.
The case popularized by Barbara Walters (1995, 1996) is an example o f how regional 
politics can register markedly different views towards the role o f the parent in controlling the 
sexual orientation o f an adolescent or child. In southern California (Los Angeles), the parent 
in question was well within her rights in sending the dependent adolescent to another state 
(Utah) for institution-based residential treatment o f depression and sexual identity dysphoria. 
In northern California (San Francisco), the dependent adolescent succeeded in divorcing 
herself from her parent on the basis of irreconcilable differences surrounding her sexual 
orientation.
Technology currently allows parents to determine the sex of their unborn offspring with 
the option o f terminating those o f the undesired sex. It is possible that prenatal testing could
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one day predict an increased risk for non-heterosexual offspring either in utero or in early life. 
The consequences of such technology could include:
• Heterosexual parents could choose heterosexual offspring and homosexual parents could 
choose homosexual offspring.
• Parents with strong heterosexist values could abort homosexual offspring.
• Offspring with ambiguous futures could be ‘conditioned’ towards one orientation or the 
other through the manipulation o f environmental factors and parenting style.
• Pre-homosexual children could be prepared for the hardships that await them, by 
strengthening their self-confidence and self-esteem in preparation for a potentially hostile 
environment.
All such potential outcomes create significant ethical issues for individual parents and for 
society as a whole. As mentioned above, were such technology to become available, it would 
probably be used first by the upper and middle classes of affluent Western societies.
Currently, non-heterosexual behavior and orientation appears to occur throughout all races 
and social classes, but the technology described above could significantly distort the 
distribution of non-heterosexual behavior and orientation in the future with the consequence 
of marginalizing non-heterosexuals still further.
Healthcare Providers
Since the early 1970s, gay and lesbian politics have been a very active force within the 
groups responsible for policy making for mental health professional groups in America.
Within Western medicine (and society in general), non-heterosexual behavior has evolved 
slowly but steadily over the last century from sin/vice to illness/compulsion to representative 
of a healthy social and biological minority.
With the removal o f homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of 
the American Psychiatric Association, many gay and lesbian groups have taken the position 
that since homosexuality is not an illness or disease it is inappropriate to offer treatment. 
Similarly, the same groups often assume that if a patient seeks treatment it is because they 
have been led to believe that they are ‘sick’, ‘diseased’, or ‘disordered’.
Caregivers may be biased as well. There are still many mental health professionals who 
consider that almost all non-heterosexual behavior or orientation in adulthood originates from
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psychosexual developmental milestones in childhood. Many subscribe to the notion that 
when these connections exist from childhood to adulthood, psychotherapeutic intervention is 
potentially useful. Similarly, there are some within the mental health professions who view 
most non-heterosexual behavior as genetically or biologically driven and thus relatively 
resistant to modification or change through psychotherapeutic interventions. The majority has 
adopted the view that non-heterosexual behaviors and orientations originate from a variety of 
potential factors including biology, genetics, environment, and psychosocial and 
psychosexual developmental events. Only a small minority o f American mental health 
professionals report routinely providing sexual reorientation therapy or interventions as part 
o f their practice. Most believe that these interventions are expensive and time-consuming and 
offer only limited potential for short-term, partial success for a condition that is not even a 
“medical illness.”
Health care providers who are engaged in research as to the origins o f non-heterosexual 
orientations and behavior have come under attack by gay and lesbian philosophers and 
politicos. It has been suggested that any research into reorientation interventions and the 
origins of sexual orientation or futuristic biotechnologies related to sexual orientation is 
unethical. Some have questioned the process o f informed consent for patients engaged in 
research or treatment for sexual reorientation, with the assertion that if the patients were fully 
informed, few would choose sexual reorientation interventions. Similarly, the ethics o f health 
care providers have been questioned on the premise that it is unethical to offer treatments that 
are expensive, show only modest success rates and are associated with a risk o f depression 
and anxiety about a state or condition that is not an illness, disease or disorder. Health care 
providers, and in particular mental health care providers, must resolve many of the following 
ethical dilemmas: “Is the process of informed consent different for sexual reorientation than 
for other procedures and interventions?” “Is the informed consent process different with 
sexual reorientation intervention for children and adolescents than for other procedures and 
interventions offered to this group?” “Is a provider unethical if he provides sexual 
reorientation interventions to adolescents despite prohibitive recommendations by the 
American Academy o f Pediatrics and the American Academy o f Family Physicians?” “To 
what extent do the provider’s personal opinions and values regarding non-heterosexual 
orientations and behavior impact how the provider deals with patients?”
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Over the years, health care providers in America have fallen victim to terrorist tactics and 
assassination by radical anti-abortionists. If future biotechnological advances include 
abortion for pre-homosexual fetuses or allow parents to select homosexual offspring in utero 
or before fertilization, health care providers might again find themselves the target o f 
terrorists and radical political and religious groups. The ethics of how a provider proceeds in 
the face of such risks to self and to patients is pertinent to this discussion
Non-Health Care Providers and Religious Groups
The services offered by religious groups have long overlapped those provided by mental 
health professionals. Examples include bereavement support, marriage and couple 
counseling, premarital counseling, and child rearing and parenting support. Because o f the 
long-established tradition of a separation o f church and state in America, few if any civil 
authorities or professional groups from within health care comment on the extent or content of 
such interactions. There is a small number of care providers with formal training in one o f the 
mental health or medical disciplines as well as in divinity or theology, or with the skills 
necessary to work as chaplains. An even smaller group of health care providers is trained in a 
program specifically designed to integrate studies in psychology or counseling with theology 
or divinity. The professional ethics of providers with formal training in one of the mental 
health or medical fields is addressed by both legislation and policy statements on the part of 
professional groups appropriate to their training.
The Ex-Gay movement exploded onto the public scene in America in 1996 and peaked in 
popularity in 1998. At that time, it included a network of 300 or more church groups across 
America offering a variety of strategies designed to help gays and lesbians to change their 
sexual orientation through prayer, scripture, attending support groups, and undergoing 
psychological and pseudo-psychological interventions. A nation-wide advertising campaign 
was launched to recruit non-heterosexuals into the movement and was followed by a mixed 
response in the general press and a vocal negative response from gay and lesbian circles.
The formulas for changing from non-heterosexual behavior and identity promoted by the 
Ex-Gay movement and its ‘franchise’ affiliates appear to vary considerably, as do the 
proposed origins o f non-heterosexual behaviors and orientations. The two predominant 
models include:
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• The ‘sin/vice/addiction’ model with interventions such as prayer, abstinence, 
individual sponsorship and support groups often modeled on the 12 step programs for 
alcohol and drug addiction.
• The masculine deficit model which emphasizes individual therapy or a mentor that is a 
strong heterosexual male figure that ‘re-parents’, together with a regime of structured 
masculine heterosexual activities.
Critics have described the latter intervention strategy as team sports and hunting therapy. 
Those opposed to the Ex-Gay movement emphasize the lack of research to support the 
effectiveness o f the strategies and the risk of escalating untreated anxiety and depression if the 
subject fails or relapses.
The Ex-Gay phenomenon has had the effect of distancing sexual reorientation from 
professional health care policy makers and the politics o f health care. This results in an 
increase in the autonomy of providers, possibly to the detriment of the autonomy and safety of 
participants. Critics question the informed consent process and lack of professional 
supervision. Some former Ex-Gay participants describe a near cult-like environment, with 
participants being ‘brainwashed’ into accepting heterosexuality. Defenders of the Ex-Gay 
movement emphasize the right of Americans to religious freedom while reporting extremely 
positive success rates.
The movement of mainstream contemporary medical and mental health professionals away 
from sexual reorientation interventions occurs at a time when the gay and lesbian cultures are 
increasingly viewed as an established fixture within contemporary Western society. I f  gay 
and lesbian politicos are successful in extinguishing sexual reorientation interventions by 
medicine or mental health professionals through policy development, legislative 
developments or ethical proclamations, the practitioners might find themselves in situations 
similar to that o f American abortionists prior to legalization. Likewise, non-heterosexuals in 
search of reorientation might find themselves having to seek out risky clandestine 
interventions by poorly trained ‘back-street’ clinicians or avaricious nonprofessionals.
Non-Heterosexual Political Movement
High profile issues spark high reaction. An organized political movement by gays and 
lesbians began in the early twentieth century and is still active today. The political movement
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for gay men and lesbians has, at times, been completely separate, independent and with 
divergent goals, and at others integrated and unified in pursuit of a common purpose. The 
initial goals for the homophile movement (composed o f gay men) in America focused on the 
decriminalization of homosexual behavior (Stein, 1996). To this end, the homophile 
movement was aggressive in its efforts to perpetuate and disseminate the medical view that 
homosexuality was a medical (genetic, biological, environmental, and/or psychiatric) 
condition and not a deficit of morality or character deserving o f punishment. The beginnings 
of a lesbian political movement in America was linked to feminism and the women’s rights 
movement.
By the middle of the twentieth century, homosexual behavior (sodomy) was viewed as a 
victimless crime and was rarely criminally prosecuted in America, although in many 
jurisdictions the laws remained on the books. Nonetheless, gays and lesbians continued to be 
both legally and illegally harassed by law enforcement agencies on the basis o f cross- 
dressing, prostitution, and alcohol related statutes. Meanwhile, women having acquired the 
right to vote had shifted to a reformulation of gender roles and economic equality (equal pay 
for equal work).
The 1960s in America were years o f great social upheaval. The fight for racial equality 
took center stage, followed by that for gender equality. Following the moral model used 
effectively by racial minorities and women, the gay and lesbian political movement 
abandoned the pathologizing medical model o f homosexuality that had successfully 
decriminalized homosexuality in favor o f an equality model. The gay and lesbian movement 
aggressively and successfully lobbied the American psychiatric community for the removal of 
homosexuality as a ‘diagnostic entity’ and simultaneously undertook to teach the American 
public that homosexuality was not a medical or moral disorder, that gays and lesbians do not 
prey on children, that gays and lesbians pay taxes, are civic-minded, and entitled to all the 
benefits and privileges of any other citizen.
HIV and AIDS appeared on the scene in the early 1980s and gay and lesbian politicos 
focused intensively on crisis management for the remainder o f the century. Issues at hand 
included treatment funding, research funding, testing privacy, civil rights, public education 
and the prevention of hate crimes and discrimination. The Ex-Gays and the ‘moral majority’ 
(conservative Christian right) were viewed as bigoted homophobic movements that directly
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opposed the gay and lesbian political agenda, perpetuated self-hatred among non­
heterosexuals, and threatened to reverse all the social gains acquired in the last half century 
for gays and lesbians. In response, the gay, lesbian and bisexual community aggressively 
lobbied medicine and mental health agencies to oppose and declare unethical any efforts at 
sexual reorientation.
Medical and M ental Health Professional Organizations
The psychiatric community came under intense political pressure in the early 1970s to 
remove homosexuality as a diagnosis from the DSM, both from within its own organization 
and from the gay, lesbian and bisexual community. Soon afterwards, the American 
psychoanalytic community came under scrutiny for policies that discriminated against gay 
and lesbian professionals in terms o f access to training and teaching positions within the field 
(Stein, 1996).
In response to conservative Christian movements, such as the Moral Majority, Exodus, and 
Ex-Gays, the gay and lesbian community aggressively lobbied the professional institutions of 
the American pediatric, family medicine, psychiatry, psychology, social work and counseling 
vocations throughout the last decade of the twentieth century for a ban on reorientation 
interventions and a declaration that the providers o f sexual reorientation interventions were 
unethical professionals (NARTH, 1991). All of the professional groups thus lobbied have 
responded to the political pressure by releasing a range o f policy statements, feet sheets, 
guidelines, declarations, and public service announcements that fall short of the goals o f the 
gay and lesbian community.
NARTH (National Association for Research on Homosexuality and Therapy) is the only 
professional group specifically established to support the provision o f sexual reorientation 
interventions by mental health professionals. NARTH persistently criticizes the response of 
the medical and mental health professional organizations to the lobbying of the gay, lesbian 
and bisexual groups, accusing them of catering to gays and lesbians at the expense of sexual 
reorientation providers and non-lesbigay non-heterosexuals who seek sexual reorientation.
When widespread and enduring social conflict exists it is often to medicine that people 
look for guidance. The role of medicine in the initiation and perpetuation of social change is 
unclear, particularly when public values and morality become involved, and the issues at hand
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are not directly related to mortality and health morbidity. Medicine must always listen to the 
community it serves and adapt itself accordingly to preserve and promote essential public 
trust essential to the fiduciary relationship between patients and their health providers. 
However, it is not clear whether organized medicine is prepared to participate as a tool for 
social change. When considering such a role, organized medicine must listen to the 
community as a whole and resist being ‘used’ by one social group to achieve specific political 
goals at the expense of other groups.
Stakeholder’s Principles Summarized:
Autonomy
The bioethical principle o f autonomy identifies the fully informed and competent patient as 
the best decision-maker for himself. The patient (not the provider, health system, socio­
political groups, legislature or courts) should be in charge of choosing between available 
medical treatments and non-medical treatments or no treatment. Policy-makers and political 
groups should not influence the accessibility o f safe and effective interventions for the 
purpose of socio-political motives or to resolve social injustices. Alternatively, it is argued 
that because of social, familial, and religious pressures; patients are often unable to be fully 
autonomous or fully informed on the subject o f sexual reorientation It has been argued that 
the principle of non-maleficence outweighs patient autonomy, given the increased incidence 
of shame, depression, and suicide prior to and during sexual reorientation procedures and 
given the low potential for successful reorientation. It has also been argued by thoase 
opposed to sexual reorientation that non-maleficence and justice should outweigh misguided 
patient autonomy. O’Neill’s paper on consent more fully explores these issues.
Beneficence
Reorientation to heterosexuality offers multiple positive psychological, social, and health 
benefits. The individual provider is obligated to assist the patient in the task o f weighing the 
potential risks and benefits o f any particular course of action (autonomy) in any given clinical 
situation. Patients are entitled to pursue legitimate efforts to improve the quality o f their lives
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(individually and socially), irrespective o f the value system o f their health providers and their 
affiliated professional organizations or socio-political movements. Alternatively, it has been 
argued that the risk o f harm (maleficence) far outweighs the potential benefits (beneficence) 
o f sexual reorientation interventions, given the low rates o f success. Gay affirming therapies 
are identified as far safer and more successful at resolving issues o f sexual orientation in a 
way that produces a higher long-term quality of life.
Justice
Health providers must acknowledge and respect patient values even when they contradict 
or are in opposition to those o f the provider or the predominant culture. It is unjust for 
professional organizations to develop policies that address the needs of one sub-culture in a 
society at the expense of another. It is unjust for health care policy makers to prioritize one 
“value-system” over another. Policy makers must allow providers and patients to resolve 
these issues on an individual basis, as they are too complex for broad sweeping profession or 
public policies. Alternatively, the mere existence of sexual reorientation interventions within 
the structure o f the health care system has been said to reinforce on a societal level unfounded 
negative attitudes and false beliefs about non-heterosexuals. It is argued that it is unjust for 
health care to participate intentionally or unintentionally in the perpetuation o f homophobia, 
homonegativity or heterosexism.
Non-Maleficence
The negative psychological, social and health consequences o f non-heterosexuality are 
argued to be both real and significant. Gay affirming therapies have the goal o f increasing a 
patient’s long-term exposure to these risks. The principle of doing no harm has been 
contrasted with the provision of gay affirming therapies, and the same principle has been used 
to argue against the provision o f sexual reorientation interventions. However, research data 
has not identified any predictable, long term negative consequences to either successful or 
unsuccessful gay affirming or sexual reorienting interventions. It has been argued that sexual 
reorientation reinforces shame and internalizes homophobia and self-loathing within patients,
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and that these problems increase when patients are unsuccessful in their attempts to change.
It is argued that harmful self-perceptions are reinforced and can produce lasting and profound 
negative consequences for the individual’s psyche.
Locus of Decision Making
The fulcrum for the resolution of complex ethical decisions has traditionally been the bond 
between the patient and the clinician. This practice has long been in place and is supported by 
the principles o f patient autonomy and competent informed consent. Autonomy must be 
balanced with provider paternalism. This balance varies dramatically from one situation to 
another (including cultural factors, health/disease status, competence, risk, and the complexity 
of the intervention planned). Professional organizations have an established role in 
monitoring members o f the profession, both to insure public safety and to promote the goals 
and public esteem of the profession itself. It can be problematic when professional 
organizations work towards their own goals to the detriment o f the patient or when 
professional organizations undertake to promote the goals of one social group over another to 
the detriment of members o f the profession and their patients alike. Courts and legislatures 
are particularly poorly prepared for managing ethical problems in medicine because decisions 
often lag behind technology and science and because the needs of the individual are too often 
lost in balancing political and social objectives.
This discussion of the stakeholders and their issues is concluded with a reminder that many 
these issues are not supported by evidence. This is in part because the debate on sexual 
reorientation interventions is largely concerned with values, but also because the values (both 
personal and political) of researchers and clinicians have dramatically colored the clinical 
landscape.
28
Section II: Morally Relevant Facts and Fictions
Much o f the debate surrounding sexual reorientation has been public and has drawn on 
intentionally and unintentionally value laden beliefs and assumptions that at times are hotly 
contested and at others quietly integrated into the discussion as fact. The chapters in this 
section explore the factual state of the debate in the twenty-first century as well as the history 
behind many o f the fictions still firmly rooted in our society.
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Chapter 3: Homosexual Incidence and Prevalence
Rarely have people been so cruel to their fellows than in condemnation and punishment of 
those accused of so-called sexual perversion. Penalties have included: imprisonment, torture, 
the loss o f life or limb, banishment, blackmail, social ostracism, the loss o f social prestige, 
renunciation by friends and families, the loss of position in school or business, severe 
penalties meted out for the convictions o f men serving in the armed forces, public 
condemnation by emotionally insecure and vindictive judges, and the torture endured by those 
who live in the constant fear that their non-conforming sexual behavior will be exposed to 
public view. These penalties have been imposed on persons who have done no damage to the 
property or physical bodies of others, but who have simply failed to conform to mandated 
custom. Only religious and racial persecutions match such savagery (Kinsey et al, 1948).
The pressure to conform to cultural, religious, familial, and internalized expectations 
dramatically impacts the accurate assessment of the incidence and prevalence of marginalized 
sexualities. Yet any discussion of an ethical problem such as sexual reorientation requires 
that the problem be quantified to demonstrate the impact on the population and health care 
consumers.
A grasp on the magnitude of homosexual incidence and prevalence is important in order 
also to place the issues surrounding sexual reorientation in a twenty-first century context.
Facts too can diminish the political and social drama that colors public debate. Because 
issues o f sexuality engender such strong emotional response, often required is an effort to 
reconcile our impression o f reality with the facts. This chapter focuses on the data relating to 
homosexuality that has been collected over the last fifty years. In doing so it brings into stark 
relief the difficulties encountered in defining, describing, quantifying, and securing a common 
language for mainstream and marginalized sexuality and illuminates the public debate 
surrounding sexual reorientation which has often included value-laden exaggerations and 
misrepresentations.
In 1948, Alfred Kinsey estimated that as many as 40% o f all males engaged in homosexual 
activity in any one year, saying that the judge who considers the case o f the male who has 
been arrested for homosexual activity should keep in mind that nearly 40% of all other males 
in the town could be arrested for homosexual activity that had taken place within that year
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(Kinsey, 1948). His views were immediately attacked by Edmund Bergler (1957), who said 
that:
Kinsey’s erroneous conclusions pertaining to homosexuality will be 
politically and propagandistically used against the United States abroad, 
stigmatizing the nation as a whole in a whisper campaign, especially since there 
are no comparable statistics available for other countries (p.35).
For many years, it has been widely taught that homosexuality exists in all populations at a 
steady rate o f 10%, as was established by the landmark study by Kinsey et al in 1948. This 
assertion has come under debate following the appearance of probability surveys of sexual 
behavior in the Americas and Europe (Michaels, 1996). These surveys, largely undertaken in 
response to the AIDS crisis, have produced estimates of the prevalence of various measures o f 
homosexuality much lower than those from the famous Kinsey studies (Kinsey et al, 1948, 
1953).
Determining the prevalence of homosexuality is not as simple as one might think.
Although recent large scale, sophisticated population survey o f sexuality (Billy et al, 1993; 
Catania et al, 1992; Laumann et al, 1994; Spira et al, 1993; Wellings et al, 1994) represents a 
major advance in the production of prevalence data, a great deal of confusion remains about 
surveys, what questions they can answer, and how one should interpret the results they 
provide. As is the case with any social data, there is a substantial risk of manipulation and 
misrepresentation for the purpose of political and social propaganda.
Behavior and Identity
Distortion o f data occurs in many ways. The most direct and efficient way to color any 
analysis o f incidence and prevalence data is to manipulate the definitions used. Current 
ethical debate is fraught with intentional and unintentional distortion subtly delivered through 
redefinitions that support political agendas. The words behavior and identity are not 
interchangeable yet data on behavior is often presented as data on identity, when the two 
actually paint very different pictures when used with accurate definitions. Likewise any 
ethical discussion that includes references to incidence and prevalence must acknowledge the 
impact o f defining and redefining sexuality for quantification and qualification.
The literature observes this. In a discussion o f prevalence, Michaels notes another 
example:
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... it is important to avoid confusing homosexuality with the notion of the 
homosexual. The latter is closely tied to the search for a single estimate of the 
number or proportion o f (true or real) homosexual individuals. However, the 
presumption built into this approach merits careful consideration. It presumes that 
two clearly delineated groups exist: homosexual persons and non-homosexual 
persons. Furthermore, it presumes that the distinguishing quality or trait used to 
classify people is homogenous, both in individual lives and across historical 
periods. Typically, researchers have used indicators such as the presence or 
absence o f any homosexual experience or exclusive homosexual experience. 
Although nothing is inherently wrong with this approach, the danger arises when 
one moves - often quite subtly - from simple and arbitrary operations o f grouping 
to conceptual distinctions between homosexual and non-homosexual individuals 
as types o f persons and from there to the inference of all sorts o f other 
psychological, social, and sexual implications for individuals in one group or 
another. In response to recent surveys, the media and others have treated 
measures of homosexual behavior (e.g. any same-gender partners in specific time 
periods or ever), desire (e.g. any attraction to persons of one’s own gender), and 
identity (e.g. any self-identification as homosexual) as if they were mutually 
equivalent, and also to the conceptual entity that is the ‘homosexual or gay 
population’. Therefore, in interpreting research results, it is very important to be 
attentive to what is actually being measured and reported (p.43).
In one of the more creative innovations devised to evaluate prevalence of homosexuality, 
in the 1960s, psychologist Kurt Freund (1965) invented ‘penile plethysmograph.’ This 
instrument measures the changes in penile volume and pressure that occur in response to 
erotic stimuli, offering scientists a means to quantify sexual arousal directly. A similar device 
has been developed for women (Sintchak & Geer, 1975). According to Freund (1974), the 
great majority o f men show plethysmographic responses to pictures o f naked adult women or 
to pictures of naked adult men, but very few, if any, were bisexual by plethysmographic 
criteria. LeVay (1996), however cautions against generalizing from Freund’s results because 
of the lack of broad random sampling o f the population. Also, a similar study of women at 
the University o f Amsterdam produced very different results (Laan et al, 1996).
Homosexual demographic evaluation relating to AIDS has supplied new, more accurate 
information on sex choice prevalence worldwide. Research activities o f public health and 
academia as related to gays, lesbians, and persons living with HIV and AIDS have come 
under significant social and political scrutiny and therefore often adhere to more stringent 
standards. An accurate and realistic understanding of sexual behaviors in various populations 
(high and low risk) is no longer a curious academic exercise but an available and essential
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public health tool for the management o f an epidemic (Carroll, 1996). Sadly, discussants 
often quote textbook data several decades old as gospel.
Kinsey and Company
For more than 40 years, the principal data on the prevalence o f homosexual activity in the 
United States were the two volumes written by Kinsey and his colleagues after World War II, 
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (Kinsey et al, 1948) and Sexual Behavior in the Human 
Female (Kinsey et al, 1953). Kinsey’s work is cited as the basis for the widely accepted 
notion that 10% o f the population is homosexual, although Kinsey never reported this and 
explicitly argued against this type of categorization (Michaels, 1996). Kinsey is by far the 
most frequently quoted author on the subject o f sexual behavior, but by today’s standards his 
works would be considered wanting in scientific rigor. All of Kinsey’s respondents were 
volunteers actively solicited by the researchers with a preponderance o f subjects from male- 
only institutions (prisons, the military, private schools and college) (Gebhard & Johnson,
1979; Kinsey et al, 1948). This process o f self-selection and sampling that fails to reflect the 
larger general population makes Kinsey’s data difficult to interpret or extrapolate from.
Kinsey rejected the notion that people were divided into the categories o f heterosexual, 
homosexual, and bisexual. Instead, he believed that everyone was capable o f both 
homosexual and heterosexual responses and that individuals should be described in terms of 
the distribution of their total experiences along a seven-point ‘heterosexual-homosexual’ 
continuum, from 0 to 6 (Michaels, 1996). Despite problems with the population sampling, the 
Kinsey scale profoundly changed the way sexuality was conceptualized for the remainder of 
the century.
Of the more than 4,000 white men who were studied by Kinsey et al, 37% had had “ ... at 
least some overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm between adolescence and old 
age,” 25% had had “ ... more than incidental homosexual experience or reactions for at least 3 
years between the ages o f 16 and 55,” (values of 2 through 6), 10% were “ ... more or less 
exclusively homosexual for at least 3 years between the ages of 16 and 55” (values 5 and 6) 
and 4% were “exclusively homosexual throughout their lives, after the onset of adolescence” 
(value of 6) (Kinsey et al, 1948). In the study on sexual behavior in women, Kinsey et al did 
not provide as extensive a summary o f the data, but did state that rates of homosexuality were
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much lower for women - about one-half to one-third o f those for men. For example, only 
13% of the women had had a sexual experience to orgasm with another woman, in contrast to 
37% o f men (Kinsey et al, 1953).
Michaels notes that although there is no necessary relationship between prevalence and 
normality or health in any moral or biological sense, behaviors engaged in by more than one- 
third of the male population are, at least, common. This finding has often been used to argue 
for the normality and acceptability o f homosexuality (Michaels, 1996). Gebbard, one of 
Kinsey’s main collaborators and the director of the Institute for Sex Research that Kinsey 
founded, constructed a reasoned estimate that “ ... about 4% o f ... white college-educated 
adult males are predominantly homosexual” and that “... in the total adult female population, 
the incidence o f predominantly homosexual individuals is between 1% and 2%, probably 
nearer 1%” (Gebbard, 1972). Gagnon and Simon (1973) reanalyzed the Kinsey data to show 
that much o f the reported homosexual behavior occurred in adolescence.
Sexology After Kinsey
Although major statistical problems (the lack o f a probability-base sample) were 
authoritatively identified within a few years o f the publication of the first Kinsey volume 
(Cochran et al, 1954), it took a long time for researchers to attempt to replicate and improve 
on the work of Kinsey et al. Only after the emergence o f the AIDS crisis did governments, 
social scientists, and private foundations begin to become acutely aware o f the lack o f 
adequate information about sexual behavior (Institute o f Medicine, 1986).
Four decades after the seminal Kinsey work more research was available. A review and 
comparison of the data from 1988 through 1990 from the General Social Survey (GSS), the 
1970 Kinsey Institute study, and a 1989 study o f male-male sexual behavior in Dallas was 
published by Rogers and Turner in 1991. They concluded: “... roughly 5 to 7% of American 
men ‘report’ some same-gender sexual contact in adulthood... that reported prevalence is 
somewhat higher for men living in urbanized areas. These survey estimates ... are best treated 
as lower bounds o f the actual prevalence o f such contact”
Because of AIDS, governments finally got on the bandwagon and, according to Michaels, 
initiated major surveys o f adult sexual behavior in the early 1990’s. Only France followed 
through to completion since conservative governments in Great Britain and the United States
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withdrew support for these national surveys, which were then completed with private 
foundation support (Michaels, 1996). The surveys all used probability samples and, in France 
and Great Britain, were based on large national samples (20,055 and 18,876 persons, 
respectively); the American study (Laumann et al, 1994) had a smaller sample (3,432 
persons).
Recent Surveys
The major focus o f these more recent large-scale national sex surveys has been on behavior 
(ACSF Investigators 1992; Johnson et al, 1992; Laumann et al, 1994; Spira et al 1993; 
Wellings et al, 1994), with most o f the data on homosexuality based on responses to questions 
about sexual partners and practices. In the National Health and Social Life Survey (NHSLS), 
the most comprehensive probability-based survey o f sexual behavior ever carried out in the 
United States (Laumann et al, 1994), questions pertaining to homosexuality were asked, 
covering three dimensions: behavior, desire and identity.
‘Behavior’ mainly refers to same-gender sexual experience or partners since the age of 18. 
‘Desire’ was measured by combining responses to two items in the survey: sexual attraction 
to same-gender individuals and the appeal o f having sex with someone of the same gender. 
Although homosexual ‘identity’ is a complex phenomenon, in the NHSLS study, it referred 
simply to a self-definition as homosexual or bisexual (or a variant o f the same, such as gay or 
lesbian). Desire and identity were asked about in the present tense, although in a global way 
(p.56).
In the NHSLS, some persons reported one o f the three dimensions of homosexuality but 
not the other two. For example, there were both men and women who reported sexual 
experience with persons o f their own gender but no same-gender desire or identity. This 
could occur in many scenarios, including situational homosexuality in the absence of opposite 
gender partners as occurs in prisons and other single gender institutions. In addition, in the 
United States as in many cultures and groups, men who play the ‘masculine’ or ‘active’ role 
in sex with other men (i.e. the inserting partner in fellatio or anal intercourse) have not 
historically been considered homosexual and may not think of themselves as homosexual 
(Almaquer, 1991; Alonso & Koreck, 1989; Carrier, 1980; Chauncey, 1994). On the other 
hand, it was not surprising to find persons who were aware o f sexual feelings toward
35
individuals o f their own gender or who found the idea o f having sex with someone of their 
own gender appealing but who have never actually had this experience and who do not 
consider themselves to be either homosexual or bisexual (Michaels, 1996).
Identity is conceptually distinct from either desire or behavior. Conceivably, 
there are individuals who have either had homosexual sex or have experienced 
some degree of homosexual desire but who do not consider themselves either 
homosexual or bisexual. It is harder to comprehend persons who say that they are 
homosexual or bisexual but who do not experience homosexual desire, because a 
self-definition as homosexual or bisexual usually develops over time and depends 
at least on previous conscious desire. However, we may see an example of this in 
cases o f strong identification with gay or lesbian culture or politics (e.g. the 
‘political’ lesbian or ‘woman-identified woman’). Homosexual culture and 
politics often seem to emphasize a general opposition to ‘straightness’ or 
‘normality’ rather than specific sexual practices and desires; this might lead some 
to identify themselves as ‘gay’ or ‘queer’ independently o f feelings or experience 
(p.44).
The 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey results, which categorize prevalence 
o f homosexuality by identity, behavior, and desire are presented in the following chart:
WOMEN MEN
Only 0% Identity Only 2%
Identity + Behavior 0% Identity + Behavior 0%
Identity + Desire 1% Identity + Desire 1%
Identity Identity + Desire + 
Behavior
15% Identity + Desire + Behavior 24%
Behavior Only 13% Behavior Only 22%
Behavior + Desire 13% Behavior + Desire 6%
Desire Only 59% Desire Only 44%
Figure 1. Interrelationship of same-gender sexual Behavior, desire, and identity in women (left; n=
and men (right; n=143, N=1410), ages 18-59 years, in the United States who reported any adult same-gender 
sexuality. Results are based on data from the National Health and Social Life Survey in 1992 (Laumann et al., 
1994). Behavior referred to same-gender sexual experience or partners since age 18 years. Desire and identity 
were asked about in the present. Desire was measured by combining responses to two items in the survey: 
sexual attraction to persons of one’s own gender and appeal of having sex with a person of the same gender. 
Identity referred to self-definition as homosexual or bisexual (or a variant such as gay or lesbian).
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Prevalence by Social and Demographic Group
Having found a medium for definition o f exactly who a  homosexual is and by what 
measure the appellation is determined other variables are encountered which affect statistics. 
Reported rates o f homosexuality vary according to many social and demographic variables, 
including age, marital status, education, religion, race, and whether or not participants reside 
in urban areas (Michaels, 1996). The examination of features o f sexuality in the context of 
social and demographic factors can be complex. The temporal order o f influence may vary, 
as gender and race clearly predate sexual experiences. Variables such as education, religion, 
and urban migration may be at least partially the result of sexuality, and the observed 
difference may be the result o f reciprocal or interactive processes (Michaels, 1996).
The results compiled so far do demonstrate a high degree of social organization of 
homosexuality, which appears to be unevenly distributed in American society. Similar 
patterns of variability in prevalence exist in other Western industrial countries such as 
England and France (Spira et al, 1993; Welling et al, 1994). The degree o f social variability 
this indicates should alert one to the importance o f the social environment and its influence on 
and the complex task o f describing the prevalence o f homosexuality (Michaels, 1996).
Stability of Sexual Orientation
Whether homosexuality and heterosexuality are objectively separate categories (as the 
NHSLS results indicate may be the case in men), or arbitrary divisions of a spectrum o f 
sexual orientation (as seems to hold true for women in the same report) and as Le Vay 
maintains, there remains a question of the stability of sexual orientation over the life span. 
Instability o f sexual orientation has been used persuasively to support the role o f sexual 
reorientation interventions. Rust (1993) reports the results of a study o f several hundred 
women, in which it appears that a significant number o f women shift from a bisexual identity 
to a lesbian identity, with some fluctuating between the two. Rust also notes, however, that it 
is uncommon for a woman who has adopted a bisexual or lesbian identity to subsequently 
adopt a heterosexual identity.
A similar study of gay identified men, (Lever, 1994) indicated that many (about 40%) had 
identified as bisexual at a relatively early age (16 to 25 years). This was seen as a transitional 
phase towards the adoption of a homosexual identity. Le Vay concludes that sexual
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orientation as measured by identity often changes, usually in the direction of heterosexual to 
bisexual to homosexual. Le Vay believes that this process of change is clearly related to the 
challenges of the coming out process for men. On the other hand, he believes that some 
women truly change their sexual orientation from heterosexual to homosexual (often late in 
life).
Summary
Although new studies reveal a lower prevalence than the 10% widely believed to be valid 
after the initial Kinsey reports, other aspects o f the reports are still largely upheld (higher rates 
o f homosexuality in men than in women and in adolescents than in adults) (Michaels, 1996). 
The seven point Kinsey scale (0-6) is still widely found in literature on sexual behavior.
Significant social stigma associated with non-heterosexuality remains and there is therefore 
a constant risk of under-reporting non-heterosexuality. Interviewing skill clearly impacts the 
quantity and quality o f under reporting and may confound comparisons between studies and 
over time. Ethical discussions about sexual reorientation that focus on efficacy are plagued 
by similar problems. Ethical discussions that are built on a foundation of unstable research 
are inherently unstable.
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Chapter 4: Cross Cultural Sexuality
The Western medical community is charged with the responsibility o f caring for all 
society’s members, not just the most vocal groups. The two groups most vocal in the ethical 
and bioethical discussion of sexual reorientation have been the middle-class conservative 
religious and the middle-class lesbigays. American and Western European societies are no 
longer culturally homogenous and have not been for centuries.
The emotional and intellectual significance o f sexuality for any one individual is related to 
an integration of the influences of the ‘culture o f origin’ and the ‘dominant culture’ that one 
finds oneself in at any given period in time. Any ethical or bioethical discussion must 
acknowledge cross-cultural sexualities and the redefining of normal between cultural sub­
groups. Contrasting sexuality between cultures can also help to illuminate some of our 
frequently inappropriate assumptions about the interplay o f biology and environment. 
Pertinent revelations from a review of cross-cultural sexuality also serve to root out 
assumptions held by academic and professional persons who carry their own inherent cultural 
biases.
Cross-cultural issues are unavoidable when so many intra-cultural conflicts exist. The 
normality o f homosexuality and bisexuality in Western medicine has been under almost 
continuous debate since the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM). The study o f homosexuality has often been 
driven by the effort to posit its ultimate causes. From Freud’s late nineteenth century 
discussions o f same-sex desire as an ‘inversion’, characteristic o f ‘psychic hermaphrodites’ 
(Freud, 1962), to the large-scale survey studies o f Kinsey et al (1948) in the mid twentieth 
century, the idea that same-sex practices were frequent but usually transitional became 
normalized. The cause of homosexuality remains an important source o f inspiration for the 
present explosion of study in anthropology, social history, and studies of gay men and 
lesbians demonstrating the significance of same-sex roles, institutions, and subcultures (Herdt, 
1983).
Herdt (1994) warns that we must be aware o f the fundamental deconstruction o f the 
construct of homosexuality as a Western, typically culture-bound concept, insofar as it 
implies a certain social role and identity deriving largely from the nineteenth century, and not 
present in many other cultures and historical periods. Efforts to understand the meanings of
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same-sex behavior must therefore take account o f local roles, knowledge, and practices 
(Herdt, 1988). Strong preconceptions about homosexuality include the perception that it is 
always deviant or perverse, that it is rare or absent from most societies, or that, if it occurs, 
same-sex behavior is stigmatized or punished (Herdt 1984, 1993; Mead 1961).
At the turn of the century, Freud (1962) challenged such views by suggesting that 
homosexual activity occurred in various archaic and tribal societies. He maintained that 
sexual behavior was more heterogeneous than was believed, even in Western society. Freud’s 
famous phrase ‘polymorphous perverse’ was meant to indicate the potential o f humans to 
manifest sexual acts with both genders, which behavior was subject to social regulation. 
Kinsey et al (1948) provided massive empirical evidence supporting this idea in their study of 
American society, demonstrating the prevalence of homosexual behavior, with 37% o f all 
men in America having experienced significant homosexual contact at some point in their 
lives. The effect was to disengage sex from reproductive behavior and to indicate how 
homosexual-heterosexual dichotomies are more an idealized cultural model than an empirical 
fact (Herdt, 1988).
In cross-cultural studies, a similar point was made soon afterward in the classic study by 
Ford and Beach (1951), who found that homosexual behavior was socially acceptable and 
normative for certain people in 64% of the 76 societies studied. Carrier (1980) has gone 
further and divided cultures around the world into those that are approving, disapproving, or 
neutral with regard to homosexual acts, illustrating that societies differ greatly in their 
conceptions of homosexuality. The North American value system, which negatively 
stigmatizes same-sex eroticism, is very different than that of many societies (Herdt, 1988).
Conceptual Refinements
The struggle for a working definition o f homosexuality has provoked elaborate speculation 
from academics. The theoretical separation o f phylogenetically universal determinants from 
socio-culturally variable elements (e.g. masculinity and femininity) in human sexuality has 
been raised as possibly relevant when defining and describing non-heterosexuality (Money & 
Ehrhard, 1972; Stoller, 1980). Another apparently difficult concept, which if grasped could 
aid the understanding and meaning of homosexuality is the difference between sexual identity 
and sexual behavior (Herdt, 1988). That someone engages in a particular gendered sexual act
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does not mean that he or she has the characteristics associated with the general category of 
homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual (Herdt, 1989). Thus a woman may marry and have 
children but regard her sexual orientation as lesbian or a man may engage in sexual activity 
with males but regard himself as heterosexual (Money & Ehrhard, 1972; Plummer, 1975).
We must, therefore, distinguish homosexuality as a state o f being - an essence - rather than 
determined necessarily from same-sex acts and transient relationships, which may not involve 
homoerotic sex-object choice and intentionality in the same way (Stoller, 1980; Stoller & 
Herdt, 1985). Stakeholders and their critics in the debate around sexual reorientation are 
often poorly equipped to manage such refinements in the way sexuality is organized. Culture 
is shaped first and foremost by thought.
A recent survey reveals that these conceptual refinements could help us to cluster 
culturally determined same-sex patterns found historically and cross-culturally into four 
forms, giving the academics, at least, something to agree on: Age-Structured Same-Sex 
Practice, Gender Transformed Same-Sex Practice, Role o f Class-Specialized Same-Sex 
Practice and Gay and Lesbian-Egalitarian Same-Sex Practice (Herdt, 1987).
Age-Structured Same-Sex Practice
Age-Structured Same-Sex Practice defines institutionalized same-sex acts between males 
of unequal ages. These acts are common but unevenly distributed throughout the world 
(Adam, 1986). They are customary practices, usually obligatory for older and younger males, 
which are associated with normative gender development (Herdt, 1988). Age-structured 
homoeroticism occurred in ancient China, Japan, Islam, and in certain Indo-European 
traditions, but the most famous example is known from our cultural ancestors, the ancient 
Greeks (Dover, 1978). Ritualized female homosexual contacts were also known among the 
Greeks (Herdt, 1988).
In the tribal worlds of contemporary non-Westem people, age-structured homosexuality is 
known to exist in Africa, lowlands South America, the Pacific Islands, and elsewhere, but it 
has been most studied in New Guinea and the South Seas (Herdt, 1984). Here, as occurs 
among the Sambia of highland New Guinea, age-structured homoerotic activities are 
implemented through initiation rites, when Sambian boys aged 7-10 years are inducted into
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ritual and military organizations. Sambian males experience many years o f these practices, 
first as semen recipients and later, in adolescence, as semen donors. At fatherhood, the 
Sambia forbid additional boy-inseminating practices (Herdt, 1981). These males experience 
both passive (fellator) and active (fellated) homosexual roles in the course of their lives, yet 
they, like the Greeks, nonetheless marry and have children (Herdt, 1987). In some New 
Guinea societies, however, this homoerotic relation with younger males continues throughout 
life, even into old age (Van Baal, 1993). A survey o f all South Seas societies has shown that 
this approved pattern of age-structured boy-inseminating occurs in between 10% and 20% of 
cultures and is probably an ancient practice, the result o f migrations and adaptations over 
several thousands of years (Herdt, 1993).
Gender-Transformed Same-Sex Practice
A different form of homoerotic practice is based on the adoption and role of the opposite 
sex in a given society (Herdt, 1988). Sometimes it is referred to as ‘institutionalized cross- 
dressing’ or ‘transvestitism’. Gender transformation often begins in childhood, has 
recognized customs associated with it, and is acknowledged and supported by society 
(Blackwood, 1986). The institution of the Berdache among the North American Indians is the 
best-known example, according to Herdt (1988). Some 115 Indian tribes recognized the 
Berdache, in which boys acted and dressed as girls and assumed the roles of girls, with some 
cases in which girls adopted the roles o f boys (Herdt, 1988). Berdache could marry, adopt 
children, acquire property, and participate in most aspects of group life. They were not 
stigmatized and, in some societies, were revered for their special qualities and pragmatic 
socioeconomic contributions to the group (Devereux, 1937; Williams, 1986).
Role of Class-Specialized Same-Sex Practice
A third form of sexual contact occurs in those societies in which engaging in a same-sex 
act is based solely on the entitlements o f a role or status not widely held (Herdt, 1988). One 
of these patterns is divine bisexuality, as described by Herdt. Those who became shamans 
among the Chukchi tribe of Siberia were entitled by supernatural authority to engage in
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homosexual behavior, even though this was generally disapproved of for the wider society 
(Herdt, 1988).
A more recent case is that o f the female factory workers o f the nineteenth century Canton 
Delta in China. Young Chinese women who lived and worked in silk factories formed erotic 
and economic bonds with each other and usually did not marry, even though female 
homosexual contact was disapproved of by the patriarchal culture of China (Blackwood,
1986).
This example reveals how institutionalization, urbanization, and the development o f a class 
system may be antecedents of the category ‘homosexual’ in the modem period (Herdt, 1983). 
Indeed, the identification of the role of the artist with homosexuality and the incipient gay 
culture of eighteenth and nineteenth century England suggest as much (McIntosh, 1968; 
Weeks, 1985).
Gay and Lesbian - Egalitarian Same-Sex Practices
From the late nineteenth century until the present, the emergence o f sexual reform 
movements led to the creation of modem gay and lesbian communities in many parts o f the 
United States (Herdt, 1988). According to Herdt, (1988) this movement represents a fusion of 
public and private, sexual and gender, and sexual and political and a fusion o f role and sexual 
orientation and identity as previously defined. Foucault (1986) showed that social 
constructions o f homosexuality in this sense did not emerge until the medicalization and 
stigmatization of gender-deviant behavior were disputed by social history. Coupling this 
sexual category with early homosexual rights movements in Germany, England, and the 
United States provided the basis for the advocacy of the human right to live a gay lifestyle on 
a permanent basis (Herdt, 1988). Thus, gayness has become a sexual orientation (a particular 
kind of homosexuality), a social identity, and a political movement (Herdt, 1993). Clearly, 
gayness is a new form of homosexual practice, which in its fullest sense is historically unique 
(Herdt, 1988).
The psychosocial conditions o f being gay or lesbian in current society must, therefore, be 
understood in terms o f cultural place and historical time (Herdt, 1988). Being gay or lesbian 
is a commentary on the tendency o f Western societies to dichotomize body and mind,
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masculinity and femininity, and homosexuality and heterosexuality (Herdt, 1988). The 
modern gay movement both reflects and mediates these dualities, indicating that social and 
erotic transformation is a part o f human potential, as suggested by Freud (Herdt, 1988).
The coming out process o f identity development can be seen in the light of this 
commentary (Herdt, 1988). Gay men and lesbians undergo a profound process o f cognitive 
change within themselves, because the self is first placed in a heterosexual category, by virtue 
of growing up in a heterosexual environment, but is then placed into the homosexual or gay 
category that replaced it (Dank, 1971). The study o f adolescents coming out further 
substantiates this trend (Herdt, 1989). The concomitants o f the process are complex and 
multidimensional, but they obviously depend on cultural barriers to the expression of 
homosexuality in society (Hooker, 1965; Weeks, 1985). Western negativity toward 
homosexuality must be seen in the light of a historically determined stigma, the symbols of 
which, in religious and political discourse, are inextricably tied to broader socioeconomic 
issues that we are only beginning to understand (Herdt, 1988).
Impact of Cross-Cultural Issues
The cross-cultural material on human sexuality points to the fragmentary nature o f our 
understanding of sexual development, especially outside Western society. New 
classifications of homosexuality help us to comprehend the variety o f sexual identities in 
terms of context, meaning, and behavioral forms. They are useful heuristics, but they remain 
analogies and models that must inevitably give way to new findings in the future. Recent 
work on bisexuality provides a similar reminder o f the tentativeness of explanatory principles 
regarding sexual development in our own cultural tradition (Herdt, 1983, p.55).
Cross-cultural studies o f sexual development reveal the great contribution of social 
structure and cultural meaning to the expression o f individual sexual desires and relationships. 
Biosocial antecedents and personality factors clearly play a role in this developmental 
process, but at present it is difficult to say how much, in what proportions they are combined 
and with what frequency they exert themselves in sexual development (Ehrhardt et al, 1982).
Policy makers in health care are obliged to acknowledge that cross-cultural issues are often 
overlooked, particularly when struggling to manage the competing interests o f vocal political 
groups within the dominant culture of a given ‘system’. The examination of reorientation
therapies and interventions as products o f a cultural value system and history should reshape 
approaches to the resolution of related ethical and bioethical conflicts.
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Chapter 5: Bisexuality
One o f the reoccurring themes in the debate over sexual reorientation is the denial o f the 
ability to change a true homosexual into a true heterosexual and insistence that any shifts 
resulting from interventions occur from the change of behavior or because the homosexual 
was actually an unidentified bisexual. There is denial of the existence of bisexuality with the 
insistent reformulation that it is only ever a transitional identity state. It is for this reason that 
any thorough discussion o f sexual reorientation must explore bisexuality as both a transitional 
phenomenon and a persistent behavioral and identity state.
Against the backdrop of AIDS related sexuality research the last two decades have 
produced a greater acknowledgment of bisexuality as a valid sexual orientation and identity. 
This is a result o f the changes in how the term ‘bisexuality5 has been defined in theory, 
clinical practice, and research (Fox, 1996). Fox identifies two primary factors that have 
contributed to a more affirmative approach to bisexuality: 1) the elimination of homosexuality 
as pathology plus development o f lesbigay identity theory and 2) the replacement of the 
dichotomous model of sexual orientation with a multidimensional model of sexual 
orientation.
Fluidity
It is no accident that theories o f bisexuality have progressed along side theories o f 
homosexual evolution. The histories of bisexuality and homosexuality are inextricably linked 
(Money, 1987, 1988) and discussion o f one demands consideration o f the other.
DeCecco and Shively (1983) have reconfigured the study of bisexuality in its historical and 
cultural contexts and have written an essay that elucidates this view. Their approach 
combines the historiography of Foucault (1986) with a re-analysis o f the ideas of Freud, 
Kinsey, and others. In reviewing their ideas, it is wise to consider same-sex practices in the 
context o f human sexuality in general (Herdt 1981,1993). DeCecco and Shively (p. 12) 
wonder at the .. willingness o f historians to make a biological concept the foundation of a 
historical inquiry that has consisted o f describing the circumstances under which this identity 
existed in the past.” They see the focus on isolated individuals and the biological motivation 
of essences as imports by the social sciences from medicine and the natural sciences 
(DeCecco & Shively, 1983). According to them: “The structure o f sexual relationships ...
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exists as an intersection o f both the uniquely personal meanings of the individual partners and 
a locus in history and society” (p. 13). The impact of history and society on sexual 
formulations is essential to policy development on sexual reorientation interventions that will 
span decades and impact a variety o f diverse subcultures.
As innovative as the ideas are, these essays do not confront the whole system o f “ ... spirit, 
body, mind, personality, or social relations” that DeCecco and Shively (p. 14) describe as 
ingredients of the concept o f sexual identity. DeCecco and Shively, Hoffrnan (1983), Paul 
(1983), Herdt and Boxer (1993) most approximate this goal in other essays. Working against 
the goal o f greater enlightenment, the absence of a holistic perspective toward development 
fosters culture-bound conceptualizations and limits an understanding o f the impact that a new 
identity - being gay - has on North American culture and on Western consciousness (Altman, 
1982; Greenberg & Bystryn, 1984).
Kaliedescopic in its manifestations in human behavior, homosexuality in the Melanesian 
culture presents yet another colorful turn. Ritual is the focus of the complex symbolism of 
Melanesian homosexuality. Homosexual contacts are begun in elaborate adolescent initiation 
rites among young males. Taboos and strict codes of conduct govern homosexual contacts 
(e.g. incest taboos comparable to those dictating heterosexual contact are evident) and these 
practices are supported by the society as a whole or by the men’s religious organizations. 
Ritual is, therefore, inextricably entwined with homosexual behavior and sexual identity 
among the Melanesian (Bateson, 1936; Herdt, 1982).
Whitehead (1981) has posited that Melanesian ritual originates from a collective response 
to inherent biosocial elements of the human condition. The Melanesian data are directly 
relevant to the essentialist explanation o f homosexual and bisexual identity (Herdt, 1988). In 
his review of the extant data from the 1860s to the present, Herdt (1993) has shown the 
occurrence of the ritual practice o f homosexual activity in about 40 different societies.
Throughout the DeCecco and Shively collection of essays the term ‘fluidity’ appears as a 
metaphor for bisexuality. Fluidity implies the rigidity o f the old heterosexual-homosexual 
dichotomy, which is perceptively analyzed by Murphy (1983). The term ‘fluidity’ denotes 
that capability o f flowing or the capacity to be easily changed and not fixed or solid (Herdt, 
1983). This leads Herdt to raise the question (p. 14): “ ... what is it in the bisexual identity 
that is changeable: sexual orientation, gender role, gender-identity, object choice, erotic
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technique used in sexual contact (e.g. oral and anal intercourse), exclusivity o f sexual contact, 
or the degree of intimacy characterizing a contact or the relationship?” He asserts that the 
existence of fluidity as a metaphor in sexology raises new questions about the prominence of 
bisexuality in scientific and popular culture.
To bolster this conjecture, Herdt identifies three interrelated aspects o f sexual development 
and fluidity:
• Culturally constituted life-cycle transitions that allow relative flexibility o f bisexual 
choices.
• Cultural systems o f sexual signs and symbols used as contrasting features in the 
stimulation of bisexual erotic response.
•  Bisexual fluidity as a paradigm o f eroticism that suggests a broader field of arousal 
than is normative in Western societies (Mead, 1961).
The correlation between social and sexual interactions in the individual’s social network.
Herdt has contributed new ideas to theoretical evaluation o f bisexuality.
Typologies
To discuss bisexuality further in the context o f sexual reorientation, it is important to grasp 
the lexicon of the bisexual landscape. Klein (1978) differentiated transition, historical, 
sequential, and concurrent bisexuality. For some individuals, bisexuality does not represent a 
stage in the process of coming out as lesbian or gay (transitional bisexuality), whereas for 
others a gay or lesbian identity is a step in the process of coming out as bisexual (Byne,
1996). Historical bisexuality refers to individuals whose sexual lives are, at present, either 
heterosexual or homosexual, but who have experienced both same and opposite gender sexual 
attraction or behavior in the past. Sequential bisexuality refers to individuals who have had 
relationships with both genders, but only with one person during a given period, while 
concurrent bisexuality refers to those who maintain relationships with both genders 
simultaneously. Defensive bisexuality is the term used by Ross (1930) to describe a person 
hiding or exploring a homosexual orientation. Married bisexuality refers to homosexual 
behavior that takes place away from the family environment and ritual bisexuality describes 
the homosexual behavior prescribed for all members of a society as in the Melanesian 
circumstances discussed above. Latin bisexuality describes the cultural phenomenon in Latin 
cultures where the partner that is the ‘inserter’ is considered heterosexual, while the
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‘recipient5 is deemed homosexual. Experimental bisexuality describes circumstantial 
homosexual behavior, secondary bisexuality refers to situations when no heterosexual outlets 
are available (prison), and technical bisexuality is often an element of prostitution.
Philosophy of Bisexual Identity
Bisexual identity theory, in all its complexities, is as important as gay and lesbian identity 
theory if we seek to grasp reaction to the sexual reorientation phenomenon. It is insufficient 
to view bisexuality through a monocular lens o f incomplete homosexual identity development 
or incomplete heterosexual identity development. When the illness model o f homosexuality 
was repealed in 1973 by the American Psychiatric Association (Bayer, 1981) development o f 
affirmative models of lesbian and gay identity began formation (Cass, 1979, 1983; Coleman, 
1981; Troiden, 1988). Many, like Cass, view bisexuality self-identification negatively and 
describe it as the prime example o f identity foreclosure, delaying or preventing the formation 
o f a positive homosexual identity. Coleman, in contrast, applied stages of identity formation 
similar to those identified in gays and lesbians to bisexuals. Troiden, like Coleman, viewed 
bisexuality as a valid orientation and identity.
The dichotomous model of sexual orientation perpetuates the belief that bisexuals are 
psychologically maladjusted (Byne, 1996), but a large number o f studies have found no 
evidence of psychopathology or psychological maladjustment in bisexual men and women 
(Fox, 1996). Weinberg et al (1994) saw bisexuality as an add-on identity to an already 
established heterosexual identity, while homosexual identity development is seen by Cass 
(1979) and others as a replacement for heterosexual identity.
Bisexual identity development has not been conceptualized as a linear process with a fixed 
outcome, as in theories o f heterosexual, lesbian, and gay identity development, but rather as a 
complex and open-ended process (Fox, 1996). For some individuals, bisexual identity 
remains constant, whereas for others bisexual identity varies in response to changes in sexual 
and emotional attraction, behavior, and relationships, as well as social and political 
environmental contexts (Carroll, 1996). Perhaps because o f these divergent theoretical views, 
the impact o f sexual reorientation interventions on the process o f bisexual identity 
development is poorly understood.
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Philosophy of Bisexual Orientation
In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, bisexuality has been the overlooked 
middle child in the analysis o f marginalized sexualities. The early twentieth century theorists 
continue to directly impact the ways bisexuality is framed by academics, professionals, and 
members o f the public. These theorists, many of whom were contemporaries of Darwin, used 
the concept o f bisexuality to explain homosexuality in terms of evolution theory (Ellis 1922; 
Freud, 1962; Kraft-Ebing, 1886; Weinberg, 1908). Freud, heavily influenced by evolution 
theory as were other early biopsychosocial scientists, used the theory o f bisexuality to account 
for homosexuality, which he saw as indicative of arrested psycho sexual development. At the 
same time, he believed that all individuals have some homosexual feelings: “The most 
important o f these perversions, homosexuality ... can be traced back to the constitutional 
bisexuality o f all human beings ... Psychoanalysis enables us to point to some trace or other o f 
a homosexual object-choice in everyone” (Freud, 1962, p.45).
Regarding bisexuality, Kinsey et al (1948) departed from traditional thinking about sexual 
orientation and emphasized the inadequacy o f a dichotomous model:
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and 
homosexual. The world is not divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are 
black and white. It is a fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with 
discrete categories. Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force 
facts into separate pigeonholes. The living world is a continuum in each and 
every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this concerning human sexual 
behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the realities o f sex 
(p.219).
Other authors, such as Shively, DeCecco, and Storms (1980) viewed heterosexuality and 
homosexuality as independent aspects o f sexual orientation and not as bridgeable via 
bisexuality. There has been a variety o f grids, scales, and scores to quantify and differentiate 
the features o f sexual orientation along multidimensional lines over the years, all with rather 
time-limited popularity.
Complicating further is the fact that compared to heterosexuality and homosexuality, very 
little scientific study has been conducted specifically on bisexuality. Yet observing 
bisexuality in detail is Schoen (2002):
Based on the studies that have been done, it appears that bisexuals are not 
people whose orientation is fundamentally homosexual but who have some 
heterosexual contact on the side. Nor are they people whose orientation is
fundamentally heterosexual but who enjoy homosexual contact on the side. Also, 
fundamentally, they are not people who, at one point in their lives, engage in 
sexual behavior with persons of one sex and then at another point, engage in 
sexual behavior with persons of the other sex, although this pattern is sometimes 
called transitional bisexuality. Rather, bisexuals are people who are sexually 
attracted to persons of both sexes during the same general time period in their 
lives.
It is thought that people develop and experience bisexuality in a number of 
different ways. For some it begins as a form of experimentation that adds a spark 
to their sex lives, but it does not become the main arena of sexual activity. For 
others it is a deliberate choice to participate in whatever feels best at the moment. 
Three particular sets of circumstances have been thought to be conducive to 
bisexuality: (a) Sexual experimentation in a relationship with a close friend is 
quite common among women and can also occur between two male friends or a 
male homosexual may develop a sexual relationship from a previously casual or 
friendly relationship with a woman, (b) Group sex is another avenue for bisexual 
experimentation, (c) Finally, some people adopt a bisexual philosophy as an 
outgrowth of a personal belief system. For instance, some women who have been 
active in the women’s movement find they are drawn closer to other women by 
the experience and translate this closeness into sexual expression.
Men who are bisexual are likely to experience homosexual attraction and 
engage in homosexual experiences before they become aware of their bisexuality. 
For women, on the other hand, the trend is to experience heterosexuality first.
Researchers who have studied female bisexuality note that some women who 
identify themselves as bisexual say that they have some emotional needs that are 
best met by men and others that are best met by women. Some bisexual men 
offered this explanation too, but much more often the male bisexual explains his 
sexual lifestyle in terms of a need for variety and creativity.
People usually discover their bisexual orientation later in life than either 
homosexuals or heterosexuals. The majority of people model the heterosexual 
lifestyle and drift into bisexual relationships without consciously thinking about it 
initially. Most individuals who discover their attraction to the same sex try to 
deny their interest and attempt to fit in with the more socially acceptable 
heterosexual lifestyle for a while. Usually by adolescence there is increasing 
internal conflict about their sexual preference that may not be fully resolved until 
adulthood.
Because it is commonly thought that people are either heterosexual or 
homosexual, even by people with bisexual interests, these people seem to struggle 
for a longer period o f time trying to conform to one lifestyle or the other. It is 
common for people to be well into their 20s or 30s before accepting their bisexual 
orientation. Society’s definitions o f what is normal, appropriate, right and natural 
have an enormous influence on how bisexual people feel about their sexual 
orientation. Given the negative bias towards bisexuality, it is not unusual for 
women and men with a bisexual orientation to feel alienated from and oppressed 
by both the heterosexual and homosexual communities. For them, this can raise 
serious questions about their sexual identity. Bisexual people have problems
similar to those that homosexual people have in “coming out” and making their 
orientation known to family and friends (pp.2-9).
With Schoen’s more detailed examination of the models of sexuality and from viewing 
sexual orientation from both historical and contemporary perspectives, the distortions and 
misconceptions surrounding sexual reorientation become easier to identify in the debate. 
As evidenced above bisexuality must be viewed as both a transitional phenomenon and a 
static sexuality and sexual identity. Still, a coherent bisexual philosophy continues to 
remain elusive.
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Chapter 6: Heterosexism, Homonegativity, and Homophobia
I  believe that one day the world will judge the witch hunt against 
homosexuals... as an unbelievable injustice perpetuated by supposedly ‘moral’ 
people against innocent groups, just as harshly as it judges the Spanish 
Inquisition and the Holocaust. Both the Church and the Nazis believed they were 
acting in goodfaith (McLean, 1998).
Heterosexism, homonegativity, and homophobia should be considered in this discussion 
since they are key emotional and cognitive states that can drive the desire for heterosexuals to 
promote sexual reorientation interventions. Potentially these viewpoints can also motivate 
desire for non-heterosexuals to request sexual reorientation intervention. No ethical 
exploration of the issues surrounding sexual reorientation can avoid acknowledgment of the 
impact o f sexual bigotry, guilt, and shame on pursuit of these interventions.
Herek (1990) defines ‘heterosexism’ as the ideological system that denies, denigrates, and 
stigmatizes any non-heterosexual forms o f behavior, identity, relationship, or community. 
Weinberg coined the term ‘homophobia’ to characterize heterosexuals’ dread of being in 
close quarters with homosexuals as well as homosexuals’ self-loathing. Homophobia has 
since been used to describe:
• Hatred of homosexuality.
•  Hatred of homosexuals.
• Fear of gays and lesbians.
•  A desire or attempt to discriminate against homosexuals.
Within the general population, the dominant meaning places ‘homophobia’ in the same 
class as ‘racism’, where hatred, fear, and discrimination are directed against persons of 
different races, and ‘sexism’ where victims are of a specific gender (Carroll, 1996).
Herek (1996) suggests that ‘homophobia’ should only be used to describe the negative 
attitudes o f homosexuals towards their own homosexuality. Shields and Harriman (1984) 
argue against the use of the term ‘homophobia’, positing that anti-gay attitudes rarely, if ever, 
meet the criteria for a true ‘phobia’. Herek argues against popular use of the term because it 
implies an individual or clinical entity instead of a social phenomenon that he claims is rooted 
in cultural ideologies and inter-group relations.
‘Homonegativity’ has been offered up as an alternative to ‘homophobia’.
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Heterosexism
In greater detail, Herek, states that heterosexism refers to prejudice comparable to racism, 
antisemitism, and sexism. He notes the term is often used pejoratively in the literature of 
homosexuality.
Cultural heterosexism refers to those prejudices manifest in societal institutions and 
customs, whereas psychological heterosexism refers to individual prejudice (Herek, 1996). 
Herek (1994) and Wood (1990) note that most Americans are inculcated with consistent 
condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual behavior as being morally wrong sin, to 
regard it as unnatural, and that the proper reaction is to express disgust toward it.
This cultural imprinting is not without dire consequence. In a review of 24 separate 
questionnaire studies with samples o f gay men and lesbians, Berrill (1992) reported that a 
median of 44% had been threatened with violence because of their sexual orientation, 33% 
had been chased or followed, 25% had had objects thrown at them, 13% had been spat on, and 
80% had been verbally harassed. It appears clear, then, that homosexuals are predictably and 
routinely victimized in Western society. Herek (1996) notes that, although Americans have 
demonstrated an increasing willingness to extend basic civil liberties to gay men and lesbians, 
most heterosexual Americans continue to condemn homosexuality on moral grounds and to 
reject or feel uncomfortable about gay people personally.
There are discernable patterns in the etiology o f this hate crime behavior, Herek (1984, 
1991) and Kite (1994) note that, in contrast to heterosexuals with favorable attitudes toward 
gay people, those with negative attitudes are:
1) Less likely to have had personal contact with gay men or lesbians.
2) More likely to be strongly religious and to subscribe to a conservative religious 
ideology.
3) More likely to support traditional gender roles.
4) More likely to believe that sexual orientation is a matter of personal choice.
5) More likely to be older and less well educated.
6) More likely to have resided in geographic areas (e.g. rural mid-western or southern 
United States) where negative attitudes represent the norm.
Herek (1994,1993), Capitanio (Herek & Capitanio, 1995), and Glunt (Herek & Glunt,
1993) report that heterosexual males tend to manifest higher levels o f prejudice than 
heterosexual females, especially toward gay men. One explanation for the sex difference is, 
in part, that heterosexual females have greater likelihood of personal contact with openly gay
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people, which circumstance correlates strongly with greater acceptance o f lesbians and gay 
men (Herek, 1994).
Such opportunities for contact may be a product o f the strong link in American culture 
between masculinity and heterosexuality which according to Herek:
... creates considerable social and psychological pressure for males to affirm 
their masculinity through rejection of that which is not culturally defined as 
masculine (male homosexuality) and that which is perceived as negating the 
importance of males (lesbianism). Because heterosexual women are less likely to 
perceive rejection of homosexuality as integral to their gender-identity, they may 
experience fewer pressures to be prejudiced and, consequently, have more 
opportunities for personal contact with gay people (1996, p. 101).
In his extensive research Herek (1992) identifies four principal psychological functions 
that underlie heterosexual anti-gay attitudes. They are: experiential, value-expressive, 
social-expressive, and ego-defensive. His position reveals:
... any given manifestation o f psychological heterosexism can serve one or 
more of these functions only when the individual’s psychological needs converge 
with the culture’s ideology. Anti-gay prejudice can be value-expressive only 
when an individual’s concept of self is closely tied to values that have also 
become socially defined as antithetical to homosexuality. It can be socially 
expressive only insofar as an individual strongly needs to be accepted by members 
of a social group that rejects gay people or homosexuality, and it can be ego- 
defensive only when lesbians and gay men are culturally defined in a way that 
links them to an individual’s psychological conflict (p.64).
Devlin and Cowan (1985) ironically observe that:
One consequence o f heterosexism is its effect on heterosexuals. Because of 
the stigma attached to homosexuality, many heterosexuals monitor and restrict 
their own behavior to avoid being labeled as gay. This pattern appears to be 
especially strong among American males. For example, many men avoid 
clothing, hobbies, and mannerisms that might be labeled ‘effeminate’. Anti-gay 
prejudice also interferes with same-sex friendships. Males with strongly anti-gay 
attitudes appear to have fewer intimate non-sexual friendships with other men 
than do males with tolerant attitudes (p.468).
Herek, looking deeply, reports with persuasion:
When expressions o f heterosexism and homophobia function to reinforce a 
person’s self-concept as a good Christian, appeals to other important values such 
as compassion and love o f a neighbor, notions of patriotism, and the support for 
civil rights are more likely to change attitudes than factual refutations of incorrect 
stereotypes about homosexual individuals (p.480).
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Prejudice against sexuality began with Eve and her apple. Its greatest enduring 
manifestation may be intractable social and religious opposition to lesbigay and other 
marginalized sexualities.
Biology of Homophobia
If arcane Biblical allegory cannot be solely blamed for it, can biology excuse homophobia? 
A study that was completed at the University of Georgia suggests a major cause of 
homophobia (Adams et al, 1996).
The study involved 64 white men, of which none had ever engaged in homosexual acts. 
Their sexual fantasies involved only women. 35 o f them were rated as homophobic and 29 
were rated as non-homophobic. For the purpose of the study, ‘homophobia’ was defined as a 
negative emotional reaction (fear, anxiety, anger, discomfort) to homosexuality. It was 
measured by a questionnaire called the Index o f Homophobia. Each was shown three types of 
X-rated videotapes: heterosexual, lesbian, and gay. A plethysmograph device was used to 
measure the circumference o f their penis as a gauge of sexual arousal. The two groups 
exhibited similar arousal when they viewed four-minute samples taken from one heterosexual 
and one lesbian movie. However, their responses to the male homosexual clip may have been 
surprising:
Figure 2.
Degree of Tumescence 
(Arousal)
Insignificant Moderate Definite
Homophobic men 20% 26% 54%
Non-Homophobic men 66% 10% 24%
The researchers concluded that the data were consistent with the belief that homophobic 
men have repressed homosexual desires. A less probable explanation is that the homophobic
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men’s erections were caused by anxiety during the experiment (Adams et al, 1996). I f  there is 
a biological component to homophobia, should we not ask if there is a biological intervention 
for homophobia? If there were a biological intervention for homophobia could the lesbigay 
taskforce justify supporting or opposing it?
Rationalization of Homophobia
It is important to understand the inculcated rationale for homophobia since it is not 
dissimilar to the rationale used in support o f sexual reorientation interventions. Common 
arguments to support homophobic beliefs include:
• Homosexuality is unnatural.
• Homosexuality is an attack on the family.
• The Bible condemns homosexuality.
• Homosexuals recruit young people.
Many homophobics express the fear that people who remain anti-gay will begin to be 
considered bigots by the general population if gays and lesbians become a protected group of 
people as other minorities have done. In the words of one conservative Christian physician 
colleague (Rogers, 2001): “I don’t want the federal government to marginalize me or the 
millions o f others who share my beliefs.” What irony.
It may be that some homophobia is tied to the need to hate. There is a phenomenon 
described by which people with low self-esteem appear to need to identify some minority that 
they can hate and feel superior to (Herek, 1996). Over the past 50 years, Jews, Afro- 
Americans, Communists, and most recently gays and lesbians have filled the role of hate- 
object.
Internalized Homophobia
The theme o f internalized homophobia is a reappearing concept in academic, political, and 
clinical discussion of non-heterosexual desire for sexual reorientation. Herek (1996) has
found that most children internalize society’s ideology o f sex and gender at an early age and
that as a result, lesbians and gay men usually experience some degree of negative feeling 
toward themselves when they first recognize their homosexuality in adolescence or adulthood.
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This internalized homophobia often makes the process of identity formation more difficult 
(Malyon, 1982).
‘Coming out o f the closet’ or ‘coming out’, for short, is an idiom o f  gay and lesbian culture 
that refers to the recognition o f a homosexual orientation within oneself, development o f an 
identity based upon it, and its disclosure to others. Conversely, being ‘in the closet’ or 
‘closeted’, for short, refers to passing oneself off to others as heterosexual despite personal 
identity to the contrary. Given the overt and covert risk o f victimization and discrimination 
for homosexuals in Western societies, ‘the closet’ offers many advantages. Coming out is not 
a once-off challenge; it is an ongoing process that is repeated with each new societal situation 
and each encounter with a new person (Weeks, 1977).
According to Herek (1996), most lesbians and gay men successfully overcome the threats 
to psychological well being posed by heterosexism and reclaim disowned or devalued parts of 
themselves in the course of coming out, developing an identity into which their sexuality is 
well integrated. Conversely, people with a homosexual orientation who have not yet come 
out, and wish that they could become heterosexual, or who are isolated from the gay 
community, may experience greater psychological distress (Bell & Weinberg, 1978; 
Hammersmith & Weinberg, 1973; Malyon, 1982; Weinberg & Williams, 1974).
Respondents to the San Francisco Examiner’s 1989 national survey of lesbians and gay 
men waited for an average o f 4.6 years after knowing they were gay before coming out (San 
Francisco Examiner, 1989). Depending on the area of the country, between 23% and 40% 
had not told their families that they were gay, and between 37% and 59% had not disclosed 
their sexual orientation to coworkers (San Francisco Examiner, 1989).
Garnet et al, (1990) note that lesbian and gay victims o f hate crimes may suffer a 
reemergence of internalized homophobia as they experience their homosexuality as a source 
o f pain, danger, and punishment. Berrill (1992) identifies secondary victimization, consisting 
of increased discrimination and stigmatization, which may be experienced by hate crime 
survivors when others learn of the attack (being outed).
Internalized homophobia is clearly linked to the coming out process and reflects a 
confluence o f individual, familial, and cultural heterosexist factors (Cass, 1983). Because of 
the complexities involved, many clinicians will refer patients with this problem to colleagues
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who ‘specialize’ in the treatment of homosexual and bisexual patients struggling with identity 
formulation.
Social Costs of Homophobia
The Standing Commission of Human Affairs o f the Episcopal Church wrote in 1994:
Not only, must lesbian and gay youth withstand ridicule and, often, violence 
from their peers, they risk outright rejection from their parents should they decide 
to ‘come out’. The combination of the culture’s condemnation o f homosexuality 
and the alienation from one’s home and parents (supposedly a haven of security 
and support) causes unusually high rates o f attempted suicide (p.2).
Substantiating this, a U.S. Health and Human Services (1993) report provides the following 
data:
Gay adolescents are two to three times more likely than peers to attempt 
suicide, accounting for as many as 30% of completed youth suicides each year ...
26% of gay youths are forced to leave home because of conflicts with their 
families over their sexual identities. Up to half engage in prostitution to support 
themselves, greatly increasing their risk for HIV infection (p. 13).
Further verifying the potential lethality o f the painful process of coming out a 
University of Calgary study reports that gay men are much more likely to attempt suicide 
than other members of society (Wright, 1999). In 1988, the Los Angeles County Task 
Force on Runaway and Homeless Youth issued the Report and Recommendations o f the 
Task Force that estimated that 25 to 35% of Los Angeles County street youth are gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual. Also in 1988, the Seattle Commission on Children and Youth o f 
Seattle issued their Report on Gay and Lesbian Youth in Seattle that estimated that 40% of 
Seattle street youth are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. These figures are consistent with those of 
the National Youth Advocacy Coalition (NYAC, 1988).
It is clear that homophobia, homonegativity, and heterosexism are endemic in Western 
societies and that the societal implications for both heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals are 
powerful and far-reaching. A discussion of the bioethics and medical ethics surrounding 
sexual reorientation will necessarily involve an acknowledgment of the impact of these social 
phenomena and an appropriately posited response. The wise clinician armed with these facts 
must be aware o f lurking or evident heterosexism or homonegativity in him or herself. 
Monitoring the impact this honestly unearthed autognostic information may have on clinical
effectiveness is imperative to relationships with patients. Awareness o f homonegativity and 
heterosexism is no less important than knowledge of and respect for individual cultural 
diversity.
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Section III: Original Theories and Theories of Origins
The clinical approach taken by sexual reorientation intervention is often attributed to 
supposed hypotheses regarding the biological or environmental origins o f the specific 
individual’s sexual orientation. Yet, the why and how o f sexual orientation are irrelevant to 
other theories o f intervention and some interventions persist despite the fact of the 
obsolescence of the original hypothetical formulation which has either been refuted or 
abandoned by the larger medical community. Debate surrounding sexual reorientation has 
focused not only on hypothetical origins o f orientation associated with various interventions, 
but also on the nature of the interventions themselves, their social implications, and clinical 
outcomes.
Stakeholders on either side o f the debate draw support from their view of the origins of 
sexual orientation.
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Chapter 7: The Essentialists and Social Constructionists
At the core o f debate about the origin of sexual orientation is the ongoing discourse 
between the essentialists and the social constructionists. These opposing camps speak 
throughout the literature and must be acknowledged. While Kinsey et al (1948,1953) 
concluded that the division o f individuals into simple dichotomous categories based on sexual 
characteristics was impossible and argued instead for an appreciation of diversity and 
variation in human sexuality, essentialists and constructionists take philosophically 
antagonistic approaches to postulating the origins of sexual orientation, identity, and behavior. 
These philosophically diverse perspectives fire cannon in the debate over the appropriateness 
and utility o f sexual reorientation interventions.
Social Constructionism
In his study of human sexuality, McIntosh (1968) first described social constructionism 
and defined the distinction between homosexual behavior and the homosexual role.
Plummer’s (1975) discussion of sexual stigma is another important early contribution to the 
literature of social constructionism. Stein (1984) describes social constructionism as a belief 
in both the primary importance of social forces in shaping human behavior and experience 
and the fact that knowledge is not a reflection o f the world but a product o f discourse. LeVay 
describes ‘social constructionism’ as a school o f thought in which concepts like 
‘representation’, ‘signification’, ‘discourse’, and ‘power’ are more important than the details 
o f individual development.
Gergen and Davis (1985) describe four assumptions that underlie social constructionist 
theory:
• Existing categories and ideas arise from language and context and do not serve as a map 
of the world. For example, commonly accepted concepts such as gender, emotion, and 
psychological disorder should not be taken as objective facts derived from observation but 
as social conventions.
• Common ideas and categories are artifacts o f particular societies at specific periods and 
change with the passage o f time. Even the most fundamental conceptions, such as ideas 
o f self, identity, romantic love, emotion, reason and language, should be understood as 
being culturally and historically specific social constructions.
• The degree to which an idea gains prominence or survives over time should not be 
understood as a reflection o f its empirical accuracy but rather as a function of processes of 
social interaction. According to this view, even methods for attaining truth and
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knowledge, as represented in scientific rules, for example, can serve primarily as a means 
for achieving social control rather than for acquiring knowledge.
• Forms of descriptions and explanations serve as expressions of social meaning and action. 
Gergen and Davis cite the example of how conceptions about emotion, regarding the 
extent to which individuals experience choice or the lack o f it significantly affect the 
implications for treating people suffering from certain emotional states like depression, 
anxiety and fear (pp.26-27).
The seminal work of the French philosopher Foucault, beginning with the publication o f 
The History o f  Sexuality, volume I, An Introduction (1978), significantly shaped the 
parameters of the social constructionist debate about sexuality. Foucault argues that there is 
no inner human sexual drive, but that human potential for thinking and acting is shaped by 
social forces of regulation and categorization into various forms of sexuality at different times 
in history. According to this view, sexuality is not simply influenced or molded but is 
actually created by cultural forces (Stein, 1984).
Halperin’s essay One Hundred Years o f  Homosexuality (1990), introduces the notion that 
homosexuality was brought into existence by the invention, in the late nineteenth century, of 
the word used to define it. By contrast, the philosopher Richard Mohr (1992) has argued 
persuasively that, even without the word, people could and did formulate the concept in 
earlier times. The idea that a thing doesn’t exist until it is named is absurd. Gravity existed 
long before it was given the name gravity. Likewise, humans were capitalizing on the 
benefits and suffering the consequences of gravity long before it was named.
Weeks (1977), Katz (1983), and D’Emilio (1986) have documented the emergence o f 
modem gay and lesbian identities and communities in specific historic periods. Altman 
(1982) and Epstein (1987) have explored the political aspects of the construction of 
contemporary homosexual identities. Janet Hailey (1994), legal scholar at Stanford 
University, writes in her essay The Construction o f  Heterosexuality that:
The ... class o f  heterosexuals is a default class, home to those who have not 
fallen out of it. It openly expels but cowardly incorporates the homosexual other, 
an undertaking that renders it profoundly heterogeneous, unstable, and provisional 
(p. 12).
Several collections o f articles (Altman et al, 1989; Hart & Richardson, 1981; Stein, 1992) 
provide an examination of social constructionist approaches to homosexuality through the 
lens o f psychology, sexology, and the social sciences. Additional writings in anthropology
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(Herdt 1981, 1992), sociology (Greenberg, 1988; Ponse, 1978), history, (Halperin, 1990), and 
the humanities (Butler, 1990) have further elaborated the social constructionist analysis o f 
sexual identity and homosexuality.
Social constructionism has of course been criticized, sometimes in ways that are mistaken. 
Vance (1989) outlines three criticisms o f social constructionism:
The first is the notion that social constructionism implies a devaluation o f 
sexual identities. This equates the questioning in social constructionist writing of 
the cultural meaning of identity with an undermining or destruction of these 
identities (p. 13).
Vance argues that this criticism trivializes social constructionist thinking. He identifies 
another criticism of social constructionism as deriving from the belief that it implies - as a 
result of its emphasis on the cultural construction o f identity - that individual sexual identity is 
completely malleable, comparable to a set o f clothing that can be tried on and disposed of at 
will. He further states that social constructionism does question traditional assumptions about 
the rigidity o f identity and inability to change, implying that identity may not be as fixed and 
as immutable as we have been led to believe. The third criticism of social constructionism 
identified by Vance is that it assumes discontinuity and rupture in behavior and in the 
subjective experience of meaning across cultures and throughout history.
Essentialism
Essentialists maintain that fundamental differences exist between persons on the basis o f 
their sexuality. These differences may derive from biological factors such as neuroendocrine, 
anatomical, or genetic features, from early developmental experience or from unspecified 
causes. Essentialism suggests the presence of a fixed sexual quality in a person, a lack of 
choice about it, and an underlying and enduring core basis for categorical descriptions of 
persons based on this quality (Stein, 1984). Stein writes:
The description of essentialism has largely been developed in the writing of 
the social constructionists and refers to the view that sexual categories and sexual 
identities represent fixed personal characteristics that are inherent, objective, 
trans-cultural, and trans-historical. Essentialism treats sexuality as a biological 
force underlying genuine gender differences that in turn serve as the basis for 
sexual categories and identities. In relation to sexual orientation, essentialism 
argues that differences in sexual desire create categories o f persons known as
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homosexual and heterosexual which are fundamentally the same across time and 
in different cultures (p.44).
Essentialist authors include Boswell (1980), Rich (1983), and Dynes et al (1990), although 
they don’t identify themselves as such. Vance compares the absence o f self-identified 
essentialists to the lack of awareness of heterosexual identity. Epstein (1987) argues that the 
distinction between essentialism and social constructionism reflects the earlier debate between 
nature and nurture as the cause of homosexuality. He describes the essentialist position as 
seeing sexuality as a “biological force seeking expression in ways that are preordained” and 
the constructionists as “ ... treating sexuality as a blank slate, capable of bearing whatever 
meanings are generated by the society in question” (p. 13). Epstein further characterizes 
essentialism as being consistent with a politics o f identity practiced in gay and lesbian 
communities that demands the recognition o f gayness as comparable to being a member o f 
other groups defined by a difference such as race or ethnicity. In contrast, Epstein portrays 
social constructionism as an intellectual theory that may be seen as being out o f step with gay 
and lesbian experience and the practice of minority politics (Stein, 1984). Stein also notes 
that:
Although social constructionism is currently ascendant in academic circles, it 
is viewed by some, who see it as characterizing a social construction of sexuality 
with a voluntary choice about sexual orientation, as politically incorrect. This 
position is seen as strengthening the socially conservative argument that, if  one 
can choose to be gay or lesbian, then one can be held responsible for one’s sexual 
orientation and efforts can be undertaken to force individuals to choose to be 
heterosexual. Conversely, it is argued that essentialism represents a belief in the 
fixed nature o f sexual orientation, for which a person cannot be held responsible 
(pp.83-84).
Troiden focuses on several additional concepts to draw a contrast between essentialism and 
social constructionism. He describes an essentialist emphasis on people’s underlying sexual 
preferences and feelings to define sexual orientation, rather than on their behavior (Troiden, 
1988). Richardson (1983) describes essentialist beliefs about homosexuality as:
... developing in three distinct patterns conceptualizing homosexuality as: 1) 
a state o f being, associated with the creation o f the concept o f the homosexual 
person, 2) a state o f sexuality; linking both sexual desire and behavior with the 
homosexual category and 3) a state o f personal identity, involving the 
incorporation o f the effects of both labeling and political forces into the notion o f 
homosexuality (p. 32).
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Troiden discusses the interest o f essentialists in determining the causes of homosexuality 
arising from psycho dynamic, hormonal, or prenatal factors, and in predicting adult sexual 
orientation on the basis of childhood characteristics and behaviors, particularly early gender 
role nonconformity. He classifies as essentialists adherents o f the view that homosexuality is 
pathological (Bieber et al, 1962; Socarides, 1978) as well as those who believe that it is a 
normal variant (Bell et al, 1981; Green, 1987; Harry, 1982; Whitman & Mathy, 1986).
Essentialism, Social Constructionism and Medicine
Fiercely, Tiefer (1992) states that: “The major obstacle to a social constructionist approach 
to sexuality is the domination of theory and research by the biomedical model” (p. 311).
Stein promotes another explanation, suggesting that
... the lack of attention to social constructionist theory within the field o f 
mental health may lie in the deliberate movement away from viewing 
homosexuality as being a sexual orientation that is freely chosen. The idea that an 
individual’s sexual orientation might change has been associated with the notion 
that one should attempt to change it in the case of homosexuals, an obviously 
disagreeable thought for those interested in promoting a higher degree of 
openness about and tolerance o f homosexuality (p.87).
Stein highlights the essentialist belief now pervasive within the fields o f psychiatry and 
psychotherapy, that sexual orientation is the expression o f an inherent and largely fixed 
personal quality. This position has been used to argue against sexual reorientation 
intervention as inherently unnatural and unsafe. Stein asserts that:
... this belief underlies theories that view homosexuality as pathological as 
well as those that describe it as a normal variant, and notes that it serves as a 
central motivation within the biomedical sciences for attempting to determine the 
cause of homosexuality, whether this is believed to lie primarily in genetic, 
hormonal, environmental, or familial factors (p.88 )....
The two central essentialist assumptions underlying virtually all 
contemporary approaches to psychotherapy with lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men 
today are: 1) that sexual orientation is the expression of some inner personal 
nature that is determined either before birth or within the first two or three years 
o f life, and 2) that sexual orientation, although it may be denied or repressed 
because of social or individual forces acting against its expression (especially if it 
is homosexual), rarely changes throughout a lifetime (p.80).
Hart and Richardson (1981, 1984) emphasized the role o f choice in deciding how to act in 
relation to sexual identity and the need for the therapist to distinguish between the client’s
66
problems relating to social sex-role characteristics and those involving sexual orientation. 
They also describe the therapist’s need to recognize the essentialist beliefs of clients about the 
immutability of their sexual identity. These themes emerge in the debate about sexual 
reorientation.
Adding more, Richardson outlined the importance of the therapist’s exploring the meaning 
and significance of being gay for each individual and understanding that sexual identity and 
sexual orientation are open to change. At the same time, Richardson cautions that a wish to 
change sexual orientation may often arise from guilt about being homosexual and that the 
therapist, therefore, must fully explore the motivation for change.
Schippers (1989) describes four pragmatic approaches representing possible 
psychotherapist’s responses to constructionism during clinical treatment:
• Exploring the meaning of homosexuality for each person in therapy.
• Exploring the possibilities and limitations associated with adopting a homosexual identity.
• Emphasizing the different ways in which an individual’s homosexuality may be 
expressed.
• Using feelings within the psychotherapeutic transference to demonstrate the variability o f 
the emotions that can be associated with being homosexual (p.86).
As Schipper demonstrates, despite the obstacles associated with the biomedical model, 
many therapists are able to integrate and navigate with patients in clinical practice between 
essentialist and constructionist formulations o f sexuality.
The clinician’s ability to integrate essentialist and constructionist formulations is, I believe, 
key to effective clinical work with patients struggling to resolve issues of sexual orientation 
and identity. These patients often present with a monocular and self-condemning view of 
their sexuality (either entirely essentialist or entirely constructionist) with the therapeutic task 
for the clinician being to move the patient to a more integrative stance. My clinical view is 
that each individual has an essential, core sexual orientation that may or may not have the 
potential to evolve over time, depending on the person, the consequences of which are 
socially constructed. In other words, there is an essential core with social construction 
operating on the margins of sexual behavior and identity. The type of sexual reorientation 
intervention chosen by a given clinician or patient may be impacted by their essentialist or 
constructionist views. Likewise, both essentialist and constructionist arguments have been 
made in opposition to as well as in support of reorientation interventions.
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Chapter 8: A Biological Philosophy of Sexual Orientation
Debate about the biology o f sexual orientations has been a recurring theme throughout the 
last century of medicine and psychology and no discussion on essentialist or constructionist 
views of sexual reorientation is able to escape a debate on the role of biology. The biological 
contributions to the origin o f non-heterosexual orientations have long been used as the 
principle argument against the criminalization o f non-heterosexual behavior (Schmalz, 1993) 
as well as in support for reorientation interventions. Research findings that appear to confirm 
a major biological influence on sexual orientation have been viewed as ‘good news for gays’ 
(Bailey & Pillard, 1991) and criticism o f evidence o f biological origins has been viewed as 
‘anti-gay’ (Jefferson, 1993). The legitimacy o f sexual reorientation research and clinical 
interventions has been historically supported by the discovery of evidence in support of 
biological determinants of sexual orientation. The rationale has historically been that the 
presence of a biological basis for behavior legitimizes biological research and clinical 
interventions directed towards correcting biological defects and misadventures. The ethical 
question becomes: A t what cost?
Throughout the last 100 years, many distinguished sexologists have believed that sexual 
orientation has a biological or genetic basis (Pillard, 1996). In various forms, this view was 
shared by von Krafft-Ebing (1901), Ellis (1922), Hirshfield (1936), and Freud (1962). Ellis 
(1922, p.2) said: “Any theory o f the etiology of homosexuality which leaves out the 
hereditary factor cannot be admitted.”
Ellis’s opinion was based on three observations: 1) homosexuality often runs in families, 2) 
many gay men and lesbians behave in ways we would now call ‘gender atypical’ during 
childhood and 3) homosexual desire seems, in many cases, to spring into being 
spontaneously, that is, it was never taught to, discussed with, or observed by the child (Pillard, 
1996, p.203).
Biological Models
Three basic models are commonly used to describe the involvement o f biology in 
sexual orientation and form the basis o f clinical interventions. These are the formative 
experience, direct and indirect models (Byne, 1996).
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Formative Experience Models
Biology, in the form of neural substrate, provides the slate upon which sexual orientation is 
inscribed by formative experience (Byne, 1996). This model suggests that biology might 
determine the developmental window during which environmental factors or social 
experiences impact future sexual orientation. Byne draws an analogy between sexual 
orientation and gender-identity. It appears that both boys and girls pass through an early 
developmental period o f undifferentiated, over-inclusive gender-identity - that is, they 
exclude no aspect of experience as impossible or inappropriate to them on the basis o f their 
sex (Fast, 1984). It also appears that there is a sensitive period for the development o f  a 
differentiated sense of gender, roughly between the ages of 18 months to 3 years (Byne,
1996). The biological factors involved in delimiting this sensitive period remain obscure.
Direct Models
Direct models rely heavily on biological evidence and statistical analysis and are often less 
attractive to social scientists and integrative physicians.
Biology, in the form of genes, exerts direct influence by organizing the neural 
circuitry that is responsible for sexual orientation. Through their impact on 
protein production, genes influence hormone production, the distribution of 
receptors and substrates for neurotransmitters, the density of neurons, and 
distribution o f neuronal pathways as well as all the other features that distinguish 
one human from another. Advanced models hypothesize that direct biological 
effects are probably modulated by social experiences and environmental factors, 
such that a predisposition might be either enhanced or suppressed by external 
factors. Direct models are the simplest to formulate and investigate, and as such 
are enticing to researchers. The future may reveal a specific gene or 
neurotransmitter receptor subtype that correlates strongly to sexual orientation.
The potential for numerous intermediate mechanisms to explain the relationship 
will probably prove difficult (Byne, 1996, p.229).
Indirect Models
These models suggest that biology only indirectly influences the acquisition of sexual 
orientation through factors such as personality and temperament. The hypothesis is that social 
and environmental factors are essential to the acquisition of sexual orientation (Byne, 1996).
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Prenatal androgen exposure has been associated in humans as well as other species with 
‘rough and tumble’ play (Ehrhardt & Meyer-Bahlburg, 1991). Aversion to competitive rough 
and tumble play in boys is thought by many to be moderately predictive o f homosexual 
development (Bell et al, 1981). Direct model theorists suggest that such aversion is merely 
the childhood expression of a brain that has been pre-wired for homosexuality (Isay, 1989), 
perhaps through a genetic or hormonal mechanism (Bell et al, 1981).
An indirect model interpretation postulates that the biologically influenced aversion to 
rough and tumble play does not imply pre-wiring for homosexuality. Instead, it can become a 
potent factor predisposing the individual to development as a homosexual in particular 
environments - for example, where stigmatized by family or peers as ‘sissy’ behavior. It 
would arguably have different consequences in environments where such behavior is 
accepted, perhaps making no contribution to sexual orientation at all (Byne, 1996, p. 132).
It has been similarly conjectured that temperamental variants (for example, reward 
dependence, novelty seeking, and harm avoidance) could have an impact on the acquisition of 
sexual orientation in an interactive way (Byne & Parsons, 1993). If temperament variants 
were genetically determined, then homosexuality would appear heritable despite the 
significant influences o f environment and culture (Byne, 1996).
The Unsupported Paradigm
Most biological research addressing the issue o f sexual orientation is based on the direct 
model and the assumption that sexual orientation is a sexually dimorphic trait.
Some researchers, therefore, expect particular aspects of an individual’s brain 
or physiology to conform to one o f two archetypes: a male type that drives sexual 
attraction to women and is shared by heterosexual men and lesbians or a female 
type, shared by heterosexual women and gay men, that causes attraction towards 
men. Research then seeks to demonstrate that a variety of presumed sexual 
dimorphisms (sex differences) are either reversed or incompletely differentiated in 
homosexual individuals (Byne, 1996, p. 133).
This paradigm appears to be significantly contaminated by cultural prejudices. The 
premise that gay men are more feminine or lesbians are more masculine appears to be 
culturally driven. Some ancient Greek literature, for example, describes homosexual men as 
the most manly of men and lesbians as the most womanly o f women (Hamilton & Cairns,
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1961). Culturally prescribed homosexual activity on the part o f young Melanesian males is 
described as necessary for the attainment of strength and virility (Herdt, 1984).
Hormonal Hypotheses
Since the discovery o f the sex hormones (androgens and estrogens), scientists have 
hypothesized that plasma or brain concentrations of these hormones have an impact on sexual 
orientation. However, the overwhelming majority o f studies failed to demonstrate a 
correlation between sexual orientation and adult hormonal constitution (Meyer-Bahlburg,
1984). Moreover, hormonal ‘therapies’ failed to change sexual orientation, and sexual 
orientation has not been shown to shift in adults as a consequence of alterations in hormone 
levels resulting from gonadal malignancies, trauma, or surgical removal (Gooren, 1990).
In rodents, hormonal exposure in early development determines the balance 
between male and female patterns o f mating behaviors displayed in adulthood. 
Specifically, female rodents that have been exposed to androgens early in 
development show more male-typical mounting behavior than do normal adult 
females. Conversely, males deprived of androgens by castration during the same 
critical period will subsequently mount less and display female mating posture 
(called ‘lordosis’), when they are mounted (Goy & McEwen, 1980, p. 17).
Similar hypotheses have been developed for humans, although, for obvious reasons, there 
have been no human experiments to investigate their validity. It is very problematic 
extrapolating from sexual behavior in rats to human sexuality. That rats are the only species 
with such overt adult consequences to changes in neonatal and prenatal hormone levels 
identified thus far probably argues against any comparable process in humans (Byne, 1996).
A variant o f hormonal hypotheses is the Prenatal Stress Hypothesis which postulates that 
significant stress during the prenatal period impacts the hormonal milieu of the fetus and can 
impact future sexual orientation. A number of animal models have been presented and 
replicated supporting the model in both rats and mice (LeVay, 1996). Domer et al (1980) 
presented data to suggest that homosexual males report that their mothers suffered 
significantly increased amounts o f stress during pregnancy. However, numerous efforts to 
replicate Domer’s studies have failed to show a correlation between prenatal stress in humans 
and future homosexual orientation (Byne, 1996).
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Human Prenatal Hormone Abnormalities
Several different medical conditions in humans are associated with low or no exposure to 
androgens in male newborns and excessive androgen exposure in female newborns. These 
syndromes and disorders account for the development o f pseudohermaphroditism and the so- 
called ‘inter-sexed’ infant. For several decades, these ‘inter-sexed’ infants were treated with 
surgery to create external genitalia consistent with one sex or the other.
Research into the subsequent sexual orientation of such individuals tends to support a 
formative experience model. Regardless o f their genetic sex or the nature of the prenatal 
hormonal exposure, these individuals usually become heterosexual in accordance with the sex 
they are assigned - provided that the sex assignment is made unambiguously and early 
(Meyer-Bahlburg, 1984). However, some studies have reported an increase in homosexual 
fantasies or behavior among women who were exposed to excess androgens as fetuses. 
Friedman and Downey (1993) note that these findings were not robust, and interpretation is 
difficult given the limitations of the experimental design and execution.
Interestingly, Hall and Kimura (1994) of the University o f Western Ontario found a 
relationship between the number of fingertip ridges on men and their sexual orientation. They 
compared the number of ridges on the index finger and thumb of the left hand with the 
number of the corresponding fingers of the right hand. They found that 30% of the 
homosexuals tested had a surplus o f ridges on their left hand, whereas only 14% of the 
heterosexuals did. This is o f particular interest, because fingerprints are fully determined in a 
fetus before the 17th week of pregnancy, and do not change thereafter. This seems to suggest 
that the sexual orientation of some adult homosexuals was determined before birth, perhaps at 
conception, and certainly by the end of the 4th month of pregnancy (Donn, 2000).
Researchers at the University of California at Berkeley (Donn, 2000) compared the length 
of index fingers and ring fingers of 720 volunteers. It is well known that men’s index fingers 
tend to be shorter than their ring fingers and that women tend to have index and ring fingers 
that are about the same length. They found that lesbians tended to have shorter index fingers 
(relative to their ring fingers) than heterosexual women. They also found that gay males 
tended to have shorter index fingers (relative to their ring fingers) than heterosexual males.
The relative size of a person’s fingers is determined well before birth, implying that sexual 
orientation is also at least partly decided before birth.
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A group of researchers at the University o f Texas found structural differences in the inner 
ears of lesbians and heterosexual women (Weeks, 1985b). On average, women have more 
sensitive cochlea amplifiers than men; they are able to detect softer sounds in a very quiet 
room. The researchers found that lesbians had inner ear characteristics similar to those of 
men. The structure of the inner ear forms before birth and is affected during pregnancy by 
both androgens and viral infections.
Prenatal viral and bacterial infections as well as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and toxins 
have been tied to a number of overt clinical conditions that begin in utero. Examples include 
fetal alcohol syndrome, congenital rubella, congenital syphilis, and thalidomide associated 
phocomelia. Prenatal, postnatal and childhood exposures to these environmental agents have 
been posited as potential origins for a variety of conditions that appear on the surface to have 
roots in both genetic risk and environmental exposure. Schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
juvenile onset diabetes, and a variety of autoimmune disorders have been investigated for 
potential environmental exposures as catalysts to the development of the condition. An 
argument could easily be made to support such a hypothesis in the case o f homosexuality and 
a variety o f sexual fetishes.
Immune Hypothesis
T. Binstock introduced an immune hypothesis in November o f2001:
Sexual orientation is encoded within immune cell subsets (ICS) o f mucosal 
and epithelial tissues. Gender orientation may be encoded within other ICS.
Many immune cells recognize and react to H-Y and H-X antigens and enact these 
perceptions and reactions in accord with the perceiver’s and the perceived’s MHC 
haplotype, XX or XY status, and immune self recognition. Non-heterosexual 
orientations derive from excessive cross priming, accompanied by clonal 
deletions, clonal expansions, anergy, and tolerance. For at least some tissues, 
cross priming sufficient to induce altered orientations occurs during critical 
periods of immunological development and can occur during fetal and infant 
development via maternal-fetal transfusion, placental pathology, and impaired 
maternal nutrient-status or via excessive peripheral apoptosis during postnatal 
illness. Most cell interactions with neurons illustrate how mucosal perceptions 
can be transduced into neuronal signals that modulate central nervous system 
events. This hypothesis is testable by mixed-lymphocyte reactions in appropriate 
cell subsets. Dendritic cell immunizations are thought to be a potential therapy, 
(pp. 583-584)
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Although still very much in the hypothetical stage, this immunological hypothesis offers a 
multi-dimensional view that suggests a potential diversity o f phenotypic expression o f sexual 
orientation. This could account for homosexuality, bisexuality, fetishes, and a multitude of 
heterosexual behaviors (kinks) that can be difficult to explain in psychological terms.
Neuroanatomy
Gorski et al (1978) described a neuroanatomic structure in rats five to eight times greater in 
males than in females. This structure, known as the sexually dimorphic nucleus o f the 
preoptic area (SDN-POA), was found to decrease mounting behavior on destruction and 
increase mounting behavior on stimulation (Slimp et al, 1978). With similar findings in other 
laboratory species, the preoptic area has been proposed as the site that regulates male sex 
behavior in mammals (Byne, 1996).
A much popularized study by Le Vay (1991) at the Salk Institute in California identified 
the INAH3 nuclei in the anterior hypothalamus as being significantly larger in men than in 
women and gay men with AIDS. Studies with other species indicate that the SDN-POA site 
size is dependent on androgen levels. Le Vay’s study is criticized for using gay men who 
later died o f AIDS, a group that routinely has very low testosterone levels as part o f the 
disease process and as a consequence of treatment. Other criticisms include the inability to 
replicate the study findings.
The suprachiasmic nucleus (SCN) has been reported to be larger in homosexual men than 
in heterosexual individuals with no statistical difference between men and women (Swaab & 
Hoffman, 1990). Like Le Vay’s work, this study has not been replicated and gay men who 
subsequently died from AIDS were used as the homosexual controls.
Brain commissures and the corpus callosum have been examined extensively for evidence 
o f differential size with relation to gender and sexual orientation. However, the reliability o f 
these studies also suffers the same difficulties as the hypothalamic studies; male AIDS victims 
were used for the homosexual controls and none o f the studies are predictably replicable.
Genetics
Henry (1941) published extensive case material on 40 male and 40 female ‘sex variants’ 
(mostly homosexual). Pillard et al (1981) tabulated the frequency o f homosexuality in
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siblings from the family trees o f Henry’s studies and concluded that 10.6% o f the brothers and 
7.7% of the sisters of the sex variants were also homosexual, a much higher percentage than 
would occur in a random survey of the population (Pillard, 1996). Of note is that of the 12 
homosexual or bisexual aunts and uncles in Henry’s kin, 11 came from the maternal lineage 
(Pillard, 1996). Henry’s study also documents numerous scattered reports o f families with 
dense clusters o f homosexual members, markedly exceeding chance.
Pillard et al (1982), Pillard and Weinrich (1986) demonstrated that gay male probands had 
a considerable excess of gay and bisexual brothers but no excess o f lesbian sisters when 
compared to heterosexual men. A similar study revealed a trend for lesbians to have more 
lesbian sisters and a few more gay brothers than their heterosexual peers (Pillard, 1988).
Pillard (1996) identified a sibship of three brothers and four sisters in which all three 
brothers were homosexual or bisexual and three o f the four sisters were homosexual. The 
odds that such a sibship could occur by chance depends on the frequency o f male and female 
homosexuality in the population; the more common homosexuality is, the less remarkable a 
family with multiple homosexual siblings. With the use of conservative assumptions, Pillard 
calculated the odds to be about 1 in 100 million.
A high degree o f concordance (50%) for homosexuality in identical (monozygotic) twins 
has been reported on numerous occasions (Green & Stoller, 1971; Heston & Shield, 1968; 
Kallman, 1952; Mesnikoff et al, 1963; Parker, 1964; Pillard et al, 1981; Puterbaugh, 1990; 
Rainer et al, 1960). Bailey and Pillard (1991) and Bailey et al (1993) report a 52% 
concordance rate for male identical twins and 48% concordance for female identical twins, a 
22% concordance for dizygotic and non-twin brothers and a 16% concordance for dizygotic 
twin sisters and non-twin sisters, an 11% concordance rate for adopted brothers and 6% for 
adopted sisters. The concordance rates for adopted siblings (11% and 6%) are higher than the 
incidence in the general population, suggesting some environmental contribution. These 
statistics suggest that a combination o f genetic and environmental factors contribute - a mix of 
nature and nurture in predicting sexual orientation. The ideal scenario would be to study a 
cohort o f identical twins separated at birth, but unfortunately the numbers of such events 
occurring naturally are too small to provide meaningful research material.
Hamer et al (1993) of the National Cancer Institute (Washington, DC) successfully 
demonstrated a genetic linkage o f the q28 region at the tip o f the long arm of the X-
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chromosome in 33 of 40 pairs o f gay brothers who had other gay relatives related through the 
maternal lineage. Although yet to be replicated; this study offers molecular geneticists a 
specific gene locus to investigate. With recent advances in human genome technology, it is 
likely that allelic associations will demonstrate multiple gene sites interacting, which impact 
sexual orientation in a variety o f ways. These studies will require large numbers o f control 
and study subjects (Plomin et al, 1994).
Rice (1995), a neurologist at the University o f Western Ontario, conducted a test that 
contributes a new dimension to the Hamer study. He studied 46 families with 2 gay brothers, 
and 2 families with 3 gay brothers. They weren’t selected on these grounds alone, however, 
but because a pedigree test was the reverse o f the Hamer study. In the case of Rice’s subjects, 
homosexuality was present mostly on their father’s side of the family, and not the mother’s.
As a male’s X chromosome is inherited only from his mother, and as there were few or no 
gays on the mother’s side among Rice’s subjects, it would appear that sexual orientation was 
not caused by the genes on the chromosomes. If there were any ‘gay-causing’ genes among 
the 98 subjects, they would have to be elsewhere than the X chromosome. As anticipated, 
from his special group of subjects, Rice was unable to replicate Hamer’s findings of common 
sequences on the X chromosome.
One theory holds that the penetrance of the ‘gay gene’ is approximately 67%; in other 
words, when the ‘gay gene’ is present there is a 67% chance of the carrier being gay (Weeks,
1985). Assuming this to accurate, one would expect that when one fraternal twin is gay the 
other would also be gay about 22% o f the time. This would also be consistent with studies of 
identical twins (Weeks, 1985).
Ecological Genetics
Another aspect is described by Plomin et al who note that if shared environment (e.g. the 
family’s socioeconomic level) contributes to the variance in sexual orientation, we should 
observe a lesbian or gay orientation as frequently in adopted as in biological siblings, as they 
all share the same family situation. Studies o f other behavioral traits point in the same 
direction; different environmental influences tend to make children in the same family differ 
rather than otherwise.
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Kirsh and Weinrich (1991) raise the question o f the evolutionary significance of genes 
promoting non-heterosexuality. It has been suggested that non-heterosexuality must have 
been favorably selected at some point in human evolution because it is far too common to be 
the result o f accidental mutations, which would otherwise be removed by the natural process 
o f selection. A mechanism for the conservation of gay genes is a subject for significant 
debate and future research.
Evolutionary geneticists raise the question o f gene value, noting that in a wide variety of 
cultures, gender variant individuals play special roles as shamans, mediators, artists, helpers 
and so on. It has been suggested that these genes persist because of their value to the 
community (LeVay, 1996).
Alcock (1984) describes one possibility as ‘kin altruism’, referring to individuals who help 
relatives survive and reproduce at the expense o f their own reproductive potential. An 
example from nature is that of the lion pride. Larger prides are most successful in patrolling 
the territory and protecting the cubs when there are 4 or more male lions (usually brothers). 
Although one would assume that all four males would be reproducing at the same rate, DNA 
fingerprinting reveals that one or two males sire most o f the cubs and some males sire none. 
Because the males are closely related, the genes o f the non-reproducing male get passed to the 
cubs via a brother (Pillard, 1996).
One way to look beyond the immediate value o f a gene-mediated trait to the reproduction 
of its owner is to ask whether the gene confers any reproductive benefit on heterozygous 
carriers (Hutchinson, 1981). Sickle cell anemia is a classic example. When two heterozygous 
adults mate in a population where the sickle cell gene is prevalent, 50% of the offspring are 
afforded protection against malaria, 25% o f the offspring go unprotected and 25% of the 
offspring suffer the shortened life-span caused by active sickle cell anemia. It has been 
hypothesized that the heterozygous state provides some special, obscure benefits and that 
homozygous states result in increased homosexuality and decreased reproductive outcome.
Mainstream scientific opinion continues to hypothesize that there are probably multiple 
forms of homosexuality and bisexuality with multiple biological origins related to several 
gene loci which interact in some cases to direct future sexual orientation and in others to 
facilitate environmental determinants o f future sexual orientation.
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Infectious Hypothesis
Biologist Paul Ewald and physicist Gregory Cochran theorize, with indirect reasoning, 
that homosexual orientation may be caused by exposure to bacteria or a virus (Crain, 1999).
Any genetic trait that reduces a person’s chance o f procreation is said to have a ‘fitness 
cost’. A trait that has a ‘fitness cost’ o f 1% lowers the probability o f having children by 1%.
In this case, the trait would essentially disappear within 100 generations. Homosexuality has 
a ‘fitness cost’ that is much higher than 1%. A 1981 study in San Francisco showed that gays 
and lesbians have only 20% as many children as heterosexuals. In other words, the fitness 
cost factor among that sample of homosexuals is 80%. This number was probably much 
lower in the past, as gays and lesbians were forced into marriages in order to escape detection. 
Since homosexuality has not disappeared but seems to have a high fitness cost, the researchers 
speculate that the trait is at least partly determined by some outside agent, such as infection 
(p.9).
Aside from the fact that no infectious agent has even been theoretically indicated, much 
less found, it is a fact that infections tend to peak in a few geographical areas for limited 
duration and there are no obvious concentrations o f gays and lesbians who grew up in the 
same area or who are all nearly the same age. One can also criticize the theory by suggesting 
that homosexuality may have sufficient advantage to overcome its fitness cost.
The above provides a small cross section of a variety o f biological explanations for 
homosexual behavior and desire. Some of the research is flawed in its design, some flawed 
by the prejudices o f the researchers, other experiments have failed to be replicated, while 
some await replication, and many are just hypothetical cases. Criticism of the biological 
studies mirrors that of psychological explanations, in that the beliefs and values of the 
researchers often determine the direction of the research.
With the explosion o f research not yet in fruition from the human genome project, I 
anticipate a biological explanation that describes several pathways leading to the potential 
phenotype for a non-heterosexual adult sexuality including a biogenetic path for an evolving 
sexual orientation over time. I believe a role for human pheromones will be discovered, not 
just for adult interactions but also for imprinting on the brain a template for future objects o f 
sexual desire in children and perhaps adolescents. Such a system would lend itself to impact 
by both biology and environment, across the lifespan.
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Chapter 9: A Psychological Philosophy of Sexual Orientation
Psychology and psychiatry have been the driving clinical force behind sexual reorientation 
interventions since the medicalization of sexuality and non-heterosexuality in particular that 
occurred in the late 1800s. An appreciation of the evolution o f psychological and psychiatric 
thought on sexual orientation is key to a critical analysis of this ethical debate. Many of the 
stakeholders throw out as fact concepts that reflect social construction and not science.
Early Scientific Theories
In his Outlines on the Lectures o f  Mental Disease, prepared in 1825, Sir Alexander 
Morrison wrote that:
Monomania with Unnatural Propensity is a variety o f partial insanity, the 
principal feature o f which is an irresistible propensity to the crime against nature. 
This offense is so generally abhorred, that in treatise upon law it is termed 
'peccatum illud hooibile inter Christianas non nominandum ... Being of so 
detestable a character it is a consolation to know that it is sometimes the 
consequence of insanity; it is however, a melancholic truth that the offense has 
been committed in Christian countries by persons in full possession of their reason 
and capable of controlling their actions (p.2).
Only in the last half of the nineteenth century did homosexuality become the subject of 
concerted scientific investigation (Bayer, 1987). Carl Westphal, a professor of psychiatry in 
Berlin, is credited with having placed the study o f homosexuality on a clinical, scientific 
footing when he published a case history o f a female homosexual in 1869. Terming her 
condition ‘contrary sexual feelings’, he concluded that her abnormality was congenital rather 
than acquired. Westphal went on to study more than two hundred such cases, developing a 
classification of the variety of behaviors associated with homosexuality (Bullough, 1977).
In France, the Director of the Salpetriere, Charcot, also concluded that homosexuality was 
inherited after failing to effect a cure through hypnosis (Bayer, 1987). So far as his colleague 
Moreau was concerned, homosexuality was the outcome o f an inherited constitutional 
weakness and environmental forces (Bullough, 1974). Most important of the late nineteenth 
century students o f sexual deviance was Von Krafft-Ebing, whose monumental Psychopathia 
Sexualis had an enormous impact on informed opinion about homosexuality and emphasized 
both inherited and acquired origins (Bayer, 1987).
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Cesar Lombroso, the late nineteenth century Italian criminologist, argued that homosexuals 
represented a lower stage of development than heterosexuals:
Though the human race had evolved over eons, leaving behind its own 
primitive behavior, each child was required to recapitulate the process in the 
course o f its own development. Those with defective heredity failed to complete 
that process and remained at a less civilized point in the evolutionary course 
(1883, p.8).
Since homosexuals could not, in Lombroso’s view, be held responsible for their own 
failure, no justification existed for their punishment (Bayer, 1987). However, social defense 
required that they be restricted to asylums because of the danger they posed (Bayer, 1987).
Karl Ulrichs, one of the most prolific defenders of homosexuals in the late nineteenth 
century, asserted in the 1860s that homosexuality was a hereditary anomaly: “While the 
genitals o f homosexuals developed along expected lines, their brains did not, and so it was 
possible for a female soul to be lodged in a male’s body.” These views anticipated those of 
Havelock Ellis, whose work Sexual Inversion sought to demonstrate that homosexuality was 
inborn, and therefore, natural. Finally, Magnus Hirschfeld, the great German advocate of 
homosexual rights, held that homosexuality was not pathological but the result o f inborn 
characteristics determined by glandular secretions (1871).
Bayer (1987) emphasizes that the discoveries o f  the late nineteenth century did little to 
frame an understanding of homosexuality, stressing that the perspective on homosexuality 
determined the meaning of those facts. This is a phenomenon that reverberates throughout 
gay and lesbian philosophy.
Psychoanalysis
For Freud, as for most of those who undertook scientific study of sexuality in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the idea that heterosexuality represented the normal 
end o f psychosexual development (Bayer, 1987) went without question. Freud maintained 
that, despite the complex and uncertain process of maturation, “ ... one of the tasks implicit in 
object choice is that it should find its way to the opposite sex” (Freud, 1962, p. 123).
In Freud’s attempt to explain sexual inversion, he set himself in sharp opposition to those 
scientists who claimed that homosexuality was an indication o f degeneracy. Instead, he 
asserted that such a diagnosis could only be justified if homosexuals typically exhibited a
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number of serious deviations from normal behavior and if their capacity for survival and 
‘efficient functioning’ was severely impaired (Freud, 1962). This perspective distinguished 
Freud from many o f his earliest followers as well as from later psychoanalytic philosophers 
who saw in homosexuality a profound disturbance affecting every aspect o f social functioning 
(Bayer, 1987).
While many early psychoanalytic organizations and institutions sought to ban homosexuals 
from psychoanalytic training and professional memberships, Freud rejected these suggestions, 
saying:
In effect we cannot exclude such persons without other sufficient reasons, as 
we cannot agree with their legal prosecution. We feel that a decision in such 
cases should depend upon a thorough examination o f the other qualities o f the 
candidate (Freud & Rank, 1922, p.9).
To a similar suggestion by the Berlin psychoanalytic society, Freud responded that while 
barring homosexuals from psychoanalytic work might serve as something o f a ‘guideline’, it 
was necessary to avoid a rigid posture since there were many types o f homosexuality as well 
as quite diverse psychological mechanisms that could account for its existence (Freud &
Rank, 1922).
Freud characterized homosexuality as a natural feature of human psychosexual existence, a 
component of the libidinal drives of all men and women. According to his beliefs, all children 
passed through a homosexual phase in their psychosexual development, on the route to 
heterosexuality. Even in those who advanced successfully beyond the earlier phase o f  
development, however, homosexual tendencies remained (Bayer, 1987): “The homosexual 
tendencies are n o t... done away with or brought to a stop. They were rather deflected from 
their original target and served other ends” (Freud, 1963, p. 163). For Freud, social instincts 
such as friendship, camaraderie, and ‘general love for mankind’ all derived their strength - 
their erotic component - from the unconscious homosexual impulses o f those who had 
achieved the capacity for heterosexual relations (Bayer, 1987).
The capacity for both homosexual and heterosexual love was linked by Freud to what he 
believed was instinctual, constitutional bisexuality. Activity, passivity, and the desire to 
introduce a part of one’s body into that o f another or to have a part of another body introduced 
into oneself, and finally masculinity and femininity, were all reflections of bisexuality 
(Fenichel, 1945). At times the active, masculine drives dominated, at others the feminine,
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passive drives did. In no case was a person utterly without both sets o f drives. Just as with 
homosexual impulses, the repressed was not obliterated. Even in adults who had traversed the 
course to heterosexuality, masculine and feminine impulses coexisted (Freud, 1970).
Freud set forth a number o f explanations for the perversion o f the normal course o f 
psychosexual development resulting in an exclusively homosexual adult male. The classical 
mechanisms discovered during his psychoanalytic work stressed a number of possibilities, 
any one of which might determine a homosexual outcome. Regardless o f the specific factors 
involved, however, all started from the assumption that exclusive homosexuality represented 
an arrest o f the developmental process, an instinctual fixation at a stage short of normal 
heterosexuality (Bayer, 1987).
Among Freud’s first formulations on the etiology of homosexuality was one that focused 
on the male child’s attachment to his own genitals as a source of pleasure. Like all boys, 
those who are destined to become homosexual find in the penis a source o f enormous 
pleasure. Freud believed, however, that in fiiture homosexuals there was an inborn 
‘excessive’ interest in their own genitals during the autoerotic phase o f psychosexual 
development: “Indeed it is the high esteem felt by the homosexual for the male organ which 
decides his fate” (Freud, 1971).
Later, Freud (1962) asserted that homosexuality was linked to the profound frustration 
experienced during the Oedipal phase by those boys who had developed especially intense 
attachments to their mothers. Denied the sexual gratification they longed for, these boys 
regressed to an earlier stage of development, and identified with the woman they could not 
have. They then sought young men who resembled themselves as sexual partners and loved 
them in the way that they wished they themselves had been loved by their mothers (Bayer, 
1987).
According to Fenichel (1945), in those cases where an intense attachment to the mother 
was combined with a fixation upon the erotic pleasures o f the anus, the dynamics were 
somewhat different. In these instances, a desire to receive sexual gratification from the 
mother was transformed into a wish to enjoy sex in the way she did: “With this as a point o f 
departure, the father becomes the object o f love, and the individual strives to submit to him as 
the mother does, in a passive-receptive manner” (Fenichel, 1945, p. 12).
While Freud saw the child’s attachment to the mother as pivotal in most cases, he was 
careful to note instances in which the father and other male figures played a central role in the 
etiology o f homosexuality (Bayer, 1987). In some cases, the homosexual outcome could be 
determined by the absence of the mother. Deprived o f a woman’s presence, the young boy 
might develop a deep attachment to his father or another older male and consequently later 
seek someone reminiscent of the primary object o f his love in his sexual partners. 
Alternatively, homosexuality could be accounted for in terms of the fear o f the anger aroused 
in his father by the son’s Oedipal strivings. Terrified by the prospect of his father’s retaliatory 
rage, the young boy could be forced to withdraw from his intense attachment to his mother. 
Having in this instance chosen to ‘retire in favor’ of the more powerful male, such a boy 
would then abandon women entirely. Thereafter only a homosexual attachment could provide 
sexual gratification without anxiety about castration (Freud, 1971).
Finally, a later speculation of Freud’s suggested yet another formulation in the etiology o f 
homosexuality involving a powerful male (Bayer, 1987). In this case, an older male sibling 
was crucial. Jealousy derived from intense competition for the mother’s attention generated 
murderous impulses in the younger boy, and partly because of training, but more importantly 
because the boy recognized his own relative weakness, he was forced to repress those wishes. 
Transformed in the process, they would then express themselves as homosexual love for the 
formerly hated brother (Freud, 1922).
Running throughout Freud’s efforts to identify the roots of homosexuality was a complex 
series o f combinations of inherited, ‘constitutional’ factors and environmental or ‘accidental’ 
influences (Bayer, 1987). To Freud, the fact that not everyone subjected to similar influences 
became homosexual suggested that biological forces played an important role (Freud, 1962). 
Confronted by an extraordinary richness of detail in his case studies, Freud (1963, p.320) 
remarked that he had uncovered a “ ... continual mingling and blending” of what in theory 
“we should try to separate into a pair of opposites - namely, inherited and acquired factors.”
As a theoretician, Freud (1922, p. 13) was committed to the proposition: “that all psychic 
phenomena were determined by antecedent forces beyond the individual’s control.” This 
determinism, as well as his own more generous attitude toward the basic instinctual drives of 
human beings, made him so unalterably opposed to the rigid, condemnatory stance towards 
homosexuals o f the society in which he lived. That same determinism made his work an
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anathema to those whose world-view demanded that individuals be held to account for 
deliberate violations of what were then considered civilized sexual standards (Bayer, 1987).
Freud was especially pessimistic about the prospects for the psychoanalytic ciire o f 
homosexuality: “One must remember that normal sexuality also depends upon a restriction in 
the choice of object; in general, to undertake to convert a fully developed homosexual into a 
heterosexual is not much more promising than to do the reverse, only that for good practical 
reasons the latter is never attempted” (Freud, 1922, p.45). At the basis of this profound 
limitation o f his own technique was his belief that the cure o f homosexuals involved the 
conversion o f one “variety o f genital organization o f sexuality into the other” rather than the 
resolution of a neurotic conflict (Freud, 1922, p.44).
Unlike the neuroses, which were a source of pain and discomfort, homosexuality was a 
source of pleasure: “Perversions are the negative of neuroses” (Freud, 1962, p. 12). To treat a 
homosexual successfully would necessitate convincing him that if he gave up his current 
source of erotic pleasure he could again “find the pleasure he had renounced” (Freud, 1962, 
p.27). Aware of how difficult it was for neurotics to change, Freud was unable to strike a 
positive therapeutic stance with respect to homosexuality (Bayer, 1987). Only where the 
homosexual fixation was relatively weak, or where there remained “considerable rudiments 
and vestiges of a heterosexual choice o f object” was the prognosis more favorable (Freud, 
1922, p. 34).
Freud’s therapeutic pessimism, as well as his acknowledgment that many homosexuals, 
though arrested in their development, could derive pleasure from both love and work provides 
the context in which his compassionate and now famous Letter to an American Mother of 
1933 was penned:
Dear Mrs...
I  gather from your letter that your son is a homosexual. I  am most impressed 
by the fact that you do not mention this term yourself in your information about 
him. May I  question you, why you avoid it? Homosexuality is assuredly no 
advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed o f no vice, no degradation, it cannot 
be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation o f  the sexual function 
produced by a certain arrest o f  sexual development. Many highly respectable 
individuals o f  ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several o f  the 
greatest men among them (Plato, Michaelangelo, Leonardo Da Vinci, etc.). It is a 
great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime, and cruelty too. I f  you do 
not believe me, read the books o f Havelock Ellis.
84
By asking me i f  I  can help, you mean, I  suppose, i f  lea n  abolish 
homosexuality and make normal heterosexuality take its place. The answer is, in 
a general way, we cannot promise to achieve it. In a certain number o f  cases we 
succeed in developing the blighted germs o f heterosexual tendencies that are 
present in every homosexual, in the majority o f cases it is no more possible. It is 
a question o f  the quality and the age o f the individual. The result o f  treatment 
cannot be predicted.
What analysis can do fo r  your son runs in a different line. I f  he is unhappy, 
neurotic, torn by conflict, inhibited in his social life, analysis may bring him 
harmony, peace o f  mind, fu ll efficiency whether he remains homosexual or gets 
changed...
Sincerely yours with kind wishes,
Freud. (1957)
In the search for an early developmental disturbance in homosexual women, Ernest Jones 
(1927, p.23) asked: “What differentiates the development o f homosexual from that o f 
heterosexual women?” As psychoanalytic theory expanded from drive theory through ego 
psychology and object-relations models, various answers to Jones’ question emerged. The 
specific disturbance o f early development said to characterize women with homosexual 
feelings or lesbian relationships have included the following:
• A disorder of drive/object caused by penis envy at the Oedipal stage, which leads to a 
repulsion towards heterosexual relations and a regression to a fixation to an earlier object 
(Fenichel, 1945, Freud, 1920).
• A disordered identification with the father in which identification replaces object 
relationship (Freud, 1920; Jones, 1927), or an identification with the father in order to 
prevent psychotic symbiosis with mother (McDougal, 1970).
• Failed identification with mother due to maternal envy (Freud, 1920/1955) or maternal 
narcissism (Siegal, 1988) or the masochistic debasement of the life o f mother (Romm, 
1965).
• A disturbance of early (mother/child) object relations characterized by masochism 
(Brierley, 1932; Deutsch, 1948; Socarides, 1978) or failed separation-individuation 
(Socarides, 1968).
• A premature genital awareness (Khan, 1964); a precocious turn-on of erotic desire which 
“occurs when the child has been excluded from ‘good enough’ or Tong enough’ primary 
bliss and seeks inclusion by a sexual bond and sexual wooing” (Eisenbud, 1982, p.32).
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Marmor (1980), Herdt and Stoller (1985) took exception to attempts to find a common 
psychodynamic denominator in female homosexuality. Instead, they stressed the multi­
determined nature o f any psychic phenomenon and pointed to the prejudices embedded in 
psychological theories about homosexuality in women.
Rado, Bieber & Socarides
Though some analysts were more sanguine, Freud’s pessimism regarding the potential o f a 
therapeutic reversal of homosexuality dominated psychoanalytic thinking for almost forty 
years (Bayer, 1987). A marked shift took place in the 1940s, influenced in large measure by 
the work of Sandor Rado and his adaptational school o f psychoanalysis.
In Rado’s view, Freud had made a fundamental error in assuming that the ambiguous 
sexuality o f the zygote implies the presence o f both male and female attributes in the psyche. 
This, he declared, was an “arbitrary leap from the embryological to the psychological” 
(Kardiner et al, 1959). Unduly influenced by the ancient myth of the unity of male and 
female, Freud had failed to understand that:
... the sexes are an outcome of evolutionary differentiation o f contrasting yet 
complementary reproductive systems. Aside from the so-called hermaphrodite ... 
every individual is either male or female. The view that each individual is both male 
and female (either more male or less female or the other way around) ... has no 
scientific foundation (Rado, 1962, p.62).
Rado went on to assert that, while biology dictated the appropriate nature o f sexuality, 
humans did not inherit biological directives regarding the use of their sexual organs. Instead, 
the remarkable inventions of culture supplied the requisite instructions.
For Rado, homosexuality represented a ‘reparative’ attempt on the part of human beings to 
achieve sexual pleasure when the normal heterosexual outlet proved too threatening. While 
fear and resentment could thwart the natural expression of heterosexual desire, they could not 
destroy it - only schizophrenic disorganization could achieve that end (Rado, 1962).
Having explained homosexuality as a phobic response to members of the opposite sex 
rather than a component of human instinctual life, and having assumed the ever-present 
existence o f a strong heterosexual drive, Rado and his followers were able to adopt a more 
positive therapeutic stance. This new optimism, conveyed primarily through the work of 
those at Columbia University’s Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research, began to
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affect the theoretical and clinical work of a number of psychoanalysts who became prominent 
during the 1960s, when the status of homosexuals became an issue of great social concern 
(Bayer, 1987).
Bieber (1962) noted that all psychoanalytic theories assume that homosexuality is 
pathologic and explicitly rejected the Freudian assumption of constitutional bisexuality and an 
innate homosexual drive, emphasizing instead that exclusive heterosexuality was the 
biological norm. He set out to reverse the classical psychoanalytic belief in the presence of a 
latent homosexual drive in all heterosexuals and asserted that, “every homosexual is a latent 
heterosexual (p.43).”
Having rejected the possibility that constitutional factors could account for the 
development o f homosexuality, Bieber turned to an analysis o f the families o f the patients 
described in the New York Psychoanalytic Society’s sample o f homosexuals undergoing 
treatment (Bayer, 1987): “Our findings point to the homosexual adaptation as an outcome of 
exposure to highly pathologic parent-child relationships and early life situations” (Bieber, 
1962, p.2).
Mothers who were excessively protective and intimate were believed to have 
thwarted the normal development o f their sons by responding to their heterosexual 
drives with hostility, often expressing demasculinizing and feminizing attitudes, 
interfering with the father-son relationship by fostering competitiveness, often 
favoring their sons over their husbands, inhibiting the development o f normal peer 
relationships with other boys and damaging the capacity for independent action, 
subverting every sign o f autonomy (Bieber, 1962, p.23).
For Bieber, the picture with regard to paternal relationships was equally bleak: “ ... 
profound interpersonal disturbance is unremitting in homosexual father-son relationships,” 
and though relationships between the heterosexual controls and their fathers were often “not 
normal,” they were generally “far more wholesome” (p.25).
As a group, the fathers of homosexuals were depicted as detached, hostile, minimizing, and 
openly rejecting (Bayer, 1987). By failing to meet their sons’ needs for affection, they 
created a pathological need that could be satisfied only by other males through homosexual 
adaptation (Bieber, 1962).
According to Bieber:
... the pathological basis o f homosexual adaptation precludes a stable and 
intimate relationship. Fear o f intimacy combined with a fear o f retaliation on the
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part of other excluded males make homosexual couples relatively volatile. The 
hostility and competitiveness of such relationships bring to even the most 
apparently satisfactory among them a quality o f  ambivalence leading ultimately to 
impermanence and transience, hence the ceaseless, compulsive, and often 
anonymous pattern of homosexual cruising, (p. 35)
It is curious that Bieber speculated that an inborn olfactory sense (pheromones) may act as 
a steering mechanism guiding both men and women to the opposite sex, although he failed to 
hypothesize a disorder o f receptors for the pheromones in homosexuals (Bayer, 1987). 
Socarides, like Bieber, became a leading force in American psychiatry o f the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, characterizing homosexuality as a profound psychopathology. Heterosexual 
object choice is determined by two and a half billion years o f human evolution, a product of 
sexual differentiation (Socarides, 1974). Socarides rejected pheromones’ role and argued that 
both homosexuality and heterosexuality are learned behaviors (Bayer, 1987).
Heterosexual object choice is outlined from birth according to a child’s 
anatomy and then reinforced by cultural and environmental indoctrination. It is 
further reinforced by universal human concepts of mating and the traditions o f the 
family unit, together with the complementary nature o f and contrast between the 
two sexes. Everything, from birth to death, is designed to perpetuate the male- 
female duality. This pattern is not only culturally ingrained, but anatomically 
outlined. The term ‘anatomically outlined’ does not, however, mean that 
choosing a person o f the opposite sex is an instinctual matter. The human being is 
a biologically emergent entity derived from evolution, favoring survival 
(Socarides, 1974, p.291).
Socarides shared Rado and Bieber’s view that homosexuality could be explained only in
terms of ‘massive childhood fears’ that disrupted what human evolution had decreed to be the
normal course of development (Socarides, 1975). His major contribution to psychoanalytic
theory o f homosexuality has been the suggestion that the disturbance responsible for those
fears occurred much earlier in life than other formulations inferred (Bayer, 1987), being pre-
Oedipal rather than Oedipal in origin:
The failure to successfully transverse the stage o f development that occurs 
before the age of three years, at which point the child is believed to establish an 
identity separate from that o f the mother (the separation-individuation phase), has 
dire consequences. In the case of the male child, remaining pathologically bound to 
the mother precludes the emergence of an appropriate gender-identity.
Consequently, all ‘true’ or ‘obligatory’ homosexuals are characterized by a 
feminine identification, and any effort to establish a relationship with a woman 
other than the mother produces profound separation anxiety, while producing a
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terrifying dread of potential engulfment and loss o f the self’ (Socarides, 1969, 
p.202).
According to Bayer:
Socarides established a theoretical justification for characterizing 
homosexuality as more profoundly pathological than it was generally considered 
to be when Oedipal conflicts were stressed, by pushing the etiology of 
homosexuality back to the pre-Oedipal phase o f development (p.204).
The desperate and compulsive search for sexual partners assumed to be part of gay life is 
interpreted as grasping for a sense of an ever-elusive masculinity, protecting the homosexual 
from his fear o f merging with his pre-Oedipal mother. “They hope to achieve a ‘shot’ of 
masculinity in the homosexual act. Like the addict [the homosexual] must have his ‘fix’ 
(Socarides, 1970, p.212).
Despite the prominence gained by the likes o f Socarides and Bieber in the 
1960s and 1970s, American psychoanalytic formulations and psychoanalytic 
interventions remained remarkably diverse, even though everyone agreed that 
homosexuality was pathological. When the dominance of psychoanalytic theory 
in American psychiatry began to wane in the 1960s, other schools of thought 
incorporated the view that homosexuality was an abnormality with considerable 
ease. For behaviorists, homosexuality was simply transformed from a perversion 
o f the normal pattern of psychosexual development into the ‘maladaptive 
consequence’ o f ‘inappropriate learning’ (Bayer 1987, p. 196).
Bayer notes that the virtual unanimity regarding the pathological status of homosexuality 
was strikingly underscored by Karl Menninger in his 1963 introduction to the American 
edition of the British Wolfenden Report. That report, which had gained international attention 
by calling for the decriminalization o f homosexual activity between consenting adults, 
rejected the classification o f homosexuality as a disease (Wolfenden Report, 1963). 
Applauding its criminal law recommendation, Menninger (1963) ignored the latter point, 
writing:
From the standpoint o f the psychiatrist, homosexuality constitutes evidence o f 
immature sexuality and either arrested psychological development or regression. 
Whatever it be called by the public there is no question in the minds of psychiatrists 
regarding the abnormality o f such behavior (p.l).
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Reparative and Conversion Therapies
The origins of modern-day secular reparative therapy can be traced many decades back to 
the research of Bieber, Hatterer, and Freud. Moberly, a conservative British Christian 
theologian, studied their works and developed a new theory for the cause of homosexuality - 
the hypothesis that it is caused solely by environmental factors, or incompetence on the part 
of the parent of the same gender.
She abandoned Freud’s emphasis on the domineering mother, focussing instead on the 
effect o f the ‘passive’ or ‘distant’ father. Moberly determined that the homosexual men in her 
studies were suffering from what she termed ‘defensive detachment’ and ‘same sex 
ambivalence’. Her hypothesis assumes that the young boy, for any of a variety of reasons, did 
not bond with his father in a meaningful way. Feeling the lack o f a positive relationship with 
his father, the boy ‘defensively detaches’ from any potential friendships with other boys of his 
age. After puberty, he redirects his longing for a close relationship with his father and other 
males towards a search for love. The longing is sexualized and manifested as attraction to 
other men, and the subject becomes an active homosexual.
The theory that inadequate or nonexistent fathering is a factor in the development o f male 
homosexuality is not supported by the fact that when fathers are absent, as often occurs during 
wartime, a dramatic increase in the incidence of male homosexuality is not noted. Nor do 
societal sub-cultures with a high incidence of single-parent families and absent fathers such as 
the Afro-Americans of the twentieth century register higher rates o f homosexuality than the 
norm.
Joseph Nicolosi, co-founder of NARTH, together with a number o f his colleagues, such as 
van den Aardweg, have expanded upon Moberly’s theories to formulate the most popular 
versions of reparative and conversion therapies available in America since the late twentieth 
century.
The first of seven principles postulated is the central theme o f the homosexual’s 
unconscious self-pity, perceived as a strong autonomous rumination propelling the 
masochistic behavior inherent in homosexuality. Homosexual desire is said to reside in this 
unconscious self-pity together with feelings o f gender inferiority (van den Aardweg, 1997). 
This view neatly combines the notions and behavioral observations of Adler (1930) (that 
inferiority complex and compensation wishes focus the individual on the ‘reparation’ of
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inferiority), with those o f Austrian-American psychoanalyst Bergler (1957) (homosexuality as 
‘psychic masochism’), and of Dutch psychiatrist Arndt (1961) (concept o f compulsive self- 
pity).
The second principle maintains that, because of his masculinity/femininity inferiority 
complex or gender inferiority complex, the homosexual remains in part ‘a child’, or ‘a 
teenager’. This observation is known as ‘psychic infantilism’ (van den Aardweg, 1997). 
William Stekel (1922) has emphasized this Freudian notion o f homosexuality, which is in line 
with the more recent concept o f ‘the inner child’ (Missildine, 1963; Harris, 1973).
Thirdly, more or less specific parental attitudes and parent-child relationships may 
predispose individuals to the development of homosexual gender inferiority complexes (van 
den Aardweg, 1997). This view synchronizes with those of neo-psychoanalysts Homey 
(1950) and Arndt (1961) and of self-image theorists such as Rogers (1951).
Fourthly, fear of the opposite sex is frequent (Ferenczi, 1914; Fenichel, 1945) but not a 
primary cause of homosexual inclinations. Rather, this fear is symptomatic of gender 
inferiority feelings, which can be activated by members o f the opposite sex, who appear to 
demand fulfillment of the expected sex roles that the homosexual feels unable to perform (van 
den Aardweg, 1997).
Fifthly, giving in to homosexual wishes creates a sexual addiction (van den Aardweg,
1997). Persons who have reached this stage essentially have two problems: their gender 
inferiority complex and a relatively autonomous sexual addiction (a situation comparable to 
that of a neurotic with a drinking problem). This is also known as the double syndrome of 
‘pleasure addiction’ (Hatterer, 1980).
Sixthly, in self-therapy, a special role is given to self-humor. Here we see Alder’s notions 
of self-irony, Arndt’s of ‘hyper-dramatization’, and to a lesser degree those o f behavior 
therapist Stampfl’s (1967) regarding ‘implosion’, and Victor Frankl’s (1975), regarding 
‘paradoxical intention’.
Lastly, insofar as homosexual desires are rooted in self-centeredness or immature 
‘egophilia’ (Murray, 1953), self-therapy emphasizes the acquisition of those human and moral 
virtues that have a ‘de-egocentric’ effect and enhance the capacity for heterosexual love (van 
den Aardweg, 1997).
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Learning Theory and Behavioral Therapy Models
Behavioral therapy, or behavioral modification, is based on the assumption that emotions 
and desires - like any behavior - are learned responses to the environment and can therefore 
be unlearned. Behavioral therapy, or behavioral modification, trains individuals to replace 
undesirable behaviors with healthier behavioral patterns. Unlike psychodynamic therapies, it 
does not focus on uncovering or understanding the unconscious motivations that may or may 
not be behind the unwanted behavior. In other words, therapists who are strictly behavioral 
don’t try to find out why their patients behave the way they do. They just teach them to 
change their behavior using systems of reward and punishment o f a type that has been 
employed throughout recorded history in an attempt to influence behavior, from rearing 
children to the treatment o f criminals within the justice system.
Modem behavioral therapy began in the 1950s with the work of Skinner and Wolpe.
Wolpe treated patients who suffered from phobias with a technique he developed, called 
‘systematic desensitization’. This involves gradually exposing a patient to anxiety-provoking 
stimuli until the anxiety response has been extinguished, or eliminated.
Skinner introduced a behavioral technique he called ‘operant conditioning’. This is based 
on the idea that an individual chooses his behavior on the basis o f past experiences o f the 
consequences of that behavior. If a behavior was associated with positive reinforcements or 
rewards in the past, the individual will choose it over that associated with punishments.
By the 1970s, behavior therapy had come to enjoy widespread popularity as a treatment 
approach to a variety of conditions that included homosexuality. Twenty-one articles 
published, all but two in the 1970s, report on the use of behavioral therapy - usually aversion 
therapy - to reduce the sexual response of gay males to other men and also frequently to 
increase the sexual response o f gay men to female sexual stimuli.
Since the 1970s, the attention o f behavioral therapists has increasingly focused on their 
clients’ cognitive processes, and many behaviorists have begun to use cognitive-behavioral 
therapy as the preferred model. Aversion therapy has fallen out o f favor with a majority o f 
behaviorists and has been largely abandoned for the purpose of changing sexual orientation or 
behavior secondary to mounting evidence o f a failure in long term efficacy.
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The Addiction and Compulsive Models of Homosexuality
In his book Homosexuality and the Politics o f Truth, Satinover (2001) compares 
homosexuality with alcoholism and attributes to it the following negative side-effects:
• A significantly decreased likelihood of being able to establish or preserve a successful 
marriage.
• A 25 to 35 year decrease in life expectancy (because of the risk o f contracting 
HIV/AIDS).
• The risk o f contracting chronic, potentially fatal, liver disease (infectious hepatitis, which 
increases the risk of liver cancer).
• The inevitable contraction o f a fatal immune disease, including associated cancers.
• An elevated risk of developing rectal cancer, which is often fatal.
• The risk o f contracting multiple bowel and other infectious diseases.
• A much elevated incidence of suicide.
• The improbability o f being able to eliminate adverse affects of the condition unless the 
condition itself is eliminated.
• The possibility o f eliminating homosexuality stands at only 50% and necessitates lengthy, 
often costly, and invariably very time-consuming treatment in the case o f unselected 
sufferers (although he notes success rates of as high as almost 100% in the case o f 
carefully selected, highly motivated individuals).
Satinover relates homosexuality to alcoholism, saying that even though its origin may be 
influenced by genetics, the condition is, strictly speaking, a behavioral pattern. Secondly, 
individuals who have this condition continue to demonstrate these patterns of behavior despite 
the destructive consequences of doing so. Thirdly, although some people with this condition 
perceive it as a problem and wish they could rid themselves o f it, many others deny that they 
have any problem at all and violently resist all attempts to ‘help’ them. Fourthly, some of the 
people with this condition - especially those who deny it is a problem - tend to socialize 
almost exclusively with one another, forming a subculture (Satinover, 2001).
The last decade of the twentieth century saw the appearance of many ‘transformational 
ministries’ intended to support homosexuals in their struggle to abstain from non-heterosexual 
behavior through prayer, spirituality, and the application of the principles of the ‘12 steps of 
recovery’ promoted by Alcoholics Anonymous. Many of these transformational ministries 
also incorporate principles from the reparative and conversion therapies.
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Homosexuality as Disease
Despite serious political challenges from homosexual activists and their ideological allies, 
psychiatric consensus on homosexuality remained undisturbed until 1968 (Bayer, 1987). In 
1952, when the American Psychiatric Association issued its first official listing of mental 
disorders, homosexuality and other sexual deviations were included among the sociopathic 
personality disturbances. These were deemed to be characterized by the absence of 
subjectively experienced distress or anxiety despite the presence of profound pathology. 
Explicitly acknowledging the centrality o f dominant social values in defining such conditions, 
DSM-1 asserted that individuals so diagnosed were “ ... ill primarily in terms o f society and of 
conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu” (Bayer, 1987).
In 1968, the second edition of the APA’s DSM  removed homosexuality from the category 
of sociopathic personality disturbances and listed it, together with the other sexual deviations 
(fetishism, pedophilia, transvestitism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, sadism and masochism) as 
“other non-psychotic mental disorders.” Two years after the release o f the second edition, the 
DSM  became the central focus o f the Gay Liberation movement’s attack on psychiatry 
(Bayer, 1987).
In 1973, homosexuality was deleted from DSM  nomenclature. This decision marked the 
culmination of two decades of struggle within psychiatry and in the American and Western 
cultures, which resulted in the shattering o f the fundamental moral and professional consensus 
on homosexuality (Bayer, 1987).
Despite the fact that the American Psychiatric Association has established that 
homosexuality is not a disease per se, there remain those within the mental health community 
who view non-heterosexuality, as well as many variants within heterosexual behavior, as 
pathological processes amenable to psychological intervention.
Gender-identity Disorders
Although homosexuality has been removed from the APA’s DSM, gender-identity disorder 
(GID) and childhood gender-identity disorder (CGID) remain. Gender-identity disorder is 
described as a strong and persistent cross-gender identification with persistent discomfort in 
the gender role o f the assigned sex. The diagnosis of gender-identity disorder is not made
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when the clinical scenario is complicated by chromosomal or physical inter-sex conditions. 
GID is also a separate and distinct entity from transvestitism.
Gender-identity disorder is the diagnosis for which sex change operations were developed. 
Retrospective and prospective data indicate an unusually high incidence of depression and 
suicide attempts in adult males who developed a gender-identity disorder in childhood and 
remained untreated, which fact is viewed as further evidence for continued inclusion in the 
APA’s DSM.
Childhood GID is marked by cruel teasing and rejection on the part o f peers towards a 
child who is different, as well as marked distress and severe maladjustment on the part o f the 
child, not merely as a function of a rejecting society and peer group, but primarily as a 
function o f the disorder itself (Rekers & Kigus, 2001).
Bailey and Zucker (1995) report that 64% to 75% of boys whose gender-identity disorder 
was untreated in childhood develop homosexual or bisexual orientation during adolescence 
while the remaining 6% to 23% develop a heterosexual orientation in adulthood. The 
association between GID in girls and homosexuality in adulthood is unclear (Rekers &
Kilgus, 2001). These statistics further induce parents to initiate treatment early and 
aggressively.
There are some political activists and philosophers with a variety o f social agendas - 
including some mental health care professionals - who vigorously question whether the 
gender-identity disorder warrants diagnosis, assuming that the problem lies with society, not 
the patient. On the other hand, the harsh reality is that without a diagnosis it becomes 
increasingly difficult to offer treatment, especially when it is to be subsidized by health care 
institutions, insurance companies, and social agencies.
For most of the twentieth century, psychological explanations for homosexuality remained 
tied to Freudian theory. However, as psychology and psychiatry matured and diversified so 
did the explanations for homosexuality, evolving from their Freudian roots into a complex 
tapestry o f hypothetical postulations. Many contemporary clinicians have abandoned their 
formal training and academic grounding in psychological theory in favor o f a more pragmatic 
view, one that:
• Acknowledges contributions from both biology and environment.
Is willing to entertain multiple hypothetical explanations simultaneously without mutual 
exclusivity.
Acknowledges the importance for theory as a framework upon which to build discussion, 
not the discovery of fact or assessment of blame.
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Chapter 10: The Sexual Reorientation Interventions
Silverstein notes that there has always been a close fit between social norms and medical 
diagnosis and treatment. When Western society was struggling for a moral rationale to 
decriminalize and de-stigmatize homosexuality, medicine hypothesized both biological and 
psychological origins and offered interventions. Homosexuality, although it has traveled from 
being viewed as a sin to interpretation as, respectively, sickness and healthy alternative, 
remained illegal and was until recent years widely considered immoral throughout Western 
society (Silverstein, 1996). This chapter explores current and past reorientation interventions 
under debate.
Silverstein asserts that homosexuals suffered depression, misery, and risk of suicide 
because they were taught to suffer, first by society at large and then by the scientific 
community which, in an attempt to explain the perceived immorality o f homosexual behavior, 
declared that homosexuality was a medical illness. Early gay, lesbian, and feminist political 
movements in Europe and America readily accepted the scientific formulation that became a 
central theme in the movement to decriminalize homosexual behavior.
Approaches in clinical psychotherapy to changing sexual orientation have almost 
exclusively involved efforts to change homosexual and bisexual orientations to a heterosexual 
orientation (Nicolosi, 1991) and dealt largely with men rather than women (Adams & Sturgis,
1977). Stein emphasizes the fact that attempts to change sexual orientation parallel the focus 
o f anti-homosexual bias and heterosexism in American society.
The focus on the sexual reorientation of men rather than women results not only from a 
greater emphasis in general in the psychological literature on men, but also from the tendency 
in Western society for reactions towards male homosexuality to be much stronger and more 
virulent than those towards female homosexuality (Stein, 1996). This differential reaction is 
presumed to be due to the greater rigidity o f gender role requirements for men - and their 
consequent anxiety about gender variation - and to the devaluation o f women’s sexuality in 
general (Stein, 1996).
In addition to the psychodynamic therapy, behavioral therapy, drug, hormone, and surgical 
interventions described by Murphy (1992), Haldeman (1994) describes a variety o f religion- 
based conversion therapies. All o f these are based on the premise that homosexuality is 
morally wrong, medically pathological and socially undesirable (Stein, 1996).
97
Psychodynamic and Psychoanalytic Interventions
Since the late nineteenth century, the psychiatric and psychologic communities have 
invented theories to explain the genesis o f homosexual behavior. Freud (1922, 1962) 
suggested psychodynamic factors. Rado (1940), objecting to Freud’s acceptance of 
bisexuality, established the phobic theory o f homosexuality and gave birth to the Adaptation 
School o f Psychoanalysis. Bieber (1962), Socarides (1978) and Flatterer (1970), who were 
bom of this school, attempted to cure homosexuals o f their orientation in the name of 
goodness and mercy (Silverstein, 1996). Bieber describes reconstructive psychoanalytic 
treatment exposing the ‘irrational fears o f heterosexuality’, with the intention of helping the 
homosexual to resolve them. When the irrational fears are resolved, the patient’s latent 
heterosexuality is able to surface (Bayer, 1987).
For Socarides (1969):
Successful psychoanalytic therapy for homosexuals requires the uncovering 
o f an unconscious desire to achieve masculinity through identification with the 
male sexual partner, understanding the pre-Oedipal fears o f incorporation and 
engulfinent by the mother and the fears of personal dissolution that attend any 
effort to separate from her, analysis o f the Oedipal fears o f incest and aggression, 
discovery of the role of the penis as a substitute for the mother’s breast, the 
surfacing of the yearning for the father’s love and protection, and recognition of 
the presence o f repeatedly suppressed heterosexual interests and desires (p.32).
Once the crippling fear and revulsion o f women are eliminated, the former homosexual can 
“function in the most meaningful relationship in life: the male-female sexual union and the 
affective state of love, tenderness, and joy with a partner of the opposite sex” (Socarides,
1972, p.43).
Behavioral Therapies
The behaviorist school also attempted to convert homosexuals to heterosexuality, although 
they formulated the etiologies o f non-heterosexuality differently than did the traditional 
psychodynamic community. Although some o f their treatments were caustic, gay 
liberationists have depicted the aversion therapies as ‘torture’ and ‘punishment’, even though 
the vast majority o f the patients were voluntary participants. Three forms of aversion therapy 
were popular during the 1960s and 1970s. Feldman and MacCulloch (1971) used electric 
shock aversion therapy (different from electroconvulsive therapy), in which an uncomfortable
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electric stimulus was administered to the male patient following an erotic response to 
photographs of nude males (Feldman, 1977). Cautela (1967) and Barlow et al (1969) 
popularized a procedure called ‘covert sensitization’, in which disgust and images o f vomit 
were used to ‘diminish’ homosexual desire. The third form o f aversion therapy used the drug 
apomorphine (McConaghy et al, 1972), which induces nausea.
Davison (1968) developed ‘Playboy Therapy’, in which gay men masturbated to pictures 
o f naked women. He later rejected his early work as ineffective. Heath (1972) introduced the 
most bizarre form of sexual reorientation intervention by far, implanting electrodes into the 
pleasure centers o f a gay man’s brain and stimulating them while a prostitute attempted to 
seduce him.
Underlying psychiatry and psychology’s attempts to change sexual orientation is a  basic 
philosophical belief in the potential malleability o f human behavior and sexual orientation 
(Silverstein, 1996). However, of all the gay men who volunteered for ‘the cure’, few were 
able to claim that their sexual orientation had changed as a result of behavioral therapies 
(Silverstein, 1996). Researchers frequently ‘blamed’ the patients themselves for not being 
sufficiently motivated (Silverstein, 1996). Outrage, a British support group for lesbians and 
gays, recently asked the Royal College o f Psychiatrists (UK) to renounce aversion therapy 
and instruct its members to halt “the use o f all therapies that attempt to cure homosexuality.”
12 Step programs for Sex-Addiction
The ‘ 12 Steps’ program is a popular American self-help model with strong Protestant 
themes traditionally used for the management of alcoholism and other addictive disorders 
including recreational drugs, gambling and ‘sexual addictions’. A few mental health 
professionals, such as Satinover, find it useful to view ego-dystonic homosexuality as an 
addictive-compulsive behavior readily managed by using the principles o f the 12 step 
programs. Most o f the ‘ 12 Step’ resources for homosexuals seeking reorientation are linked 
to Protestant religious groups and heavily tied to Protestant moral values about sexuality, 
family, and God. In addition to support group meetings, ‘retreats’ that resemble the 
rehabilitation model for chemical and substance addictions and individual counseling and 
pastoral care by both church members and mental health professionals are traditionally part of 
the package.
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The American gay and lesbian political community has been extremely active in its efforts 
to discredit these religious based interventions as both ineffective and dangerous. Reports of 
4brain-washing’ and 'cults’ have been bandied about, although there is little evidence to 
support such claims.
Surgical Interventions
The first attempt to cure homosexuality with surgery was performed by Steinach in 1917 
(Schmidt, 1984). The procedure is described as the hemicastration of a homosexual male 
together with the transplant of testicular tissue from a heterosexual male. The belief was that 
the transplant of normal healthy heterosexual testicular tissue from a donor would facilitate 
conversion to heterosexuality and lead to successful marriage and parenting of children. 
Twelve men were subjected to surgery, but the experiments were a complete failure.
In 1962, Roeder introduced a new surgical technique, producing a right-sided lesion in the 
tuber cinereum (hypothalamic structure) o f the brain of an incarcerated 51 year old 
homosexual pedophile. A total of 75 German prisoners or chronically institutionalized men 
received similar operations for the management o f aberrant sexual behavior, and the 
procedure was promoted as an inexpensive alternative to long-term psychotherapy. There 
was no evidence to suggest that sexual orientation changed in any of the participants (Schmidt 
& Schorsch, 1981) and sex researchers in Germany demanded that their government declare a 
moratorium on the use of these surgical techniques (Sigusch et al, 1982). The publicity about 
the inhuman nature of these experiments has brought them to a halt (Reiber & Sigusch, 1979).
Hormones and Prenatal Interventions
Dumer et al (1987), clear in their intent to eradicate homosexuality, advocated altering the 
hormonal environment o f the fetus. Dumer (1983) states:
It was concluded from these data th a t... it might become possible in the 
future - at least in some cases - to correct abnormal sex hormone levels during 
brain differentiation in order to prevent the development o f homosexuality.
However, this should be done, if at all, only if it is urgently desired by the 
pregnant mother (p.578).
Meyer-Bahlberg and his colleagues at the Psychiatric Institute in New York also worked 
toward identifying the prenatal hormone influences on sexual orientation and gender
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behavior, although they rejected the use o f this information to alter sexual orientation (Meyer- 
Bahlberg, 1977,1979,1984). Thus far, research has not produced any clinically useful 
interventions, although it is difficult to predict what the future may hold.
Childhood Gender-identity Disorder Interventions
Rekers and Kilgus (1995,1998) report that psychotherapeutic interventions with childhood 
and adolescent GID produce normalization of gender-identity and reduce the future incidence 
of homosexual and bisexual orientation in adolescence and adulthood. According to Rekers, 
transsexualism and transvestism are quite difficult to treat in adulthood (2001), so early 
detection and intervention hold the greatest promise of normalizing gender identification and 
preventing the high levels o f depression and suicide associated with adult transsexualism 
(1995).
Positive reinforcement for normal sex-typed play, normal speech patterns and gender 
appropriate behavior has been found to be effective in the clinic, home and school 
environments, particularly when parents are trained to carry out behavior-shaping programs in 
the child’s environment and closely supervised by a child mental health professional (Rekers, 
1995; Rekers & Kilgus, 1998). With emerging transvestite-like behaviors in male adolescents 
(where female garments are used for sexual arousal), specific psychotherapeutic and behavior 
therapy interventions have been found to be effective (Rekers, 1995; Zucker and Bradley, 
1999).
Reparative Therapies, Conversion Therapies, and Transformational Ministries
The two methods of sexual reorientation interventions that emerged in the early 1970s and 
are still widely used by therapists and lay groups include reparative therapy, an experimental 
and controversial secular therapeutic technique and transformational ministries, consisting of 
various religious and spiritual practices combined with individual and group therapies based 
on the reparative and addiction models. The groups engaged in such interventions often 
report a success rate of 70% or more, while many gay, lesbian, and mental health groups 
estimate a conversion rate o f 0%. Reparative therapy is also widely known as ‘conversion 
therapy’.
For some, reparative therapy refers to a specific secular counseling technique that involves 
helping a gay or lesbian bond in an intimate but non-sexual relationship with an adult member 
of the same gender. This is believed to substitute for the bond between the client and their 
same-sex parent which, therapists allege, did not form properly during childhood. Others 
consider reparative therapy to include the prayer, religious conversion, one-on-one 
counseling, and group counseling provided by Christian transformational ministries.
In a book widely circulated among conservative American Christians, Moberly describes a 
‘reparative’ therapy in which the gay client is encouraged to enter into an emotionally close, 
non-sexual, non-erotic relationship with another male adult. Once this has been achieved, 
heterosexual feelings are expected to emerge over time while homosexual feelings fade.
Gay Affirmative Therapy
With the removal o f homosexuality as a ‘diagnosis’ from the DSM, the increasing political 
prominence of the gay and lesbian liberation movements and the birth o f sex research as a 
scientific discipline separate from psychiatry and psychology, the early 1970s witnessed an 
explosion o f ‘gay counseling centers’ throughout America.
Maylon (1982) describes gay-affirmative psychotherapy as:
The theoretical position that regards homosexuality as a non-pathological 
human potential. But while the traditional goal o f psychotherapy with 
homosexual males has been conversion (to heterosexuality), gay affirmative 
strategies regard fixed homoerotic predilections as sexual and affection capacities 
which are to be valued and facilitated (p.60).
According to Maylon,
... the primary goal o f gay affirmative psychotherapy is to alleviate the 
harmful effects of internalized homophobia. Since the removal o f homosexuality 
from the DSM, the literature on psychotherapy with gays and lesbians can be 
divided into three areas: 1) external stressors, 2) internal stressors, 3) 
psychotherapeutic technique (p. 71).
External stressors include: homophobia (Herek; 1984, 1989), relationships with families 
(Myers, 1982; Silverstein, 1977), parenting children (Kirkpatrick, 1987; Loulan, 1986;
Martin, 1989), civil and legal rights, ‘coming out’ (Coleman, 1982), the problems o f 
adolescents (Hetrick & Martin, 1987; 1988), impediments to successful love relationships
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(Burch, 1986; Peplau & Amaro, 1982; Silverstein, 1981), discrimination (Herek, 1984), and 
the AIDS epidemic (Silverstein, 1996).
Psychotherapy around the internal stressors include: internalized homophobia (Herek,
1984; Maylon, 1982; Smith 1988), affective disorders and sexual problems (Hall, 1987;
Reece, 1987), identity formation (DeCecco, 1981; DeCecco & Shiveley, 1983/1984), 
borderline personalities (Silverstein, 1988) and merger in lesbian relationships (Burch 1986).
The third area o f emphasis is on psychotherapeutic technique (Silverstein, 1996). Hencken 
(1982) has tried to bridge the gap between psychoanalysis and gay affirmative therapy, by 
suggesting that one can use psychoanalytic technique while ignoring traditional analytic 
beliefs about normal sexual development. Isay (1985) explores heterosexist bias in 
psychoanalysis and the failure to examine the special relationship between the gay son and his 
father. Johnsgard and Schumacher (1970) explore the use of group psychotherapy with gay 
men. Fensterheim (1972) applied assertiveness training techniques to gay populations and 
Davison (1976, 1977) explored the ethical and therapeutic concerns surrounding clinical work 
with gays and lesbians. This more recent literature emphasizes that the pursuit of the elusive 
‘cause’ of homosexuality is closely related to political, social, and legal efforts to repress 
homosexuality (Silverstein, 1996).
Carnes (1983), Mattison (1985), and Quadland (1985) have explored the significant 
controversy that continues to surround ‘sexual addiction’ and ‘sexual compulsions’. Using 
the paradigm o f drug addiction, proponents of these approaches treat ‘compulsive sexuality’, 
consisting o f such behaviors as compulsive masturbation, frequent sex, failure to be 
monogamous, and guilt about sexual acts, with a 12 step program like that employed by 
Alcoholics Anonymous (Silverstein, 1996). A similar model has been developed for sexual 
reorientation in the less central areas o f psychological, counseling and ministerial therapies.
Outcome Studies, Case Reports and Opinions 
Psychoanalysis and Psychodynamic Therapies
The early work of Stekel (1930) reports a number of complete cures through Freudian 
psychoanalysis, including one case that is discussed in detail. Anna Freud (1949, 1952) refers 
to several cases that show ‘good results’, including four that led to heterosexual adjustment.
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Ovesey (1969) reports three cases to have continued to be successful a minimum of five years 
after treatment.
One of the most ambitious psychoanalytic studies of male homosexuality in the period 
following Rado’s theoretical revision was undertaken in the 1950s by the New York Medical 
Society of Medical Psychoanalysts. The project involved 77 psychiatrists who contributed 
information on 106 homosexual and 100 heterosexual patients, with the latter serving as 
controls. In order to standardize the vast amount o f data being collected, all participating 
analysts were asked to complete a questionnaire consisting o f450 items covering a full range 
o f familial, social, diagnostic, and therapeutic issues (Bayer, 1987). The results o f the study, 
entitled Homosexuality, were published in 1962 under the primary authorship of Bieber 
(1967), “ ... although this change may be more easily accomplished by some rather than 
others, in our judgment a heterosexual shift is a possibility for all homosexuals who are 
strongly motivated to change” (p.82). Bieber concluded that analysts should direct their 
efforts towards helping their patients achieve heterosexuality rather than adjust to 
homosexuality.
Bayer finds it remarkable, given Bieber’s assertions, that the data provided by 
Homosexuality tend to suggest more modest results. Of the seventy-two patients who were 
exclusively homosexual at the outset o f treatment, 57% remained unchanged at the end o f the 
study while 19% had become bisexual and only 19% exclusively heterosexual. By combining 
the data from the exclusively homosexual and the bisexual, it can be calculated that 27% had 
shifted to exclusive heterosexuality.
Bayer notes that:
... those who made the shift to heterosexuality had exhibited a willingness to 
embark on the long, difficult, and often frustrating course of analytic therapy.
Only two of twenty-eight patients (7%) with fewer than 150 hours o f treatment 
had become heterosexual, nine of the forty patients (23%) who had undergone 
between 150 and 349 hours o f analysis had made the shift and eighteen o f  the 
thirty-eight patients (47%) who received more than 350 hours o f treatment had 
made a successful transition (pp.62-63).
Wallace (1969) describes the successful case treatment of a homosexual following a 
relatively brief period of psychoanalysis, as does Eidelberg (1956). Utilizing a group therapy 
format, Birk (1974) also claims significant improvement in a number o f cases. In a study of 
thirty homosexual college students, Whitener and Nikelly (1964) report considerable
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improvement among patients who were highly motivated, had relatively healthy character 
structures, and had not been acting out homosexuality for a long period. Of fifteen college 
students, Ross and Medelsohn (1958) report that eleven showed mild to considerable 
improvement. Monroe and Enelow (1960) describe significant change in four of seven 
patients. Mayerson and Lief (1965) reported successful outcomes in a detailed study; they 
found that 47% of the patients were functioning heterosexually after a follow-up o f a mean of 
four and half years. Ellis (1956) reports that eighteen of his twenty-eight male homosexual 
patients had ‘distinct’ or ‘considerable’ improvement in achieving satisfactory sex-love 
relations with women.
In 1979, Masters and Johnson claimed an impressive conversion rate o f 50 to 60%, which 
was maintained for 5 years after treatment These results have often been quoted by the 
proponents of reparative therapy, although these patients received short-term, intensive 
individual psychodynamic psychotherapy and behavioral modification (not aversion) by 
licensed clinicians. Notable for the Masters and Johnson data is that all participants were 
bisexual, were in a relationship with access to heterosexual contact, and in all cases behavior 
was the measured endpoint rather than orientation (as evidenced by fantasy, dreams, objects 
o f erotic arousal).
Behavioral Therapy
Although Wolpe (1969) reports a spontaneous reversal o f homosexuality in a client after 
he had left behavioral treatment several prominent authors previously in support o f aversion 
type behavioral therapy later publicly reversed their positions. It is now generally held that 
aversion therapy has failed to demonstrate long-term success (results extending beyond the 
initial phase of aversion therapy treatment) for any of the symptoms or disorders for which it 
has been used (alcoholism, smoking, drinking, homosexuality).
The problem with aversion therapy is that once the negative consequences (aversive 
stimuli) are discontinued, behavior tends to revert to baseline in the majority o f cases, 
particularly when the behavior to be extinguished is physically or emotionally pleasurable.
The other problem with aversion therapy is tracking the impact o f secondary gain. For 
example: if release from the psychiatric hospital or a return to active duty military statiis is
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dependent in part on one’s success with aversion therapy, it becomes considerably more 
difficult to accurately assess the treatment success rates, a problem that has plagued a number 
o f behavioral studies.
Reparative Therapies and Transformational Ministries
Pattison and Pattison (1980) describe eleven men who overcame homosexuality through 
spirituality based conversion. In a very detailed analysis o f therapeutic results, van den 
Aardweg (1986) divided a hundred and one homosexual clients into four categories: Radical 
Change, Satisfactory Change, Improved, No Change. Among those who continued more than 
several months in treatment, 65% are reported to have achieved results in the categories 
‘Radical Change’ or ‘Satisfactory Change’.
Spitzer, a Professor o f Psychiatry at Columbia University, conducted a study o f 143 
homosexual men and 57 homosexual women who had undergone reparative or conversion 
therapies and reported his findings, 2001 that they had become ‘straight,’ at a meeting of the 
American Psychiatric Association on May 9th, 2001. Following forty-five minute interviews 
with each subject, he concluded that 66% of the males and 44% of the females had arrived at 
‘good heterosexual functioning’. Critics complain that the subjects were carefully selected 
and referred for this study by a group that strongly promotes reparative therapy, when a 
random sample o f past participants in reparative therapy would have been preferable. Also of 
interest is the fact that all the subjects described themselves as being bisexual at the time of 
the study. It is unknown what percentage identified as bisexual prior to the onset o f reparative 
therapy.
A new North American study is underway by Schroeder and Shidlo to determine the 
experiences of people who have been treated either by Ex-Gay ministries or by individual 
reparative therapists. It is sponsored by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, and funded 
by the H. van Ameringen Foundation. By late 1997, they were half way towards their goal of 
200 subjects. Shidlo reports that he had yet to find a single cure as result o f reparative 
therapy. Two subjects had reported a cure but later admitted to having decided to become 
celibate. The study specifically looks for harmful or negative effects caused by participation 
in reparative therapy. Considering who the sponsor is, it is reasonable to assume that few
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conservative Christians have participated in the Schoeder-Shidlo study. The researchers 
announce their bias upfront by stating: “You can be of help in the long process o f getting the 
message out that these conversion therapies don’t work and do the opposite o f healing by 
informing your communities of our search for participants to be interviewed. Help us 
document the damage” (Schoeder & Shilo, 2001, p.3).
Drescher (2001), an American psychoanalyst who works extensively with gays, 
commented:
My own clinical experience with gay men who foiled to change in reparative 
therapy is that they suffered damage to their self-esteem, experienced resultant 
anxiety and depression, and often felt a deep mistrust of mental health 
professionals. This mistrust and shame may explain why no good follow-up 
studies o f these individuals exist (p.l).
Predictors for Successful Intervention
Practitioners o f sexual reorientation interventions have identified a variety o f features that 
predispose subjects to sustained success with efforts to change sexual behavior and sexual 
orientation. These are: religiosity, religious motivation, youth, limited homosexual 
experience (number o f partners, duration of behavior), bisexual behavior/orientation 
(experience and fantasies), occupational and social stability, and commitment (as expressed 
by persistence with an intervention treatment plan). One of the strongest predictors in the 
Bieber study of psychoanalysis and sexual reorientation was the number of visits with the 
psychoanalyst. Reparative therapists such as Nicolosi and van den Aardweg view gender 
inferiority and disordered paternal attachment as the best predictors for success, in large part 
because these are the issues that their interventions target. Addictionologists and spiritualists 
emphasize a life-long commitment to treatment and relapse prevention as the essential 
ingredient.
Complicating the predictors for success is, o f course, the question o f how success is 
defined. Gay and lesbian political activists define success as heterosexual orientation and 
behavior with the absence of any evidence o f homosexual orientation (arousal, eroticism, 
fantasies) and then report that there are no scientific data supporting claims for any 
intervention’s success. Christian conservatives and sexual reorientation practitioners define 
success in a variety o f terms: ego-syntonic abstinence from same gender sexual relations 
(through celibacy or heterosexual relations), ego-syntonic opposite gender sexual relations, Or
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diminished homosexual orientation and enhanced heterosexual orientation. Gay and lesbian 
political activists and practitioners o f gay affirming therapies almost universally define 
success in terms o f orientation while Christian conservatives and reorientation practitioners 
emphasize sexual behavior. It is clear, therefore, that the manner in which success is defined 
is the primary predictor of outcome for studies on treatment efficacy.
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Chapter 11: Statements by Professional Associations
This chapter reviews the input from professional groups from within the health care system 
and places them in a cultural and historical perspective. None of these statements have been 
developed easily with unanimous consensus. The behind the scenes discussions from within 
the various professional groups in many ways mimics the public debate. A historical review 
highlights the frailty o f professional consensus and the impact of public opinion and social 
pressure on organized health care.
An American Psychiatric Association fact sheet prepared for educators states in part:
The most important fact about 'reparative therapy’, also sometimes known as 
'conversion therapy’, is that it is based on an understanding of homosexuality that 
has been rejected by all the major health and mental health professions. The 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Counseling Association, the 
American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the 
National Association of School Psychologists, and the National Association o f 
Social Workers, together representing more than 477,000 health and mental health 
professionals, have all taken the position that homosexuality is not a mental 
disorder and thus there is no need for a ‘cure’ (APA, 2001) ... health and mental 
health professional organizations do not support efforts to change young people’s 
sexual orientation through ‘reparative therapy’ and have raised serious concerns 
about its potential to do harm (2001, p.l).
In 1993, the American Academy of Pediatrics published a policy statement entitled 
Homosexuality and Adolescence. It was critical of any form of sexual reorientation 
intervention, commenting:
• “Some adolescents are uncertain about their sexual orientation. For them, a 
‘counseling or psychotherapeutic initiative’ aimed at clarification might be useful. 
Therapy directed specifically at changing sexual orientation is contraindicated, 
since it can provoke guilt and anxiety while having little or no potential for 
achieving changes in orientation.”
• “The psychosocial problems of gay and lesbian adolescents are primarily the result 
o f social stigma, hostility, hatred and isolation.”
• The statement mentioned that about 30% of “a surveyed group o f gay and bisexual 
males have attempted suicide at least once.”
In 1994, the American Psychiatric Association released a fact sheet that stated:
There is no published scientific evidence supporting the efficacy of 
‘reparative therapy’ as a treatment to change one’s sexual orientation. It is not 
described in the scientific literature, nor is it mentioned in the APA’s latest 
comprehensive Task Force Report, Treatments o f Psychiatric Disorders (1989, 
p.l).
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There are a few reports in the literature o f efforts to use psychotherapeutic and counseling 
techniques to treat people who are troubled by their homosexuality and desire to become 
heterosexual. Results have not been conclusive, however, and nor have they been replicated. 
There is no evidence to suggest that any treatment can change a homosexual’s deep-seated 
sexual feelings for others of the same sex (APA, 1994).
The American Psychological Association has published a brochure entitled Answers to 
Your Questions About Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality (2001). It contains a section 
called: “Can Therapy Change Sexual Orientation?’ which reads:
No. Even though homosexual orientation is not a mental illness and there is 
no scientific reason to attempt conversion of lesbians or gays to heterosexual 
orientation, some individuals seek to change their own sexual orientation or that 
o f another individual (for example, parents seeking therapy for their child). Some 
therapists who undertake this kind of therapy report that they have changed their 
client’s sexual orientation (from homosexual to heterosexual) in treatment. Close 
scrutiny of their reports indicates several factors that cast doubt: many o f the 
claims come from organizations with an ideological perspective on sexual 
orientation, rather than from mental health researchers; the treatments and their 
outcomes are poorly documented; and the length of time that clients are followed 
up after the treatment is too short (p.3).
In 1990, the American Psychological Association stated that:
... scientific evidence does not demonstrate that conversion therapy works 
and that it can do more harm than good. Changing sexual orientation is not 
simply a matter o f changing one’s sexual behavior. It would require altering 
one’s emotional, romantic, and sexual feelings and completely restructuring one’s 
concept o f self and social identity. Although some mental health providers do 
attempt sexual orientation conversion, others question the ethics of trying to alter 
a trait that is not a disorder and that is extremely important to an individual’s 
identity through therapy (p.2).
A 1994 resolution which would have branded therapists engaged in reparative therapy as 
following unethical practice was defeated by the membership of the American Psychiatric 
Association. A similar resolution was defeated by the American Psychological Association in 
1995. However, the latter overwhelmingly passed a resolution on August 14, 1997, which 
stopped just short of calling this form o f therapy unethical. Haldeman, President o f the 
APA’s Society for the Psychological Study o f Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Issues, helped to 
write the resolution, saying:
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In the past 10 years, Christian fundamentalists have enlisted a coalition of 
old-style psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers who have become very 
visible in this country and internationally, and who have as a mission to ‘help’ 
homosexuals get rid of the sexual orientation. Our aim is not to try to stop them 
per se or interfere with anyone’s right to practice [therapy] but we want to expose 
the social context that creates this market (1994, p. 1).
APA officials are concerned that some who enter therapy do so because of the coercion of 
their families, employers, church members, etc. The APA resolution requires that the 
therapist obtain ‘informed consent’ from the client (2001). This is to include:
1. A full discussion o f the client’s potential for happiness as a homosexual,
2. communication to the client that there is no sound scientific evidence that the therapy
works,
3. raising the possibility that therapy may exacerbate the client’s problems, and
4. an analysis of the client’s true motivation for wanting to change.
A spokesperson for the National Association for Research and Therapy o f Homosexuality 
(NARTH), Socarides, commented on the resolution, saying:
Homosexuality is a psychological and psychiatric disorder, there is no 
question about it. It is a purple menace that is threatening the proper design of
gender distinctions in society (1999, p.2).
NARTH complained that the resolution infringed on the rights o f therapists, that it was 
passed without due process and that an open hearing should have been conducted in which 
NARTH and other organizations could have participated. They would like the APA to 
attempt to correct what they feel is the “very widely disseminated, popular misconception that 
homosexuality is genetic.” The resolutions received condemnation from Evangelical 
Christian groups and support from gay and lesbian civil rights groups.
In 1996, the National Association o f Social Workers (NASW) adopted a policy statement 
on lesbian, gay and bisexual issues. It states, in part:
Social stigmatization o f  lesbian, gay, and bisexual people is widespread and 
is a primary motivating factor in leading some people to seek sexual orientation 
changes. Sexual orientation conversion therapies assume that homosexual 
orientation is pathological and freely chosen. No data demonstrate that 
reparative or conversion therapies are effective, and in fact they may be harmful. 
NASW believes social workers have the responsibility to clients to explain the 
prevailing knowledge concerning sexual orientation and the lack o f data 
reporting positive outcomes with reparative therapy. NASW discourages social 
workers from providing treatments designed to change sexual orientation or from  
referring to practitioners or programs that claim to do so (NASW, 1997, p. 3).
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On January 9th, 1997, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial in support of 
reparative therapy, called: “Don’t forsake homosexuals who want help.” A flood of highly 
critical letters to the editor resulted, from psychiatrists, sociologists, lesbigay associations, and 
individuals (WSJ, 1997).
The American Psychological Association overwhelmingly passed a resolution on Aug 14 
1997, directed against reparative therapy and affirming a number of basic principles when 
accepting homosexual and bisexual clients. These include:
• That homosexuality is not a mental disorder.
• That psychologists do not “knowingly participate in or condone discriminatory practices 
with lesbian, gay and bisexual clients.”
• That “psychologists respect the rights o f individuals, including lesbian, gay and bisexual 
clients, to privacy, confidentiality, self-determination and autonomy.”
• That “psychologists obtain appropriate informed consent to therapy in their work with 
lesbian, gay and bisexual clients.”
Their resolution concluded by saying that:
... the American Psychological Association opposes portrayals o f  lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual youth and adults as mentally ill due to their sexual orientation 
and supports the dissemination o f  accurate information about sexual orientation, 
and mental health, and appropriate interventions in order to counteract bias that 
is based in ignorance or unfounded beliefs about sexual orientation (APA, 1997, 
p .3 f
By way of contrast, the Chinese Psychiatric Association still classified homosexuality as a 
mental disorder in 1997 (CPA, 1997). Most professional therapists in China regard 
homosexual orientation as a curable illness, and electric shock treatments are sometimes used 
in a futile attempt to convert non-heterosexuals (CPA, 1997).
On December 4th 1998, the American Psychiatric Association rejected reparative therapy 
as ineffective and potentially destructive (Katz, 1998). Their Board o f Trustees unanimously 
adopted a position statement opposing reparative therapy. APA President Rodrigo Munoz 
commented:
It is fitting that this position opposing reparative therapy is adopted on the 25th 
anniversary of the removal o f homosexuality as a mental disorder from the DSM. 
There is no scientific evidence that reparative or conversion therapy is effective in 
changing a person’s sexual orientation. There is, however, evidence that this type 
of therapy can be destructive (1998, p.3).
The APA statement said:
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• “The potential risks of ‘reparative therapy’ are great, including depression, anxiety and 
self-destructive behavior, since therapist alignment with societal prejudices against 
homosexuality may reinforce self-hatred already experienced by the patient.”
• “Many patients who have undergone ‘reparative therapy’ relate that they were 
inaccurately told that homosexuals are lonely, unhappy individuals who never achieve 
acceptance or satisfaction.”
• “The possibility that the person might achieve happiness and satisfying interpersonal 
relationships as a gay man or lesbian is not presented, nor are alternative approaches to 
dealing with the effects o f societal stigmatization discussed.”
• “Therefore, the American Psychiatric Association opposes any psychiatric treatment, such 
as ‘reparative’ or ‘conversion’ therapy which is based upon the assumption that 
homosexuality per se is a mental disorder or based upon a prior assumption that the 
patient should change his/her homosexual orientation. The American Psychiatric 
Association recognizes that in the course of ongoing psychiatric treatment, there may be 
appropriate indications for attempting to change sexual behaviors” (APA, 1998, p.4).
On January 15th of 1999, the American Psychiatric Associations Board of Trustees:
... endorsed a position stating at its December meeting that it opposes 
therapeutic techniques some psychiatrists and mental health professionals claim 
can shift an individual’s sexual orientation from homosexual to heterosexual. The 
Board acknowledges that there is no evidence that these so-called ‘reparative 
therapies’ have any efficacy in converting someone from one sexual orientation to 
another (p.2).
During the 1999 Annual Press Release, at its World Conference, the American Counseling 
Association adopted a position in opposition to the promotion o f ‘reparative therapy’ as a 
‘cure’ for homosexuals.
The Board of Directors o f the National Association o f Social Workers (NASW) adopted a 
statement on therapy designed to change a person’s sexual orientation, saying, in part:
The increase in media campaigns, often coupled with coercive messages from 
family and community members, has created an environment in which lesbians 
and gay men often are pressured to seek reparative or conversion therapies, which 
cannot and will not change sexual orientation (1997, p.2).
Aligned with the American Psychological Association’s 1997 position, the National 
Caucus for Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals: “ ... believes that such treatments potentially can 
lead to severe emotional damage.”
The National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH) is the 
only professional group that considers homosexuality to be a ‘sexuality disorder’. Below is 
listed a series o f beliefs subscribed to by NARTH, some of which are taken from the
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association’s Statement of Policy, while others are derived from a speech given by NARTH’s 
founder, Dr. Nicolosi to a One-By-One meeting on June 26th, 2000 (NARTH, 2001).
• Homosexuality is probably the most misunderstood ‘sexual disorder’.
• Effective scientific study of homosexuality has been eroded by the gay and lesbian 
political movement.
• Human sexuality researchers have been intimidated into silence by a conspiracy.
• “Social-Activist groups... have portrayed sexual deviancy as a normal way o f life.”
• “There is no such thing as a homosexual person. We are all heterosexuals.
Homosexuality is a description of a condition. It is not a description o f the intrinsic nature 
o f the person.”
• Homosexuality “works against society’s essential male-female design and family unit.”
• Homosexuality is caused by incompetent parenting and/or child sexual abuse.
• “The male homosexual is basically someone who did not develop a strong sense o f 
masculine identity and he is trying to fulfill that sense of masculine deficit by connecting 
with a man. But the only way he knows how to do it is sexually. What feels right and 
natural is the sex drive that is being displaced onto a person o f the same sex for emotional 
needs.”
• Homosexuality is often caused by early sexual abuse.
• Homosexuality is preventable in childhood and treatable in adulthood.
• Most gays and lesbians can successfully convert to heterosexuality through reparative 
therapy (p.3).
All o f  the statements from bodies representing organized medicine are political, as 
evidenced by the many strong assertions lacking supporting data, or an exploration o f the 
alternative views. When opinions are represented as fact, the prudent patient and clinician 
should suspect underlying motives.
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Section IV: Queer Philosophy
The last four decades have seen the birth and evolution o f philosophical thought and a 
growing literature by non-heterosexuals on the subject o f non-heterosexuality. The lesbigay 
and queer communities view themselves (quite rightly) as de facto stakeholders in any ethical 
discussion on sexual reorientation interventions. Queer philosophy brings to social and 
political thought a unique language and value system with which to wage the debate. This 
section explores these concepts from both historical and contemporary perspectives.
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Chapter 12: Identity Evolution and the Historical Homosexual
Sexual identity and, often, gender identity are at the core of requests for sexual 
reorientation. The philosophical and clinical formulations on identity acquisition, 
maintenance, and fluidity are a reoccurring theme for the debate on sexual reorientation. This 
chapter explores past and current philosophical and clinical theory.
Carroll believes that in order to better understand homosexual identity development, one 
must question the origins o f notions such as the concept o f a relationship between gender, 
patriarchy, and desire as naturally determined. Historically, this has been assumed to be a 
‘natural’ reflection of our evolutionary heritage (Carroll, 1996). Anthropologists such as 
Levi-Strauss (1969) attempted to place gender division, organized heterosexuality, and the 
incest taboo at the crossroads of nature and culture. Thus, as Goldberg observed (1995), 
‘hetero-normality’ assumes a foundational position. Many feminist and queer scholars (Gayle 
Rubin, Luce Irigaray, Monig Wittig, Judith Butler, Gerda Lemer, Kathleen Gough) have 
sought to pull apart this conflated foundation of repressed desire, gender, and kinship through 
enforced heterosexuality as the sine qua non o f culture. In order to argue that homosexuality 
results from a particular crisis in patriarchy at a specific point in the past, rather than from 
natural causes, there is a compelling need to dismantle the history of heterosexuality (Carroll,
1996). Carroll emphasizes that in this retelling, the drive to reproduce patriarchal kinship 
bonds is that which organizes the socially acceptable (and unacceptable) categories o f desire, 
not some fundamental essence, genetic encoding or psychological trauma.
Evolution and Primates
Leibowitz (1975), a feminist anthropologist, offers an interesting revisionist account of the 
evolution o f sex roles. It has been widely assumed that sex roles evolved from the 
dimorphism found in upper primates. As Leibowitz (1975) put it:
The tasks and roles assigned to men and women in our own cultural tradition 
were assumed to be correlated highly with anatomically based aptitudes. It is still 
a common belief that anatomy is destiny (p. 20).
Historically, anthropologists - almost exclusively white males, as Leibowitz points out - 
scrutinized primate behavior in an attempt to determine the precursors of ancient social-role 
differences. Their conclusions were then formulated as a justification of current sexual
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practices. Through her work with a variety of primates, including those whose behavior does 
not resemble current human traits, Leibowitz comes to a very different conclusion:
The sex role adaptation of the sexual dimorphic nonhuman primate species do 
not in fact conform to the models used in current explanations of how and why 
dimorphism developed among humans. In fact, sexual dimorphism cannot easily 
be equated with sex-role patterns. However, dimorphic primate species do have 
one thing in common: they all live under environmental conditions that encourage 
the male to range more widely than females (p. 24).
It is the call for some male primates to become long-range hunters that results in marked 
dimorphism. However, this does not necessarily result in male dominance or increased access 
to females. Leibowitz effectively contrasts gibbons, who pair for life, but who are not 
sexually dimorphic (they are of equal size with no special male dominance) to gorillas (who 
have dominant leaders who protect the group of females). She notes that, among gorillas, the 
dominant male has no special sexual prerogatives or preemptive rights over food. Their 
dominance offers protection to the group, but does not necessarily award the male increased 
individual rights over any particular female. Leibowitz notes this as an important unhinging 
of the theory of the ‘natural’ origins of male dominance over the reproductive rights o f 
women and kinship systems.
Family Institution
In her exploration of the origin o f the family, Gough (1975) suggests that it was this 
‘dominance’ that eventually transmuted into ‘fatherliness’. She also notes that the role, rather 
than developing as a genetic response to fathering a child, is largely a social role for the good 
o f the tribe. This bond o f social fatherhood is recognized among people who do not know 
about the male role in procreation, or where, for various reasons, it is not clear who the 
physiological father o f a particular infant is (Gough, 1975).
Gough suggests that in the proto-human family, women still had sexual autonomy even 
though they were non-dominant, and bore the responsibility for rearing children. However, 
with increased levels of organization (the early use o f fire, cooking, language, etc.), rules that 
lasted beyond a single generation developed and the sexual ordering of kinship began. Male 
dominance became the male domination of women (Gough 1975):
Rules banning sex relations among close kinfolk must have come very early. 
Precisely how or why they developed is unknown, but they had at least two useful
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functions. They helped to preserve order in the family as a cooperative unit, by 
outlawing competition for mates. They also created bonds between families, or 
even between separate bands, and so provided a basis for wider cooperation in the 
struggle for livelihood and the expansion o f knowledge (p.61).
In short, men took control o f women’s ability to reproduce the existing social system. By 
establishing a taboo on close kin sexual relations, men could organize larger and larger social 
systems (Carroll, 1996). However, Gough emphasizes that social roles were fairly egalitarian 
in the early hunting tribes. Everything was communally owned; women were as essential and 
often as important as men. Carroll emphasizes that, in order to survive, any small human 
group would recreate gender roles. In many primitive societies, the consistency o f gender 
roles with biological sex was not ubiquitous. Occasionally, a biological male would choose to 
live as a woman (the Berdache of North American Indians, discussed above, being the 
obvious example) or vice versa. However, individuals were not allowed to demonstrate 
characteristics o f both gender roles (Gough, 1975).
Decades of cross-cultural studies have shown that gender roles can vary radically from one 
group to another (Carroll, 1996). According to Leibowitz:
... knitting, weaving, and cooking sometimes fall into the male province, 
while such things as pearl diving, canoe handling and house building turn out to 
be women’s work in some settings (p.20).
She notes, however, that in most instances men were responsible for defense and long- 
range hunting (when applicable) and women were generally responsible for child-rearing 
(Leibowitz, 1975).
On the other hand, in her groundbreaking essay, The Traffic in Women, Rubin (1975) 
stresses the repression inherent even in this early, egalitarian setting:
Far from being an expression of natural differences, exclusive gender identity 
is the suppression o f natural similarities. The division of the sexes has the effect 
of repressing some of the personality characteristics o f virtually everyone, men 
and women (p. 180).
Thus, according to Carroll, the early kinship scheme operated under several constraints, 
such as enforced gender roles and males’ discretionary access to females. Larger systems o f 
organization such as the state, a product of male domination and competition, began to exploit 
this fundamentally uneven distribution o f power. Lemer (1986) specifically states that the 
domination of women by men, together with a Western form of consciousness stressing
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dialectical thinking, is the prototypical model for all domination: social, economic and 
political.
Other feminist writers such as Irigaray (1985) and Wittig (1992) see women as 
autonomous beings completely disappearing into the fantasy o f a world increasingly 
dominated by men. Women become simply the means of replicating a masculine order, while 
a heterosexual male of lower rank is increasingly likely to be used as a tool allowing the 
development o f higher order male homo-social bonds. An interesting example is found in 
Sowing the Body (Dubois, 1982), where she traces the appropriation of the female body as 
‘metaphor’ within male philosophical texts such as the Greek texts by Plato and others.
Female creative powers become reworked as the creative powers of male intellectual prowess. 
In this way, the male was seen to metaphorically contain both woman and man. Hence, 
women were conceived of as defective, lesser men (Dubois, 1982).
At this point, it seems wise to step back and explore this view from two different vantage 
points. A more benign view of kinship and its functions is taken by anthropologists such as 
Gough and Geertz, who focus on the vast differences in exactly what constitutes different 
genders in kinship structures, marriage between cousins, brothers and sisters, etc., with 
respect to the political status of women. The other is that taken by Rubin, who stresses the 
inherently repressive nature o f any kinship structure and the unequal power unilaterally 
conferred on women through such a system. However, Carroll considers this tendency 
towards universalization to be a product o f modem culture itself and therefore open to the 
criticisms o f modernism as outlined by Nietzsche. According to Carroll, this view ultimately 
reduces a very complex field that is more accurately understood by studying a complex matrix 
o f power relationships that include class, race, age, etc., rather than by concentrating on the 
influence of laws surrounding the issue o f incest. According to Foucault:
There is no single, all-encompassing strategy, valid for all o f society and 
uniformly bearing on all the manifestations of sex. The idea that there have been 
repeated attempts to reduce all o f  sex to its reproductive function, its heterosexual 
and adult form, and its matrimonial legitimacy fails to take into account the 
manifold objectives aimed for, the manifold means employed in the different 
sexual politics concerned with the two sexes, the different age groups and social 
classes (Goldberg, 1995, p. 392).
Rubin (1984) shirks this issue in an essay called Thinking Sex, where she separates the way 
in which kinship structures legislate gender roles, economic divisions, and political power
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from the actual creation of sexualities. Compulsive heterosexuality is seen by Rubin first and 
foremost as a social institution -  not necessarily one based on sexual desire. According to 
Carroll, this opens the door for the reworking o f the inequalities of the gender system on a 
political level, while not inhibiting the wide-ranging, personal reworking o f the gender 
system, thereby avoiding the feminist trap o f outlawing certain systems of desire 
(sadomasochism, pornography, etc.), which become de facto  replications of cultural violence 
against women (and men). According to Dubois (1988):
Our paradoxical enterprise is to be both within and outside the sex/gender 
system, to see the ways in which it enables our being, but to call to the foreground 
its bias, its history (p.9).
According to Carroll:
... a closer look at male dominance shows just how tentative and provisional 
such dominance, in fact, really was. Males were usually left with their mothers 
for lengthy periods that resulted in a  primary identification with mother that could 
be a threat to the sexual division of labor as codified within the prevailing gender 
system. Highly formalized systems of initiation (which often included scarring 
and other types o f physical transformation) and formalized homosexual rituals 
cemented homo-social bonds in order to ensure that a boy was firmly on the road 
to a gendered manhood (p. 198).
In his lengthy opus The Construction o f Homosexuality, Greenburg (1988) outlines three 
major types o f homosexual organization in kinship societies: trans-generational (in which the 
partners are of different ages), trans-genderal (the partners are o f the same sex but different 
genders), and egalitarian (the partners are socially similar). Although Greenberg hesitates in 
drawing any generalizations from the various ways in which different tribes organize 
homosexual relations, he does offer:
Homosexual relations are found, then, when they are most needed to solidify 
male power against challenges from women. They function to reproduce male- 
dominated gender relations where they are shaky (p.35).
According to Greenberg, as male dominance continued to expand during the rise o f  archaic 
civilizations, class divisions, and the rise o f market driven economies, male homosexual 
relationships expanded to include more specialized types, such as a male warrior class 
structured through homosexual ‘lover’ relations, and an emerging group o f lower class male 
prostitutes. Again, it is essential to note that these reflect social positions that may or may not 
have been concurrent with individual sexual desire. As Greenberg says:
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Class structured homosexuality appears with the dawn o f economic 
stratification. Here the two partners are drawn from different economic strata or 
classes, the wealthier partner purchasing or commanding the sexual services o f the 
poorer. The partners may differ in age, gender, or preference for particular types 
o f contact, but these differences do not define the relationship. What does is the 
preference of the wealthier partner. Thus Captain Bligh, visiting Tahiti in the late 
18 th century, observed a chief sucking the penis o f his attendant. By the usual 
conventions linking rank and sex role, this transaction should not have occurred.
The attendant should have been sucking the chief. However, the chief occupied a 
social position that enabled him to gratify his personal preferences irrespective of 
conventions about homosexual roles. In societies where social relations are 
commercialized, wealth bestows sexual power (p.l 17).
Carroll notes that:
... growing political power created increased sexual exploitation o f those 
with lesser power, thereby rendering the desire of the lesser partner a moot point.
It had no social significance and so it did not exist. Instead, the desire of those in 
power was often free to range across sexes, genders, and ages (p.207).
According to Carroll, Western tradition was formed when a group o f Northern Doric 
invaders overtook Southern Greece, bringing with them with a male dominated, patriarchal 
religion and - more importantly - bronze-age weapons. They quickly subsumed the older 
matriarchal organizations and religions and created their own complex homosexual 
organizations.
The myths of proto-ancient Greek culture provide an interesting insight into the kinship 
based homosexual organization of the time (Carroll, 1996). Sergent (1984) traces several 
classical myths, such as the myths of Narcissus and Hyacinth, back to their roots as stories o f 
initiation. In particular, he outlines the typical initiation pattern for young men in proto-Greek 
culture:
... an abduction of a young man by a male suitor was followed by a month 
hunting in the bush (where it was presupposed that the suitor had a sexual 
relationship with the boy and initiated him into the ways of men). At the end of 
the month, the boy, now man, was restored to his family with specific gifts (an 
animal to sacrifice, a cup to make libations, and a sword with which to fight) that 
would enable him to participate in the community as a male adult. Thereafter, the 
boy and his suitor maintained a special relationship that lasted throughout 
adulthood, including the responsibility of the suitor to find the boy a suitable wife
(p. 102).
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The importance of an older male in the role of initiator of a younger male is common in 
many cultures (Greenberg, 1988). Carroll notes that this practice seems at least foreign, if not 
suspect, in our own culture. Despite this, the story of the boy who must die to become a man 
can still be seen throughout Western literature and is often intertwined with ideas of 
homosexuality and narcissism. Paglia (1990) highlights works in the Western canon retelling 
this (e.g. Melville’s Billy Budd, James Purdy’s Malcolm, or H.H. Monro’s Bassington) as well 
as those which tell the story o f the abomination such a boy becomes when he lives past his 
time (e.g. Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray), All of these works embody a lively homoerotic 
undercurrent. Carroll notes that Western writers repeatedly capture the inability o f Western 
males to access this erotic connection, resulting in violence instead of initiation.
Carroll summarizes:
Thus, society institutionalized cross-generational homosexual bonds as a way 
o f stabilizing an exceedingly competitive male culture. However, such 
competition could also lead to troubles when sex was involved. Hence, the exact 
nature of the sexual relationship became increasingly circumscribed in order to 
reflect (and protect) the unequal nature o f these cross-generational patterns. In 
addition, egalitarian homosexuality became ever more asexual as a society 
transformed itself from the smaller scale organization of the tribe to that of the 
state (p.206).
In his pioneering work, Greek Homosexuality, Dover (1978) outlines a classical Greek 
society in which the older initiatory structures were still in place and successfully bore a 
homoerotic connection. However, such relationships were under vastly increased scrutiny as 
social relationships expanded from those of a kinship society to those of a state society.
Dover explicated the courtly and highly ritualized relationship in classical Athens between the 
‘eratastes’ (the older lover) and his ‘eronmenos’ (the younger beloved). He stresses (Dover, 
1978):
... the highly ritualized nature of the relationship as well as its ambiguity.
For example, the younger boy was not supposed to enjoy his seduction, but to 
remain chaste and aloof. However, not to be wooed and won would bring 
dishonor to the young, noble Greek. The older lover was often laid prostrate 
(shedding tears, and demonstrating loss o f appetite and other forms of 
stereotypical ‘feminine’ behavior) in this highly romanticized game involving an 
uncaring youth (p. 362).
Dover emphasizes how delicate the situation could be when playing with the honor of 
freebom, upper class Athenians, who were, or shortly would be, leaders o f the aristocracy.
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The institutionalized use o f homosexual relations was an integral part o f maintaining cohesion 
within an extremely competitive male oligarchy. As Lacquer points out, intense male 
friendships, philia — friendship, based upon arete — virtue, became the ethical base for a 
philosophy o f ‘the good life’ and the connection between the individual and the social, 
between equality (of true friends) and justice (equality on a societal level). Homosexual 
relations, however, could also be a threat to the existing order as they allowed two men with 
access to power to form liaisons with revolutionary potential (Carroll, 1996). The cautionary 
tale of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, two lovers who killed a fifth century tyrant, became an 
inspiration to the oppressed in the Greek world (Bowder, 1982). According to Carroll, 
homosexual relations always carried an ambivalent relationship to the state. The notion of the 
‘ideal’ friend as first articulated by Plato and subsequently Aristotle in his Nichomachean 
Ethics eventually became a rich template for idealized homosexual relations (Carroll, 1996).
In ancient Greece, however, such a template was rarely coexistent with sexual desire 
(Carroll, 1996). Winkler (1990) emphasizes how the range of desire for a well bom Athenian 
male (as long as one did not act passively with an inferior) was not restricted to gender but 
was free to range across gender lines as well as across class divisions. According to Winkler:
Class organized sexual behavior even more than gender. The sexual act, 
instead of being a private one, was a social enactment of social roles based upon 
class distinctions. In short, a typical upper class man could have several types of 
sexual partners: slaves (of either sex), young boys, hetairas (female courtesans), 
depending upon the constraints of duty (to sire a family, to initiate a boy, etc.), 
availability o f partners, and the whims of fancy and taste. A strictly maintained 
sexual orientation (of either variety) was looked upon as a nonsensical 
impracticality, if not an unhealthy obsession (p.403).
According to Lacquer:
... the ancient Greeks’ hierarchical relationship o f ffeebom Athenian males to 
boys, to women, and then slaves reflected a larger cosmic order in which the adult 
male was seen as the pinnacle of creation. The male form was the standard; the 
boy and woman merely derivative (p. 10).
For Lacquer:
... there were not two distinct sexes for the ancients. There was just one, 
which was modeled upon the perfect male. The woman was not seen as a distinct 
biological entity, but as a poor reflection of the more perfect male counterpart.
2 The theme of the dangerous homosexual re-emerges throughout the Renaissance.
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Anatomy simply demonstrated the larger cosmic truths of patriarchy, as reflected 
in traditional gender roles, which were patent to the Greeks. The truth of gender 
roles and the domination o f the male over the female came first, followed by 
biology. To be a man or a woman was to hold a social rank, a place in society, to 
assume a cultural role, not to be organically one or the other of two 
incommensurable sexes. Sex before the seventeenth century, in other words, was 
still a sociological and not an ontological category (p. 8).
Surprisingly, this ancient view has been corroborated by current research into gender 
acquisition (Carroll, 1996). It has been shown that young children first acquire notions of 
gender as a social form (e.g. Johnny is a little boy because he holds a football; Mary is a little 
girl because she wears a pink ribbon), and later as a physical form (e.g. Johnny is a little boy 
because he has a penis; Mary is a little girl because she has a vagina) (Fagot & Leinback, 
1993).
In many ways, all relations in this economy of one sex were homosexual. The important 
difference was not the partner’s sex, but “the difference in status between partners and 
precisely what was done to whom” (Fagot & Leinback, 1993). In this way, according to 
Halperin: “ ... ‘boy or woman’ appears with perfect nonchalance in an erotic context, as if the 
two were functionally interchangeable (p.23).”
This is not to say that preference did not exist and that such preference could not be life 
long. As Carroll notes, such preference was generally seen as exactly that: a preference, not a 
strict orientation preordained from an early age. Halperin and his colleagues Winkler and 
Zeitlin suggest that the very idea of sexuality as an organized field was a foreign notion to the 
Greeks. Instead, as Hocquenghem suggests, sexuality was diffused throughout the public 
domain, within rituals, religious festivals, and household iconography and management. The 
idea of a ‘sexual orientation’ as a separate part of someone’s identity around which a core self 
would be developed (a sense of ‘me’, ‘not me’) is very foreign to the Greek perception 
(Carroll, 1996). In this sense, Carroll notes that:
... there were men enacting homosexual acts, but no ‘homosexuals’ in 
ancient Greece. It is also important to note that the Greek sense of volition was 
very different from our modem sense of responsibility. Erotic desire came from 
outside, from the gods. Love was a madness, albeit a delightful one, that was 
visited upon the individual. Hence, the Greek sense of accountability for erotic 
acts was very different from our modem one; the gods took not only the blame, 
but also the guilt away from a transgression (p.202).
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Carroll (1996) finds it useful to trace the trajectory of a young man’s sexual experience in 
this world:
As an infant and toddler, he was almost exclusively within the world o f 
women. He was completely in his mother’s charge. Men seldom penetrated into 
this domain. Greek women were cloistered within the house and seldom ventured 
forth into public. The marketplace was the natural home of the man; the house 
belonged to the woman. At around age five or six, a child from a family o f means 
was put under the care of a male teacher, a pedagogue, usually a slave. This 
would last up until just before puberty. The pedagogue would lead the boy back 
and forth between classes and the gymnasium and introduce him to the rudiments 
o f male public life. At around age 13 or 14, just prior to puberty, the boy would 
be taken up by an older male admirer; an unmarried male in his mid-twenties.
This intense relationship would bring the boy out of the family and fully into the 
world of men. The boy would be involved gradually in the socializing of men: 
symposiums, drinking parties, hunting, etc. The older lover would act as a guide, 
confidant, political mentor, and lover. This relationship would last until the older 
lover was married (usually around age 33) or the youth no longer was physically 
‘youthful’ (a full beard was considered a sign of manhood, which usually 
happened around age 18 or 19). To pursue a homosexual relationship beyond this 
point was considered unwise, although doubtless it was frequently done. Soon 
thereafter, the youth would now become the pursuer and reenact the entire process 
with a younger youth. The senior partner went on to marriage. He continued his 
relationship with his younger companion and helped to secure for him an 
advantageous marital match (p. 104).
Winkler emphasizes that such a social arrangement served several purposes besides 
reenacting the patriarchal imperative:
Puberty became a guide process o f initiation by an older and wiser hand, both 
into the ways of men, and into the pleasures of female courtesans, paid 
professionals who were skilled in the erotic arts as well as often politically very 
savvy. Courtship and marriage with the highborn Athenian girl were still many 
years off Also Athenian society saw women of marriageable status, who were 
secluded until marriage, more as ‘property’ than as fit beings for social and 
intellectual intercourse. Hence, they were seldom in the public eye and not 
available for social interaction for men in their 20s. The romantic arrangement 
between erastes and eromenos filled a gap before marriage, and even after. The 
typical age of a young bride was 13. She often had very little in common with her 
new husband of 33. It was expected that marital intimacy would grow in later 
years as the wife matured. This also ensured that in the man’s old age, his wife 
would still be young enough to care for him adequately, (p.67)
As Trumbach points out, such non-egalitarian organization of sexual behavior is 
prototypic for many cultures. Echoes of its presence in Western sexual history can still be
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found in modem gay culture (e.g. the cross class, cross generational nature of many 
European gay relationships) (Trumbach, 1989). According to Carroll (1996):
... it is important to note that any cultural history o f homosexuality must 
acknowledge that as new forms of sexual organization arise, they seldom totally 
supplant the preexisting form. Rather, the new form overlays and mingles with, 
as well as co-opting, the previous form, which often will mn concurrent with a 
competing new form (p.202).
Carroll (1996) stresses that it is important:
... to emphasize how the Greek scenario of male initiation into political 
society, was in actuality, an extremely limited phenomenon restricted to a small 
upper class o f free bom, aristocratic men. The rest of men and women living in 
Greece had no such prerogatives. It cannot be stressed enough how the borders of 
desire (and o f self) were reflected though class and race, as well as gender. To the 
older man, a young boy’s desire was simply irrelevant, as was a girl’s. For the 
slave, it could be said not to exist. Slaves had no notion of ‘individual rights’ or 
some interior ‘essence’ that was inviolate; all that would come later (p.203).
Halperin (1990b) has noted that the sexual system of classical Athens, which defined the 
scope of sexual object choice for adult men in terms independent o f gender, was, therefore, 
logically inseparable from the gender system:
It distributed to men and women different kinds of desires, construing male 
desire as wide-ranging, acquisitive, and object-directed, while construing female 
desire (in opposition to it) as objectless, passive, and entirely determined by the 
female body’s need for regular phallic irrigation. Instead of viewing public and 
political life as a dramatization of individual sexual psychology, as we often tend 
to do, they see sexual behavior as an expression of political and social relations” 
(pp.36-37).
The Middle Ages
With the fall o f the ancient world and the rise of Christianity, a very different relationship 
arose between the body, sexual acts, society, and the cosmic order (Carroll, 1996). In the 
ancient world, there was little thought o f an eternal life. All good things could be found on 
earth. Carroll notes that with the rise o f Orphism (a late classical phenomenon) and then 
Christianity (which was largely based upon Orphic ideas) came the idea of other worldly 
redemption:
Mundane life was seen as a life o f sin. Mortification o f the flesh was needed 
to purify oneself from sin in this world in order to obtain a place in a paradise 
after death. From writers such as St. Paul to St. Augustine and beyond, a new
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sexual ethic was being developed that stressed abstinence except for the minimal 
act needed for procreation within marriage. All pleasure was suspect. The body 
was de facto contaminated, evil, puerile. Any attention paid to it was sinful 
( p l  18).
According to Highwater, (1990) the apostle Paul was outspoken on the matter of the 
opposition o f flesh and spirit. “The flesh lusts against the spirit and the spirit against the 
flesh; and these are contrary to one another ... For to be carnally minded is death; but to be 
spiritually minded is life and peace.” (Gal. 5:17; Rom 8:5).
The procreative act was often seen as something to be reviled. Lacquer notes,
“Intercourse, argued Pope Innocent III, is a diatribe against the body, is never performed 
without ‘the itch of the flesh, the heat of passion, the stench of the flesh” (p. 140).
Unsurprisingly, such a difficult ethos was slow to take hold and the ancient view (now 
‘pagan’) continued alongside the Christian until the Renaissance and beyond. According to 
Lacquer:
... it was ‘common knowledge’ well up to the nineteenth century that in order 
to impregnate a woman, a sufficient degree of ‘heat’ generated by sexual passion 
was a vital ingredient: Desire then was a sign of warmth and female orgasm a 
sign of its sufficiency to ensure ‘generation in the time o f copulation’ (p. 102).
This clearly ran counter to the church’s injunction to ‘cool it’!
According to Boswell (1980),
... it was not until the twelfth century that specific prohibitions against acts 
such as pederasty (which referred to ‘unnatural’ male and female sex acts) were 
proscribed and enforced. Indeed, until that time, same sex partnerships could be 
officially sanctioned by the church with a ritual proscribed for such unions, (p. 36)
Boswell attributes the change in Church attitudes to the rise of a middle class that needed 
to vilify an entrenched aristocracy and aristocratic values, which for the most part continued a 
more pagan, ancient tradition. Free wheeling sexual license was associated with a leisured 
upper class. Religious reformers, who usually had the support of the middle class, such as 
Savarolona, often vilified homosexuality, which was associated with a more educated, liberal 
upper class (Carroll, 1996).
Saslow’s study of homosexual iconography in Renaissance Italy describes a scene 
compatible with that discussed above. Saslow finds it remarkable that this clash between 
classical learning and Christianity is marked by profound differences between the various
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courts as to what constituted acceptable behavior. The influence of specific leaders and their 
attitude towards sexual mores and behaviors were very dramatic and could vary within 
principalities that were only a few miles apart (Saslow, 1986).
Saslow notes that the upper class was vilified as decadent by the middle class, often with 
the help o f a highly politicized church that was more than willing to capitalize on such 
dissatisfaction as a political issue within the quickly changing landscape of alliances that was 
Renaissance Italy. In his large-scale cross-cultural and historical investigation of the social 
construction o f homosexuality, Greenberg stresses how the supposed decadence of the 
ascendancy became a recurrent theme in the continuing war between the classes, with the 
emergent bourgeoisie consistently on the winning side:
The increased repression of homosexuality in the late Middle-Ages can be 
traced to two distinct but related sources: church-state conflict and class conflict. 
With regard to the former, it will be argued that the growing preoccupation with 
homosexuality was an indirect and unanticipated consequence o f the efforts of 
church reformers to establish sacerdotal celibacy. With regard to the latter, it will 
be suggested that a popular hostility toward homosexuality was part o f a broader 
middle class morality that became increasingly forceful in its opposition to a 
lifestyle o f luxury and excess as class divisions widened (p. 280).
However, Carroll notes that:
... the ancient model of a more diffuse notion of sexuality continued in the 
secular courts, which continued to grow during the late Renaissance. This period 
saw a dramatic increase in highly ritualized court life. Power was increasingly 
centralized and men and women o f the upper class were increasingly in daily 
contact, a situation which threatened to undermine the older, all male society of 
the ancient world (p. 208).
Two hundred years after the fabliaux, the all-male world o f the aristocratic warrior 
class had waned. Courts were still overwhelmingly male, but more was required o f the 
courtier now than military prowess and naked brutality. Political and social success 
depended not only on might and cunning but on the gentler skills of courtesy, dress, 
conversation, and the skills o f ‘self-fashioning’ (Lacquer, 1990, p. 125).
However, such close contact with women and a crossover of social skills between men and 
women also engendered new anxiety concerning the power of patriarchy, the power of the 
male over the female, and of male-male relationships (Carroll, 1996):
The modem question, about the ‘real’ sex of a person, made no sense in this 
period, not because two sexes were mixed but because there was only one to pick
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from and it had to be shared by everyone, from the strongest warrior to the most 
effeminate courtier to the most aggressive virago to the gentlest maiden. Indeed, 
in the absence of a purportedly stable system of two sexes, strict laws of the body 
attempted to stabilize gender -  woman as woman and man as man -  and 
punishments for transgression were quite severe (pp. 124-125).
Writers such as Bray (1988) and Goldberg (1994) suggest that male-male relationships 
continued in an idealized and elevated position according to the model inherited from the 
classical world. After the Renaissance, however, there was increasing scrutiny o f the exact 
nature o f these relationships. Sodomy -  which referred to any sexual act outside marriage -  
was always a hovering guest at the border of intense male relationships. “Within this world, 
however, power still equaled sexual access and prowess: the greater the increase in power, the 
more multifarious the opportunities to exercise one’s sexual peculiarities” (Carroll, 1996).
A charge of sodomy almost always had a political context and was frequently 
directed toward a political rival. It was hardly worth bringing the charge against 
an inferior; one dare not bring it against a superior. If one had sufficient power, 
colonization o f underlings went without notice (Goldberg, 1994, p.42).
The life of the Marquis de Sade -  the sexual colonialist par excellence -  as illuminated by 
Lever (1991) offers an intimate look into the rapacious possibilities of aristocratic power 
when the lower classes existed simply for upper class enjoyment. What is remarkable to us 
now, noted Carroll, is how ‘natural’ this exploitation seemed at the time. Society was still 
profoundly hierarchical. To know one’s place was to know who one was. The approach of 
Descartes’ cogito in the next century heralded a stunning reversal of seismic proportions 
(Carroll, 1996).
The Enlightenment
The modem era brought to Western civilization a radical change in outlook toward many 
things, including sexuality. Carroll offers a noteworthy review of the evolution of this new 
outlook towards sexuality and sexual orientation which offers powerful insights into how we 
come to be where we are today in Western Europe and North America with our sexualities.
The beginning of the seventeenth century in continental Europe and England 
saw the fruition of the accelerated cultural growth that had been the hallmark of 
the Renaissance and the resulting Copemican revolution in the new relationship 
between individual and state that became known retrospectively as the 
‘Enlightenment’. At this time the modem notions of the individual and individual
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rights came into being. The larger cosmic order, whether classical or Christian, 
was assaulted by a new rationalism based on science that no longer ordered 
individuals according to paternity, class, race, or immortal soul. Man, the 
pinnacle of creation, was becoming man the animal. The rights of the aristocracy 
were intellectually and physically challenged throughout Europe, and the 
foundations of traditional patriarchy were shaken by events such as the French 
revolution. The ordering meta-structure o f race, class, gender, and religion, which 
had been the bedrock of civilization for millennia, was increasingly destabilized in 
a rising new order.
Central to this new order was the very idea o f the individual. No longer did 
the slave make the man, but rather a man -  a thoughtful and rational man (as 
defined by the cogito ergo sum of Descartes) was enslaved. The individual 
became key: an individual who hypothetically existed apart from culture, 
language, and history. Society arose because of the social contract it had with 
autonomous individuals, who were willing to sacrifice part of their autonomy for 
the advantages of culture and congeniality. However, Man, -  in his essence -  was 
free. This view contrasted starkly with the previous view of man as zoan politikon 
-  the political animal o f Aristotle, who was created though interaction with 
society. Neither did man remain the pinnacle of God’s creation according to a 
sliding scale o f perfection that started with nature and rose up through the 
animals, women, and boys to men.
The emerging, modem view o f the individual, however, also created an 
ideological conflict between the individual and society which is manifested in two 
major variations. In the vision offered by Rousseau, man was essentially good -  a 
noble savage. Society was a corrupting influence on the natural nobility o f man. 
Hence, society was a repressive force to be fought at every turn. For other writers 
such as Hobbes (and later Freud), man was a violent animal, and society was 
necessary to ameliorate his violent tendencies. Society needed to be repressive in 
order to protect man from the worst in himself. These views had one thing in 
common: they created an imaginary duality -  man in nature (whether violent or 
benign) versus man in culture. It was the vision of man in nature (the free man 
before the coming of the law) that allowed the creation of the leading myth o f the 
day: all men are created equal.
However, such an assertion was not articulated without society. Certainly, to 
the rising bourgeoisie, all men with money, with capital to invest, were equal... 
and why not? Capitalism needed a free market made o f free agents in order to 
survive. In addition, it was to the bourgeoisie that these freedoms were first 
extended. The rhetoric of the American Declaration of Independence still granted 
suffrage only to the wealthy. It was not yet meant to encompass people who were 
treated as property (women and slaves). However, these distinctions, too, began 
to break down. If women were, even hypothetically, ‘free’, how was the old 
patriarchal kinship order to reproduce itself? How were gender roles, the bedrock 
of kinship and male authority, to be justified in this changing order? (Carroll, 
1996; pp.226-227)
Trumbach elaborates on the cultural upheaval:
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I think that what we are describing is the beginnings of a major cultural shift, 
which is still far from complete. A patriarchal morality that allowed adult men to 
own and dominate their wives, children, servants and slaves, was gradually 
challenged and partially replaced by an egalitarian morality which proposed that 
all men were created equal, that slavery must therefore be abolished, democracy 
achieved, women made equal with men, and children with their parents (p. 117).
However, as Lacquer (1990) insightfully points out:
... rather than becoming the foundational bedrock of a new order, science 
became the new justification of the old order. Patriarchy and the saliency o f 
gender roles were upheld by using science as the lens through which a ‘natural’ 
order could replace the previous ‘cosmic’ one. However, science seldom had all 
the answers. Instead there arose ‘an imagined biology’ in which women were 
found, conveniently, to be the ‘weaker o f the sexes’ while men were found to be 
‘naturally aggressive’ (p.28).
According to Lacquer, men and women were now seen to be biologically different on a 
fundamental level. Sex arose as this absolute difference. The ‘two sex’ model replaced the 
‘one sex’ model. The hierarchical gave way to the horizontal. Women were no longer 
‘defective males’ but an absolute other, a biological world unto themselves. Anatomy was 
now destiny (Carroll, 1996).
In an age obsessed with justifying and distinguishing the social roles o f 
women and men, science seems to have found more than just signs of sexual 
difference in the disparate forms of the penis and the vagina. Instead, it saw the 
very basis of difference, representing the web of heterosexual union on which 
reproduction, the family, and civilization itself appeared to rest (Carroll, 1996, 
p.207).
However, Lacquer is also quick to point out that at that period science had little actual 
proof o f many of the claims that it was making about gender roles and absolute differences 
between men and women. Rather, science became myth.
The ways in which sexual differences have been imagined in the past are 
largely unconstrained by what was actually known about this or that detail of 
anatomy or physiological process, and instead derive from the rhetorical 
exigencies of the moment. Basically, the content of talk about sexual difference is 
unfettered by fact, and is as free as mind’s play (Carroll, 1996, p.209).
Implications for Homosexuality
As Carroll himself points out, these scientific claims had important practical implications:
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Men now desired women (and vice versa) because of a preordained biology.
If sex with men was like sex with women, then the men who have this sex must be 
like women. Before, such an idea was not a problem, because women were 
simply an inferior type of men, and sex in general was thus fundamentally 
homosexual. However, with the ‘two sex’ idea, men who had sex with men were 
now seen as women. In other words, they were a totally different species. There 
was no way to cross this absolute divide (p. 210).
In addition, with the breakdown of the old social order, a new social contract that would tie 
woman inextricably to man was needed. Sex, seen from a biological standpoint, became the 
justification for this order. Correct gender behavior now became correct heterosexual 
behavior. Men and women were biologically made for each other and only for each other. 
Within the two sex models, heterosexuality arose as the only sexual option that satisfied strict 
gender roles and that would reproduce civilization. In other words: “sex, gender, and 
sexuality were locked together as the biological imperative” (Weeks, 1985).
Hence, for the first time, a male who performed homosexual acts became de facto  
feminine, regardless of whether he was an active or passive partner, young or old. It was this 
fear o f the ‘woman’ in man that led to its exorcism through the emergence of a new class o f 
man who was no man at all (Dollimore, 1991).
According to Trumbach (1989):
... such a transition did not happen overnight, but was more or less in place 
by the mid 1700s. Around this time, public meeting places called ‘molly houses’ 
appeared in major urban centers, catering to this new style o f creature, the 
‘effeminate sodomite’. Homosexual acts, in any of their permutations, became a 
clear indication of a transgression across a conflated sex/gender line. To 
transgress this line was now to invert the natural order. Homosexuality became 
‘the crime against nature’ (p.47).
The female transvestite was perceived as a deeply disturbing figure in the early 
seventeenth century. Certain cultural distinctions were breaking down and in the anxiety that 
they provoked we read the effects of far-reaching historical change. In obsessions with dress 
and its social significance we witness contemporary tensions and struggles between classes, 
between residual and emergent cultures, between the mercantile order and what it was 
actually (or seemed to be) replacing, between rank and wealth, and between innate and fiscal 
value (Dollimore, 1991, p. 103).
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In the emergent market economy, class could be bought, fancy clothes could be bought, 
male status and privilege could be bought. Everyone was a potential gentleman, a patriarch, a 
real man. The lower classes were no longer seen as the sexual playground o f the rich. The 
sexual colonialism o f lower class men, which had previously been pervasive as an enactment 
o f sexed social roles, was now a transgression against individuals who might be exploited 
(Carroll, 1996, p.212).
Again according to Trumbach:
... the need to inscribe homosexual acts and attributes associated with them 
with effeminacy emerged. The sodomite had become a symbol o f failed 
masculinity and as such, began to occupy an increasingly important symbolic 
position as an ever more visible threat to the social order. The newly emerging 
class and gender tensions that were well on their way to creating exclusive 
heterosexuality also created the tension and anxiety that created a more exhaustive 
and highly visible homosexual deviant (p.48).
Conversely, sex became a market commodity to be bought and sold like any other. In the 
free market economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, social forces, with appeals to 
nature at every turn, were applied to keep sex out of the marketplace and within socially 
acceptable institutions. A science of sexology arose to create, defme, and ultimately control 
sexual behavior and mores (Carroll, 1996).
Concurring with this theory, Weeks (1985) remarks:
Just as the foundation of sociology in this period sought, through the writings 
o f August Comte, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and 
many others, to find the Taws of society’, so, in a complementary and equally 
influential fashion, the early sexual theorists attempted to uncover the silent 
whisperings, the hidden imperatives of our animal nature “on account of its ... 
deep influence upon the common will.” The science of sex was a necessary 
adjunct to the science of society; each came to rely implicitly but absolutely, on 
the other. A dichotomy between ‘sex’ and ‘society’ was written into the very 
terms of the debate (Weeks, 1985, p.339).
The emergent significance of “the family”, as one vocal group in particular is pointed 
out by Carroll:
As the metaphysical underpinnings of society collapsed, as history lost its 
prescriptive power, as law was being reduced to custom, to group consensus, one 
last bastion of un-assailed order emerged: the family. The nuclear family was 
made to carry the recreation of the patriarchal order and science was used to 
justify the ‘naturalness’ of the gender roles reflected in the bourgeois family and 
the ‘naturalness’ of genital desire within marriage. As metaphysics were
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withdrawn from society, they were reinvested in the family. The King was no 
longer a god, but every man was a king, every woman an Eve, every family a 
recreation o f the entire cosmic order of creation. There was a grand reversal of 
metaphor: what previously had been writ large on the outside of the social order 
(distributed through God, king and country), was now to be found written inside 
individual psyches. Cultural mythology was quickly collapsing into individual 
psychology, and the family was on its way to becoming its executioner and scribe. 
Unsurprisingly, sex outside the family was vilified and there was a growing 
condemnation o f masturbation, prostitution, and homosexual acts (p.213).
It is often thought that the eighteenth and nineteenth century obsession with masturbation 
and prostitution were part of a new literature “dominated by a tone o f total and repressive 
sexual intolerance” (Carroll, 1996, p.213). Lacquer argues instead that the ‘solitary vice’ and 
the ‘social evil’ were believed to be, as their new names imply, social pathologies that visited 
destruction on the body in the same way that blasphemy and lechery were seen to produce 
monsters in ages past.
Weeks (1985) notes that many o f the new categories created by sexologists accurately 
recreated classifications “nearly identical with theological classifications and with more
thpronouncements of the English common law of the 15 century.” With the growing tension 
between sex and society, and between individual and society, it was inevitable that sexual 
deviance would be transferred from the acts themselves to the individual: “ ... the eruption of 
the speaking pervert, the individual marked, or marred, by his (or her) sexual impulses” 
(Weeks, 1985). The pervert now became the border of the normal (Carroll, 1996). The 
cataloging of case studies and creation of new categories o f deviants, such as the sadist, the 
masochist, the fetishist and the newly minted ‘homosexual’ began at the turn of the twentieth 
century with the efforts o f sexologists such as Kraft-Ebing, Hirshfield, Bloch and others 
(Foucault, 1978). “The 19th century homosexual became the personage, a past, a case history, 
and a childhood, in addition to being the type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an 
indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology” (Foucault, 1978).
Thus, a crisis in the ‘natural’ order o f the old patriarchal kinship structure 
created a conflation of gender and sexuality into a new character type, the 
homosexual, who had a definable psychology and identity. Over the next century, 
the identity of the homosexual underwent several shifts and reversals from its 
origins as a perverse character flaw to being a criminal activity that should be 
excised from society. In turn, homosexuality would be described as: 1) a mental 
illness, 2) a natural, biologically based variant o f human behavior, and 3) a 
revolutionary term to be turned back on a bourgeois, paternalistic order that had
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created the term to safeguard heterosexuality. As we shall see, each of these 
belief systems created vastly different expectations for the normative development 
and maintenance of homosexual identity (Carroll, 1996, p.221).
A Queer Century Summarized
Carroll summarizes the twenty-first century for the American gay and lesbian community 
as an:
... odd time of transition. It is a time of paradox, change, fragmentation, and 
reflection. As gay publications, gay organizations, gay churches, etc. have 
flourished, so have gay positions on just about everything, including the economy, 
politics, religion and academics. Some gays have become an entrenched part of 
the middle classes away from the more radical hubs of gay ghettos in major urban 
centers. These gays often espouse a growing conservatism, and tend to opt for 
quiet assimilation. Others, mostly within larger urban centers, are still fighting 
the seemingly endless battle against AIDS, both outside and within the 
institutional mainstream. Some have taken up specific causes, such as 
transgender rights or S&M. The community seems to have grown to encompass a 
very loose ‘patchwork quilt’ of local causes, communities and interests. Once 
again, gays are both everywhere and nowhere. The very notion of a unified ‘gay 
identity’ seems like some quaint idea from the past. For some, this is a reason to 
mourn, but for others, the de-centered nature of the community points the way to a 
more empowered, postmodern fixture (Carroll, 1996, p.223).
Queering the Future
Carroll notes that the vast majority of interests for gay and lesbian studies have been:
...retrospective; the unearthing hidden histories, silenced voices, and 
sequestered knowledge. This unearthing has questioned the foundational roots of 
heterosexuality, which is now seen as a social construct and biological 
phenomenon, providing a founding myth for the legitimization of gender roles. It 
has also enriched gay and lesbian lives immeasurably, providing an iprimatur and 
nihil obstet for their very existence (Carroll, 1996, p.224).
However, it has been suggested (Carroll, 1996) that:
... the weight of this scholarship has prompted the lesbian and gay 
community to move its sense of identity beyond the reactionary politics of the 
1970s and 1980s. This is identified specifically as a move toward questioning 
heterosexuality and the primacy o f the masculine gender role, not defensively 
(‘We are just as good as you’) but from an offensive position affirming gay 
relationships as models for fixture relationships within society at large. For 
example, the gay egalitarian relationship, in which both partners work, share 
household duties, etc. offers an interesting model of how one gender can include 
all the various attributes that society has provided for both (e.g. nurturance,
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assertiveness, support, leadership, etc.). In this regard, gay men and women offer 
a positive model for everyone, acknowledged only recently.
In addition, those within the gay community who traverse traditional gender 
lines, such as the ‘boy identified lesbian’, anticipate the increased blurring o f 
gender possibilities within culture at large (e.g. mixed contact sport teams, female 
police officers). They are also active in the creation of new possibilities that may 
be introduced to the general population.
Lastly, the many gays and lesbians who move to urban centers and live and 
work within gay communities offer a model of community that challenges the 
traditional barriers of public/private, individual/group and work/life space. In 
addition, the lack of a closely defined identity within the community offers a 
model for multi-cultural awareness and the politics o f inclusion. In many ways, 
the gay and lesbian community has just begun to be discovered and valued for the 
creative social laboratory it is, offering a great deal to culture in general (pp.225- 
226).
The Twentieth Century in Review
The current organization of homosexuality is a culmination o f a century of slow evolution 
away from a gender-based organization to a modem, middle class organization based upon 
exclusive sexual object choice (Weeks, 1985). This split was originally based upon the 
vilification of homosexuals and the creation of a heterosexual normative ideal (Carroll, 1996), 
and it is a relatively modem creation that only reached saliency in all classes in the 1950s. 
Subsequently, an organized resistance to the pathologizing of homosexuality arose (with, 
however, the tacit acceptance of the categories hetero and homo) as well as active pursuit of 
the creation of a positive gay identity. This new gay identity, however, was mainly o f interest 
to white people from the middle classes (Weeks, 1985). Older forms of sexuality, such as 
gender-based identifications, as well as other categories of identification, such as race, 
continue to operate in other subcultures as the major substrate of identity. Nonetheless, 
within traditional mainstream psychology, the middle class norm continues to be uncritically 
applied (Carroll, 1996).
Today, there is a need for a detailed inquiry into the ideological assumptions behind the 
normative ideal of ‘the good homosexual’ and our step-by-step exploration of Cass’ 
developmental stages. Carroll suggests that the unspoken assumptions that underlie the 
schema spring from the bourgeois notion of the anxiety- and contradiction-laden individual 
and that, ultimately, such a schema supports a conservative agenda very much in line with the 
conservative, middle class agenda of mainstream psychology and psychiatry.
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Chapter 13: Queer Theory
Queer and lesbigay stakeholders in the ethical debate on sexual reorientation often operate 
from a political and philosophical perspective bom of the queer theorists. To fully understand 
the drive behind objections to sexual reorientation some familiarity with queer theory is 
required. Queer theory is a recurring theme in non-heterosexual philosophy and politics. Any 
analysis of the clinical or social implications of sexual reorientation interventions involves 
discussion of themes from queer theory and queer philosophers.
In its broadest sense, queer theory concerns itself with the overarching theme of how 
sexual minorities have forever been made to create meanings by those who wield political, 
scientific and cultural power, and how such meanings are externally and, eventually, 
internally enforced, so as to seem natural, inevitable, and necessary to civilization (Butler, 
1993). Its concern is to examine in depth the social, political, and personal forces that 
combine to create a fixed sense of self-identity with the goal o f uncovering the mutability o f 
these identities and making accessible possible sites o f individual and cultural transformation 
(Jagose, 1996). According to Fradenburg and Freccero (1995):
It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of the concept of historicity 
to queer theory and other critical enterprises devoted to dismantling the 
universals, essences, and natures that have for centuries been used to define and 
persecute ‘others’ (p.375).
Identity, within this historical perspective, is not a fixed ‘essence’ but something that 
reflects the combination of the individual character and the story within a temporal 
framework. The power of such a critique lies in its ability to subvert the dominant mythology 
through the positing of alternative readings of ‘how things came to be’ (Carroll, 1996). The 
new narratives of queer theory provide avenues for growth on both the individual and cultural 
levels. In the words of Paul Ricoeur (1992):
The person shares the condition of dynamic identity peculiar to the story 
recounted. The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be 
called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the 
identity of the story that makes the identity o f the character (pp. 147-148).
Queer theory explores the history that has resulted in the current situation of today’s 
homosexual and offers insights into modem gay identity as well as the struggle of the non-gay 
homosexual and the many other sexual minorities (Carroll, 1996). Many of the premises
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which underlie contemporary sexual identity are historically unexamined and have remained 
unchanged for centuries.
The Genesis of “Queer” as a Theory
Oddly enough, Nietzsche is the grandparent of queer theory. According to Carroll, the
historical inspiration for such a critique dates from the works of Nietzsche with his draconian
‘revaluation of values’ in the late nineteenth century. Nietzsche dramatically detonated the
tenets o f high modernism - the possibility of universal truths, clear moral imperatives, and the
grand evolution o f civilization away from the mytho-poetic realm to the exalted realms o f
pure science. Nietzsche (1887) saw only contingencies, power, and perspective:
There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the 
more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we 
can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing, 
our ‘objective’ be (p.503).
The world, for Nietzsche, is not composed of facts -  a positivist notion -  but rather
interpretations that clash against each other while vying for a claim to attention -  for
vindication. In short, to rule undisputedly (Carroll, 1996). Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot be
understood without considering his essential pluralism. There is no event, no phenomenon,
word or thought which does not have a multiple sense (Deleuze, 1962).
Most o f Nietzsche’s work centers specifically around traditional Judeo-Christian morality
(Carroll, 1996). He attempted to re-historicize this tradition, thus showing its contingent
nature -  its creation through the historical machinations of ‘will to power’ (Nietzsche, 1901).
As a result, he re-examined most values from the perspective that history was no longer
inevitable, but a function of the will to power:
The maxim of ‘knowledge is power’ dated back to Sir Francis Bacon and the 
dawn of the age of enlightenment and the high modem period. Nietzsche reversed 
the equation to begin the postmodern inquiry based on the maxim ‘power is 
knowledge’ (Carroll, 1996, p.227).
Foucault
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher and psychologist, turned the study o f power and 
knowledge towards an understanding of sexuality, using the foundation laid by Nietzsche. 
Foucault ‘historicized’ the naturalness of our modem ideas of sex, making of them a natural
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category to be studied, cataloged and controlled. From Foucault’s perspective, we see nature 
giving way to culture throughout history (Carroll, 1996).
Many gay writers in the 1970s, such as Katz (1976), Altman (1971), and Weeks (1977), as 
well as many feminist and lesbian writers, had been exploring the idea that sexual categories 
that appear natural and inevitable (such as male/female, masculine/feminine, 
heterosexual/homosexual) are actually historical creations bound to a particular place and 
time. Katz, among others, has been vocal regarding the trend among ‘queer philosophers’ to 
glorify the contributions o f Foucault prematurely.
Foucault, however, was the first to place such questions into a larger 
philosophical tradition that linked such historical inquiry to larger issues o f 
epistemology, power, and truth. He showed how the social sciences claim 
objective truth, yet are complicit with the maintenance of the status quo o f a 
bourgeois, patriarchal power regime (Carroll, 1996, p.226).
For Foucault, it was the category of ‘sex’, that provided these regimes with their most 
invasive instrument o f control.
From Ancient to Modern Alliances
Foucault (1984) marked the seventeenth century as representing the initial transition away 
from ancient, aristocratic patriarchal power structures, based on traditional ‘deployment of 
alliance’, such as a hierarchical caste system and marriages based on long standing family 
alliances (and hence, non-romantic, impersonal, and political). He describes the subsequent 
order as a bourgeois structure based on the ‘deployment of sexuality’, such as the need for 
monogamy, strict sexual orientations, and a list o f approved sexual acts (Carroll, 1996).
In aristocratic society, marriage was first and foremost a societal contract, devoid of 
romance, spirituality, and passion. Alliances and the property they represented were meant to 
span generations in a meaningful and steady course (Boswell, 1994). Although sex was 
necessary for the creation of an heir, romance was a threat to the order of the system. Outside 
marriage, individual sexual desire was free to roam across a variety o f borders so long as the 
basic tenets of the contract, such as the creation of an unchallenged heir, were not broken 
(Carroll, 1996). For the lowest classes, marriage was barely a consideration and knowledge 
of who one’s true parents were was often a moot point. Hence, patriarchy and class 
constructed long-term relationships, not erotic desire (Foucault, 1978).
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With the rise o f the bourgeois society, the complete control of the ruling elite 
gave way to the freedoms of the common-man. The Age of Enlightenment undid 
‘the great chain o f being’ wherein people had been able to find their place (and 
identity) along a continuum of power that started with God and ended with slaves. 
Instead, the Enlightenment offered the notion that ‘all men are created equal’.
The individual was created with certain unalienable rights. Identity that had 
previously been handed to the individual at birth (e.g. sex, name, rank, 
profession), now became an interior ‘tabula rasa.’ Accordingly, once-stable 
alliances were in danger of disintegrating into a dangerous, disordered flux by 
theoretically autonomous individuals who could order alliances willy-nilly 
(Carroll, 1996, p. 129).
Hence, according to Foucault, the individual human body now became a machine to be 
structured and controlled by the ruling bourgeoisie. By extension, the community became a 
populace in which the government was concerned with propagation, birth, mortality, the level 
o f health and life expectancy (Foucault, 1978). The older power of the sovereign, with 
control over life and death, was now transformed into a bourgeois administration that exerted 
control as seamlessly as possible through all aspects of personal and community life (Carroll, 
1996). According to Foucault, sex became the key to this ordering, and sexual desire the glue 
that held it together. Sex became a subject of expert medical, religious and psychological 
discourse, a discourse that ran through the body and soul of each individual, ensuring an 
absolute source of control from which none could escape (Carroll, 1996).
The deployment of sexuality has its reason for being, not in reproducing 
itself, but in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating bodies 
in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly 
comprehensive way (Foucault, 1978, p. 122).
Foucault refers to what he calls the ‘notion of sex’ as ‘an artificial unity’, that was lumped 
together out of sensations and pleasures in order “to make use of this fictitious unity as a 
causal principal, an omnipotent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere” (p. 154). 
According to Foucault, ‘sex’ was an ‘imaginary point’ that was posited prior to sexuality by 
the regimes of power that organized sexuality. Each individual had to pass through the 
absolute category o f ‘sex’ and be named unequivocally a male or a female in order to have 
access to a body, which is now sexed and an identity, which is now based on sexuality:
We arrived at a point where we expect our intelligibility to come from what 
was for many centuries thought o f as madness (the vicissitudes o f Eros) ... from 
what was perceived as an obscure and nameless urge” (Foucault, 1978, p.l 56).
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To Foucault, the nuclear family, originally universalized in support of the bourgeois state, 
is the premier bourgeois institution, one that has been invested as the site of power and 
control. To queer theorists, sexual desire, once poly-vocal and free ranging within certain 
exterior limits, was made to reside within the drama of the family and subjected to internal 
limitations, such as a fixed opposite sex orientation, and delimited to a strict reproductive 
imperative (Carroll, 1996). The rising bourgeoisie vilified sex that was not strictly 
reproductive in intention (Carroll, 1996).
For Foucault, Freud’s work, with its excessive emphasis on psychosexual development 
grounded in biology, represented an excellent example of how the prevailing tide o f 
nineteenth century science allowed the bourgeoisie agenda to delimit and control alliances. 
Freud’s Oedipus complex was the logical culmination of such a conflation of a nuclear 
family, sex, desire, and a reproductive imperative (Foucault, 1978). Queer theorists note that 
submission to the law was no longer an external obeisance to a powerful ruler, but an internal 
submission through a complex interplay of relinquishment and identification (Carroll, 1996). 
Western culture became dependent on the inner workings o f the nuclear family and the 
sublimation of incestuous strivings within that family (Butler, 1980).
Where Freud saw the repression and sublimation o f primitive sexual drives as necessary 
for the creation of culture, Foucault saw production -  the production of the repressive regimes 
of bourgeois power and control. Psychology, for Foucault, created riddles -  such as the 
Oedipus complex in psychoanalysis -  in order to answer them and thus obtain authority over 
the persons who have been explained:
This convoluted psychological discourse -  itself a prodigious production, 
when legitimized by regimes of power, such as a psychoanalytic elite (or social 
elite, such as politicians, city planners, prison wardens - the whole panoply of 
bourgeoisie positions of power), ensured an intrusive control that penetrated the 
inner psyche of every citizen. Sex as a secret in need of an explanation became 
the democratic illness -  are we not all castrated? And discourse about it -  the 
cure. Eventually, the need to have a stable sexual orientation that remained stable 
over time (or whose truth was unearthed and developed through therapy) became 
a shibboleth o f modem culture, a way of giving ‘body and life to the rules of 
alliance by saturating them with desire’ (Foucault, 1978, pp.98-99).
Foucault argues that power is not a unitary phenomenon, incapable of change. It is the 
result o f multiple alliances and smaller power structures, each with its own unstable base.
The result is an overlapping and often contradictory matrix of injunctions and proclamations
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(Carroll, 1996). For Foucault, this dynamic view of power also allowed for the possibility o f 
change. Every restriction could become a point of resistance. Every dictate, fiat, rule created 
the possibility o f its opposite, the seat o f its own undoing. According to Sheridan (1980):
Power relationships depend on a multiplicity o f points of resistance, which 
serve at once as adversary, target, support, and foothold. Just as there is no center 
of power, there is no center o f revolt, no unified class of the seat of rebellion.
There is a plurality o f resistance (p. 185).
Foucault returns us to Nietzsche’s notion of plurality and its transformational potential 
(Carroll, 1996).
The Queering of Identities
In recent decades there has been an explosion within popular culture o f writers, artists, 
performers, philosophers and social scientists speaking from gay, lesbian, queer, and other 
marginalized perspectives. This intentional, sometimes promiscuous performance of 
dislocated, multiple sexual identities continues to create an ongoing ‘queering’ o f familiar 
identities and stories. It is worth quoting a number o f authors here to provide a sense o f what 
is involved:
Sedgwick (1993) emphasizes:
That is one of the things that ‘queer’ can refer to: the open mesh of 
possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonance, and resonance, lapses and excesses of 
meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of anyone’s sexuality 
aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically. The experimental 
linguistic, epistemological, representational, political adventures attaching to the 
way many o f us who may at times be moved to describe ourselves as (among 
many other possibilities) pushy femmes, radical faeries, fantasists, drags, clones, 
leather-folk, ladies in tuxedoes, feminist women, feminist men, masturbators, 
bull-daggers, divas, snap queens, butch bottoms, storytellers, transsexuals, 
aunties, wannabes, lesbian-identified men, lesbians who sleep with men, or ... 
people able to relish, learn from, or identify with such (pp.298-299).
Carroll holds the view that:
The queer approach to sexual identity expands on many of the ideas that 
originated with Nietzsche and Foucault. It emphasizes the unstable state o f 
apparently natural categories such as sex, gender, and orientation. Exposure of 
the inherent instability o f these ‘natural’ categories makes change and 
transformation on individual and cultural levels possible. The ‘queering’ of 
identity is the conscious taking on of many contradictory roles (‘butch bottom’) as 
a political act (p. 158).
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Butler (1993) asserts that:
“I f  the term “queer” is to be a site o f collective contestation, the point o f 
departure for a set o f historical reflections and future imaginings, it will have to 
remain that which is, in the present, never fully owned, but always and only 
redeployed, twisted, queered from a prior usage and in the direction of an urgent 
and expanding political purpose” (p.73).
Carroll correctly emphasizes that:
The term ‘queer’ itself remains controversial within the gay community.
There are many (often middle aged), middle class gays who eschew the 
appellation altogether, mostly because of its profound negative cultural 
connotations. Others consider ‘queer’ to be a term which is accessible to 
everyone through an active act of interpellation -  ‘I am queer in my multiplicity 
of identities’-  but one that belongs to no one group, lifestyle or set of political 
objectives (p.240).
According to Halperin (1995),
,.. queemess is a “new kind of sexual identity characterized by its lack of 
clear definitional content... not by what it is, but by where it is and how it 
operates. Those who knowingly occupy such marginal locations, who assume a 
de-essentialized identity that is purely positional in character, are properly 
speaking not gay but queer” (pp.61-62).
Queer theorists are less concerned with a unified ‘doer’ behind the deed, than with the 
collection of deeds themselves (Carroll, 1996):
Where there is an ‘I’ who utters or speaks and thereby produces an effect in 
discourse, there is first a discourse, which precedes and enables that ‘I’ and forms 
in language the constraining trajectory of its will. Thus, there is no ‘I’ who stands 
behind the discourse and executes its volition or will through the discourse 
(Butler, 1993, p. 109).
The Postmodern Homosexual
Queer’s investigation into the development of modern gay identify is evidenced, according 
to Carroll by:
... multiple stories and perspectives, and an emphasis on the discontinuities 
of the epistemes (truth claims) over the course of history, rooted in 
postmodernism. Complexity is valued over the creation of an overarching, bird’s 
eye, grand narrative a la Hegel, or the crushing equanimity of consensus a la 
Habemas (p. 241).
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According to Carroll (p. 156), the result is what Lyotard (1979) calls a “pairology” or ‘"the 
double observation of the heterogeneity of rules and the search for dissent.”
Interpreting texts, regardless o f the person involved, does not seem to be simply a  matter o f 
some arguments defeating others, but of the expansion o f ideas, alteration of practices and 
general self-education (Hoy & McCarthy, 1994):
In this regard, a "queer’ education, with its emphasis on illuminating the 
previously hidden, the silenced, and the left behind, creates the ground from 
which new narratives, new identities, new cultural forms can arise that can have 
transformational potential on a personal and collective level (pp. 114-115).
The exploration of the creation and development of the modem homosexual as a cultural 
form begins with the exploration of a diachronic, historical investigation of male homosexual 
acts within their social context (Butler, 1993). Carroll (p. 162) describes the major homoerotic 
themes woven throughout our Western histories:
• Same-sex erotica as the glue of a patriarchal, male dominated culture.
• Same-sex erotica as the basis for ideal friendship.
• Same-sex erotica as sexual colonialism within a rising market economy.
• Same-sex erotica as abomination outside the law of reproduction.
• Same-sex erotica as "inversion’: evidence of a female in a male’s body.
• Same-sex erotica as a threat to a patriarchal, male dominated culture.
• Same-sex erotica as a recognized character type -  ‘the homosexual’.
• Homosexuality as genetically inherited.
• Homosexuality as acquired through the family.
• Homosexuality as an illness without a cure.
• Homosexuality as a curable perversion o f choice.
• Homosexuality as a hysterical border for heterosexuality.
• The "homosexual’ as sexual outlaw and rebel.
• The "homosexual’ as a political force.
• The ‘homosexual’ as unremarkable variation of sexual desire.
• The ‘homosexual’ as just another family down the block.
• The ‘homosexual’ as a dire threat to "family values’.
Carroll demonstrated that such themes reflect prevailing prejudices as well as the ethical 
imperatives of their times, and that many o f these continue to resonate in contemporary 
society and impact public policy and prevailing public opinion. With the expansion of the 
boundaries of identity categories, and in seeming to diminish, discredit, and disregard 
distinctions between the various forms of marginalized sexual identification, ‘queer’ has 
provoked exuberance in some quarters, but anxiety and outrage in others (Weeks, 1990).
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Queer Skepticism
Queer’s discredit o f the ‘self-evident’ status o f identity categories has itself come under 
suspicion from those who see it as merely a political or even a reactionary form of 
intellectualizing (Jagose, 1996). A bioethical analysis o f sexual reorientation interventions 
will necessarily need to examine both sides of queer theory and its clinical utility. At the 
extreme are Wolfe and Penelope (1993), who introduce their anthology of lesbian cultural 
criticism by identifying the destabilization of identity as an explicitly homophobic strategy:
We [cannot] afford to allow privileged patriarchal discourse (of which post­
structuralism is but a new variant) to erase the collective identity Lesbians have 
only recently begun to establish. For what has in fact resulted from the 
incorporation o f deconstructive discourse, in academic ‘feminist’ discourse at 
least, is that the word ‘Lesbian’ has been placed in quotation marks, whether used 
or mentioned, and the existence of real Lesbianism has been denied, once again 
(p.23).
West and Zimmerman (1997) make an anxious observation that “the discourses o f 
‘common sense’ and contemporary theory seem to be moving further apart.” This 
observation has been used to discredit the role o f queer theory in any debate on the ethics of 
sexual reorientation. Palmer (1993) and Castle (1993) express similar distress in critiquing 
the way in which it has become popular to contest, along deconstructionist lines, the very 
meaningfulness of terms such as ‘lesbian’ or ‘gay’ or ‘coming out’, especially among younger 
lesbian and gay scholars trained in Continental philosophy (including a number of queer 
theorists). In a critique of Castle, Traub (1995) argues that such claims ignore the ideological 
dimension o f an appeal to common sense:
The assumption that one knows, in an ‘ordinary’, ‘vernacular’ sense, what a 
‘lesbian’ is, and that on the basis o f such a stable knowledge one can forge 
connections across time and culture, obscures the recognition that such knowledge 
is less a position from which one can make autonomous claims than the result of 
normalizing discourses (p.29).
Malinowitz (1995) complains:
Over-represented by prestigious academic institutions, drawing on closed- 
circuit calls for papers, using a post-structuralist vocabulary that unabridged 
dictionaries haven’t yet caught up with, heavily inter-referential and 
overwhelmingly white, the queer theorist network often resembles a social club 
open only to residents of a neighborhood most of us can’t afford to live in (p. 12).
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According to Jagose (1996), another common objection to the recent queering of lesbian 
and gay identities focuses on political efficacy: to question the self-evident status o f identity 
(so the argument goes) may well be explicable in intellectual terms but is indefensible 
because it encourages apolitical quietism* Often conceptualized as a ‘gay generation gap’ is 
the expressed objection that comes from those who cannot accept a once pejorative term as a 
positive self-description (Read, 1993). The reluctance of certain gay men and lesbians to 
identify themselves unequivocally as queer demonstrates that the categories are not 
synonymous (Jagose, 1996). Sedgwick observes that “there are some lesbians and gays who 
could never count as queer, and other people who vibrate to the chord o f queer without having 
much same-sex eroticism or without routing their same-sex eroticism through the identity 
labels lesbian or gay.”
Jagose notes:
Queer’s impact on identity politics has yet to be determined. It is probable 
that identity politics will not disappear under the influence of queer but become 
more nuanced, less sure of itself, and more attuned to those multiple compromises 
and pragmatic effects that characterize any mobilization of identity. Although 
frequently described as aggressive, queer is also tentative. It remains suspicious 
o f homogenous identity categories and totalizing explanatory narratives 
necessarily limits its own claims. Queer’s principal achievement is to draw 
attention to the assumptions that -  intentionally or otherwise -  are inherent in the 
mobilization of any identity category, including itself (p.47).
Mental Health and Queer Theory
To mental health professionals, queer theory and its discourses on the philosophical 
politics of identity are clinically relevant for a number of reasons. Foremost, because many 
gay and lesbian patients are increasingly familiar with the subject and are eager to discuss 
their lives and histories, using the rather unique vocabulary of queer theorists; secondly, 
because the traditional Western mental health formulations on sexual identity are decidedly 
bourgeois and grounded in a middle class perspective that fails many, especially those not 
from an American or Western European middle class; and lastly, because queer theory 
questions not just sexual identity but the process by which one acquires all the multifarious 
identities that coalesce to form a stable (and sometimes unstable) self that is fluid over time 
and dependent upon and related to one’s place in history (Carroll, 1996). Queer theory offers
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a complex view of non-heterosexuality without legislating its future. This larger 
philosophical perspective on non-heterosexual behavior and identity can offer a framework 
for demystifying sexual reorientation efforts.
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Chapter 14: Homosexual Identity Development
The fluid versus static nature of homosexual and non-heterosexual identity and its 
relationship to sexual orientation is a recurring core theme in the debate over sexual 
reorientation. The use of the concept o f ‘homosexual identity’ to refer to an aspect o f 
homosexual functioning spans more than three decades. Cass (1984/1985) was one of the 
first to examine the popular writings o f the late 1960s and 1970s through a scientific and 
philosophic lens. She postulates a number of factors that might account for the development 
of widespread interest in homosexual identity and formulates a scheme for identity 
acquisition:
• A change in perspective, apparent since the nineteenth century, from homosexual-as- 
object to homosexual-as-person.
• The gradual abandonment during the 1960s of the notion of collectivity and its 
replacement with the ideology of the individual, which emphasized the rights of 
individuals, free expression, self-fulfillment, and social tolerance.
• The increasing emphasis on social psychology and sociology in the humanistic 
approach to the individual.
Defining Homosexual Identity
An accepted standard of the concept of homosexual identity remains elusive. As Cass 
noted in 1985, there continues to be a very noticeable, almost universal lack of definition of 
the term ‘identity’ as it relates to the homosexual. A variety of diverse meanings can be 
inferred from the literature: 1) defining oneself as gay, 2) a sense of self as gay, 3) image of 
self as homosexual, 4) the way a homosexual person is, and 5) consistent behavior in relation 
to homosexual-related activity. ‘Sexual-identity’ and ‘self-identity’ are often used as 
explanations of homosexual identity. The notion of self, as in self-definition, self-concepts, 
and self-image, is often intricately bound to the idea of identity (Dank, 1972, 1971; 
Loewenstein, 1980; Weeks, 1980).
In the absence of a definition for ‘self, defining identity in these terms is of 
limited value. There are a number of idiosyncratic definitions for identity in the 
literature, however. Most authors can subscribe to the idea that identity is: “ ... 
the answer to the questions: ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Where do I belong?’ ” (Warren,
1981, p.10).
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General Conceptions of Identity
Cass notes that when homosexual identity is considered from the perspective of human 
identity, interesting questions emerge. Can homosexual identity be presented as a construct 
similar to that described in the general literature as a person’s overall identity? Is homosexual 
identity essentially similar to or different than ethnic, occupational, or status identities? Can 
one assume that homosexual identity and heterosexual identity are structurally alike? To what 
degree is homosexual identity time- and space-specific? What effects do particular 
sociological, psychological, political or economic conditions have upon the nature o f 
homosexual identity?
Berger and Luckman (1966) assert that “theories about identity are always embedded in 
the more comprehensive theories about reality (p.26).” Cass worries that in homosexual 
literature theorists have given little attention to the assumptions that form the underlying base 
for their views on homosexual identity. Wegner, Vallacher (1986) and Riebel (1982) worry 
that there are researchers who fail to recognize the degree to which their work is based on 
personal beliefs about self. Any understanding of reality reflects past experiences, present 
social and psychological functioning and fixture aspirations, all of which are easily and subtly 
incorporated into research, either intentionally or unintentionally (Cass, 1985).
Identity and Self-Concept
In homosexual literature, the description of the relationship between identity and self takes 
one of three forms, holding either that the terms are interchangeable, that they are distinct and 
separate or that identity refers to a component o f the self. Maslow (1968) noted, with 
reference to the concepts o f ‘identity’ and ‘self that:
... partly, identity is whatever we say it is ... it means something different 
for various therapists, for sociologists, for self-psychologists, for child 
psychologists, etc., even though for all these people there is also some similarity 
or overlap of meaning (p. 32).
Schafer (1973) believes that the only way to deal with the diffuse, multi-purpose uses of 
the terms ‘self and ‘identity’ is to “decide on the basis o f the situation and the verbal context 
in which the word ‘self or ‘identity’ is being used at the moment, which aspect o f a person is 
being pointed at.” Cass found these approaches to be problematic for both scientists and 
researchers.
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Homosexual Identity - Theory
Rosenberg defines ‘self-concept’ as the totality o f the individual’s thoughts and feelings 
referring to self as object. It includes all one’s self-perceptions or self-attitudes, and the 
affective component attached to them, as well as self-perceptions o f how one wishes to be.
Identity refers to organized sets of self-perceptions and the related feelings held by an 
individual about self with regard to some social category (Cass, 1985). It is said to represent 
the synthesis o f one’s own self-perceptions with views o f the ‘self as they are perceived to be 
held by others. When self-perceptions and imagined other’s views of self are in accord, 
identity may be said to have developed (Cass, 1985).
Homosexual identity is said to evolve out of a clustering of self-images linked together by 
the individual’s idiosyncratic understanding of what characterizes someone as ‘a homosexual’ 
(Cass, 1985).
Carroll believes: that
This understanding develops from the integration of the individual’s unique 
interpretation o f socially prescribed notions and self-developed formulations.
Early stages of homosexual identity development usually involve cognitive 
processing of self-information against a symbolically held image of the 
‘generalized other’. Development of a fully integrated identity, however, requires 
more direct communication with others. Ultimately, this includes the presentation 
of a homosexual self-image to both homosexual and heterosexual others. When 
presentation is to one but not the other of these groups, homosexual identity 
cannot evolve completely. Commonly, the homosexual self-image is withheld 
from non-homosexual people and a heterosexual role adopted. A fully developed 
sense of self as ‘a homosexual’ requires accord between self-perception and 
imagined views of self held by all others constituting the individual’s social 
predictable behavioral patterns. Stability is created through the constancy 
experienced in interaction with others. The individual strives to maintain 
cognitive and behavioral consistency, which in turn serves to reinforce the way 
others are believed to see the self, (p.26)
Both self-concept and identity are essential to an understanding o f ‘homosexual identity’ 
(Cass, 1985). For example, the statements ‘I am a guilt ridden homosexual’ and ‘I am a proud 
homosexual’ both reflect some degree of identity development (‘I am homosexual’) (Cass, 
1985). It is clear that there is no such thing as a single ‘homosexual identity’. Many have 
noted that the nature of homosexual identity may vary from person to person, from situation 
to situation, and from period to period. Much has been written about the difference between 
self-image, ‘I am a person who relates sexually to others of the same sex’, (self-conception)
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and ‘I am a homosexual’ (identity). Homosexual literature on identity alludes to both 
personal and social identity (Carroll, 1996).
A significant amount of psychological literature has been dedicated to identity as a 
cognitive construct. Cass recommends the terms ‘presented identity’, ‘perceived identity’, 
and ‘self-identity’ as solutions to the inherent conceptual problems:
Presented identity refers to that picture of self presented to others with regard 
to a specific socially defined category, that is, the identity that a person wants 
others to believe one holds about self. Presented identity is closely linked with 
ideal components of self-identity. Perceived identity refers to that image held by 
another about self with regard to a specific social category. Such an image will 
develop out o f a synthesis o f the meaning others put on our behavior (presented 
identity) together with perceptions already held about us (p.42).
Cass (1984) was one of the first mental health writers to direct attention away from a 
discussion of the social identity and origins o f the homosexual and towards the personal, 
cognitive aspects of homosexual identity development. Cass (1985) emphasizes that the 
individual’s own perceptions of the world, rather than the world itself, are critical to the issue 
of identity.
Homosexual Identity as Childhood Outcome
The medical and mental health professionals have long promoted the idea that homosexual 
identity arises from childhood developmental processes. Proponents of these theories work 
either within an ego identity framework (Gundlach & Riess, 1968; Pattison, 1989; Weis & 
Dain, 1979) or a sexual identity framework (Green, 1974; Hoffman, 1968; Whitam, 1977).
Ego psychology, from which ego identity arose, is a derivative of psychoanalysis. Most 
ego identity theorists equate homosexual identity with ego identity (Carroll, 1996). Erikson 
(1959,1968) proposed the term ‘ego identity’ as the psychosocial integration of the individual 
that normally takes place in adolescence or early adulthood. Erikson (1959) clearly 
distinguishes ego identity from self-identity, which he defines as that which emerges from the 
integration of the individual’s self-images (self representations) with role images (perceptions 
of social positions held).
Green’s model for gender identity (1974) forms the basis of most of the models associated 
with the ‘sexual identity’ theorists. These dwell on explanations of sexual preference or 
orientation centered on early childhood development. These theorists generate significant
151
confusion between the behavioral and cognitive aspects of homosexuality and labor over the 
timing o f identity development (childhood, adolescence, or adulthood) (Carroll, 1996). 
Plummer proposes a synthesis o f both approaches, but, according to Cass, comes close to 
irreparably mixing behavioral and cognitive concepts. Cass (1986) emphasizes that the 
content and structure of gay identity change over time as the individual moves from childhood 
to adulthood, as well as from one period of adult life to another. The nineteenth century 
medical model classified homosexuals as sexual perverts (Boswell, 1980; Foucault, 1978).
Psychoanalytic theory arose from this model and presented a theoretical 
conception of human development that likened identity development (the 
satisfactory integration of id, ego, and superego) with sexual identity.
Accordingly, the development of homosexuality in adolescence and adulthood is 
seen as a fixation at the Oedipal stage of sexual identity development.
Psychoanalytic theory therefore clearly links homosexuality with sexual identity. 
However, it is also clear that there are components of gay identity that are non- 
sexual (Carroll, 1996, p.56).
Cass’ Six Stages of Gay Identity Development
Cass’ (1985) proposal for a new model for homosexual identity development was bom 
from dissatisfaction with the state of homosexual identity theory in the late 1970s. This 
model has been widely accepted throughout the mental health community, and is one of the 
core foundations upon which many of the ‘gay affirming’ therapies are based (Carroll, 1996).
In widespread use for fifteen years, generations of mental health providers have been 
trained (either directly or indirectly) to use this model in formulating treatments for 
homosexuals. The widespread and often uncritical application of such a model is problematic 
and not without consequences (Carroll, 1996).
Cass (1986) begins by stating her intention to explore the process by which a person 
acquires the identity of ‘homosexual’ as a relevant aspect of self. Her model has six stages of 
development through which all individuals move to acquire a ‘frilly integrated’ homosexual 
identity. At each stage ‘identity foreclosure’ is possible (‘the person may choose not to 
develop any further’). She describes the ‘interactionist’ situation that contrasts private and 
public aspects of identity. Growth from stage to stage is driven by the incongruity between 
aspects of private and public identity felt by the individual. Initially, the person in question 
assumes that everyone will self-label as heterosexual. With time, the label ‘homosexual’
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replaces ‘heterosexual’, resulting in a stable homosexual identity with the minimum amount 
of inconsistency between self and society (Carroll, 1996).
Stage 1: Identity Confusion
Cass (1979) assumes that, because of pressures from society, everyone is initially 
heterosexual. Subsequently, the realization that feelings, thoughts, or behaviors can be 
defined as homosexual “present an incongruent element into a previously stable situation” 
(Cass, 1979). For the first time, the subject asks: ‘Who am I? Am I a homosexual?’
Stage 2: Identity Comparison
With this stage comes ‘the first tentative commitment to a homosexual se lf, manifested as 
the recognition of difference from the societal norm (Cass, 1979). Cass (1986) outlines three 
groups of people who tend to react this way: 1) those who feel that they have always been 
‘different’ and come to use the term ‘homosexual’ as a way of verifying this difference, 2) 
those who have felt ‘different’ on the basis o f their nonconformity to traditional heterosexual 
forms such as marriage, 3) those who find being different ‘exciting’. She outlines four 
strategies that people use during this stage to reduce incongruence:
• Special case strategy - “If it were not for this special person, I would be heterosexual.”
• Ambi-sexual strategy - “I could act heterosexual if I wanted to.”
• Temporary identity strategy - “A homosexual identity is only temporarily applicable.”
• Personal innocence strategy -  “I cannot help it. I was bom this way.”
Stage 3: Identity Tolerance
At this stage, an individual declares: “I am probably a homosexual” and seeks additional 
contact with like-minded others. There is also an increased sense o f ‘not belonging’ with 
heterosexual others (Cass, 1979).
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Stage 4: Identity Acceptance
The gay subculture “ ... now plays an increasingly important part in the individual’s life 
and subsequently in the restructuring of an interpersonal environment” (Cass, 1979).
Stage 5: Identity Pride
In this stage the individual devalues the importance o f heterosexual others and instead 
esteems the opinions of his homosexual peers (Carroll, 1996). The individual “not only 
accepts a homosexual identity but prefers it to a heterosexual one” (Cass, 1979, p.22). The 
disparity between the treatment of homosexuals and that o f heterosexuals generates “feelings 
of anger bom of frustration and alienation (p.23).” As a way o f coping, the individual opts for 
increased disclosure o f his homosexuality and ‘comes out’ to his straight peers and family 
(Cass, 1986).
Stage 6: Identity Synthesis
With this stage the dichotomy blurs between the heterosexual and homosexual worlds as 
the individual finds that some heterosexuals are supportive of an alternative lifestyle (Carroll,
1996). Anger diminishes because of a reduction of incongruence and “ ... the gay identity, 
instead of being seen as the identity, is now given the status o f being merely one aspect of 
self’ (Cass, 1979, p. 12).
Critique of Cass’ Stages of Homosexual Identity Development
Cass specifically identifies that there are six stages through which all individuals pass. 
Weinberg makes a number of useful criticisms of her approach. Cass’ primary assumption 
precludes consideration o f the possibility that there may be other pathways to the same 
identity. It also presupposes a uniform development rate. Cass conceptualizes variation from 
the developmental schema as ‘identity foreclosure’ and implies that ‘to waver from the single 
pathway’ is immature, regressive, or fixated. Cass establishes a single ‘starting point’ from 
which everyone begins as ‘heterosexual’ and an ultimate goal of a stable homosexual identity 
as the final ‘objective.’. Her schema fails to acknowledge the ‘inherent flexibility o f human
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beings’, an example of which is the individual who begins as a heterosexual, becomes a 
homosexual and then later returns to heterosexuality (Cass, 1985).
Carroll notes that:
... the way in which Cass uses the term ‘homosexual’ in the presentation of 
her stages of development is notable for a lack of definition or any exploration of 
its meaning. In other works by the same author, she makes clear her belief that 
‘homosexual’ is a term in desperate need of definition, resulting in a situation 
whereby, for the last thirty years, mental health providers have been free to apply 
any meaning they choose for the terms ‘homosexual’ and ‘heterosexual’ and then 
organize it according to Cass’ stages. The use o f a hetero/homo split embodies an 
unspoken assertion that there are no other major organizing categories and that 
categories such as race, class and gender have little or no impact on how 
individuals organize their own sexual identity. Cass describes an original stability 
of identity that assumes alignment with other cultural norms, so that confusion 
only exists on a ‘hetero/homo’ sexual axis (p.86).
Cass makes no mention o f the use of the hetero/homo binarism as a predominantly middle 
class, male distinction that has a particular ideological agenda - one which is described by 
Carroll as the quest to create an individual identity recognized within society as a male middle 
class objective. Cass presents a hetero/homo split which begins with stability and leads to 
instability and is representative of white middle class male anxiety, failing as an indicator 
valid for ‘all individuals’ (Cass, 1986). Carroll is interested in comparing Cass’ hypothetical 
gay male, who seems to become gay solely because of his internal homoerotic desire, to the 
‘political lesbian’, who first identifies as a radical feminist and then makes a conscious choice 
to be a lesbian for political and ideological purposes.
Carroll, irrevocably classist, places the emphasis on comparison in the second stage 
identified by Cass conflates the many points o f multiple comparisons that occur. This 
comparative process is clearly idiosyncratic and multifarious with influences from race, class, 
gender, religion, and place in time. Carroll notes that lower class Hispanic culture in America 
often insists on a very rigid split between genders. Many young gay men in this culture 
identify same sex desire with gender inversion and assume a feminine gender role. The 
nascent gay from such a background will feel forced to emphasize behavior that reinforces the 
opposite gender as well as same-sex attraction.
Cass’ stage two also presupposes a salient core of homosexual behavior or desire with 
which the term ‘homosexual’ fits with some resonance (Carroll, 1996). She dismisses the
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frequency with which the categories of homosexual or heterosexual fail to be an exact fit for 
the individual, pre-empts other interpretations and disavows incongruent behavior as well as 
reinterpreting previous behavior using a homosexual context. Carroll describes how, once an 
individual assumes the label ‘homosexual’, a case must be made to support the identity from 
past behavior. Evidence in support of the label will probably be highlighted and that which 
fails to support it will be eliminated or suppressed. The individual wrought with cognitive 
dissonance will effectively rewrite personal history to give him or herself a homosexual past, 
regardless of whether or not that was actually the case. The same individual is also likely to 
construct a future in support of the label. Much has been written about heterosexuals who 
must disavow homosexual desire so completely that they eradicate any indication o f its 
original presence.
The stage of identity tolerance is described as a time of increased confusion and 
excitement, with marked differences between the experiences of urban and rural people. In 
large cities, the gay and lesbian world is a highly varied, pluralistic one containing many 
subcultures with divergent mores and codes (Carroll, 1996). In rural areas, gay socialization 
may be highly restricted and fail dramatically to reflect the individual’s tastes, be they 
cultural, religious, racial, gender, political, or economic.
The stage of identity acceptance is marked by increased incongruity between a private life 
o f ‘acceptance’ and ‘the closet’. Cass fails to fully explore the complexity o f the gay 
environment for those who are neither white nor middle class. The debate on sexual 
reorientation is often guilty o f the same failings. Much has been written of the unique 
experiences o f ‘multiple minorities’ individuals (Afro-American lesbians, HIV positive gay 
Latin-American men, inter-sexed native Americans, post-op trans-gendered pacific islander 
lesbians, etc.) Among the ‘multiple minorities’ writers there is wide consensus regarding the 
lack of applicability o f models based on white middle class American values and culture.
Economic class differences, as well as race and gender issues, provide additional levels of 
complexity. Such complexities often escape public and professional analysis as they cloud 
the political agenda. Carroll notes that among lower class urban, often homeless youth 
involved in prostitution, many identify as ‘straight’ or heterosexual, although all sexual 
contact is with the same sex, independent of the presence o f an exchange of money.
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‘Coming out’ originally referred to the process of coming out within the gay community 
and contained no reference to the ‘straight’ community. According to Carroll, identity pride 
as a component o f a middle class egalitarian model parallels the rise of the middle class in the 
course o f the last century. A homosexual model that imitates many o f the same structures of 
heterosexual life, such as marriage (long term monogamous relationships) also places an 
emphasis on coming out to the straight world. This has multiple political, religious, and 
cultural implications associated with the assertion ‘We are just like you, just different’. 
‘Coming out’ and ‘outing’ has been a very politically powerful tool for cultural change in the 
West.
Within the gay community there is significant pressure for its members to get out of the 
‘closet’, as doing so generates political and social power to fuel change. Cass’ model views 
the process o f ‘coming out’ as a developmental step, yet neglects the impact of local gay 
culture and subcultures (1985). ‘Coming out’ is a very different process in San Francisco 
than in Cardiff, Dublin, Toronto, or Dallas.
Cass (1986) also neglects the complexity associated with ‘coming out’. Much has been 
written about unilateral or partial outings (at work but not with family, with family but not at 
school). Partial outings are often viewed as foreclosure or a stalling o f identity development, 
but may in reality reflect specific environmental situations or other identity attachments not 
considered by Cass’ model and the therapists that depend on it. The teacher or sports coach 
may jeopardize a career by coming out of the closet before tenure is obtained. It is not 
uncommon for Hispanics to live a fully obvious gay life-style, yet never use the terms gay, 
lesbian, or homosexual with their families, out of respect for their elders, Catholicism, and 
culture.
Identity pride and ‘coming out’ may be profoundly complicated by HIV and AIDS.
Carroll describes the existence of an unspoken code of appropriate behavior amongst HIV 
positive and negative men that is only now finding representation in the literature. Often, 
these codes of behavior remain difficult to explore because they run counter to politically 
correct messages about sex and safety (Carroll, 1996).
Cass (1979) notes that as gay pride develops, many gays discover for the first time a 
deeply seated anger against society and governments for their discrimination against gays. 
Carroll postulates that for many this anger originates from the lie of living within a sexist,
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capitalistic society. He believes that it has the transformative potential for uniting women’s 
causes with gay male and lesbian causes as well as those o f other minorities (racial and 
religious). This anger may cause some to drop out of traditional society altogether and 
embrace a marginalized life-style as part of a broader political statement against capitalism 
and the tyranny o f gender. Others (often white, conservative middle class males) may 
encapsulate the anger and aim it exclusively at those engaged in same sex discrimination.
The final stage of identity synthesis reveals the normative ideal. According to Cass, the 
ideal homosexual is not too angry, has an acceptance of some heterosexuals as such, and has 
returned the major focus to the larger existential issues of life, which are outside the purview, 
per se, o f a gay identity (Carroll, 1996). Carroll views this as a middle class model o f 
appropriate social behavior which seeks to contain the waywardness of the angry, militant 
homosexual within the traditional boundaries o f private/public, individual/social, and 
family/society. The good homosexual is one who is angry, but not too angry, separatist, but 
not too separatist, rambunctious, but hopefully able to settle into a long term, monogamous 
relationship.
Cass (1986) presents a normative ideal in which gay identity recedes to the background 
and mainstream middle class identifications (in which class and race are bracketed out) 
supersede the minority identifications of the gay community.
Homophobia and the Normative Ideal
Cass (1979) describes the beginnings of a negative self-hating identity in Stage One as the 
idea of a homosexual self first arises. “Such an identity is internalized during subsequent 
stages o f gay identity consolidation” (Cass, 1979). However, Stage Five: Identity Pride is 
said to mitigate this self-hating identity as a new sense of pride is internalized through 
“voraciously consuming gay literature and culture” (Cass, 1979). Ultimately, such a  strategy 
is only partially successful. Given societal attitudes about homosexuality “it is probably 
impossible ... to achieve a homosexual defining matrix that is totally (cognitively and 
affectively) congruent. It is possible, however, for incongruence to be reduced to a level that 
is both tolerable and manageable” (Cass, 1979).
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Carroll identifies the dilemma of Cass’ middle class view of homosexuality as the 
contingent nature of homosexual identity and its relationship to heterosexuality and the 
middle class. Carroll notes:
Heterosexuality and homosexuality are enforced categories that only recently 
have been mapped onto gender. They are not inevitable organizations o f ‘natural 
human kinds’, but socially created categories that represent specific middle class 
aims. Such categories are forcibly and often violently enforced upon all boys at a 
young age through repudiation and vilification of specific thoughts, emotions, and 
behaviors, which are then carried as a ‘negative or self-hating’ identity by all 
straight and gay people alike. The acceptance of the term ‘homosexual’ is the 
acceptance of the middle class organization of sexual behavior as organized by the 
hetero/homo binarism. Thus, to accept homosexuality is also to accept 
heterosexuality, while exclusive heterosexuality is built upon the vilification and 
suppression of homosexuality (p. 192).
Cass’ model of development presents a positive gay identity built upon the category of 
homosexual, which contains the acceptance of the category heterosexual and, by 
consequence, the vilification of homosexuality with the culture (Carroll, 1996). Internalized 
homophobia is the double bind of the gay positive identity. The model presents the ideal 
homosexual, who, through acceptance of his marginalized and second-class status, is made 
‘tolerable and manageable’ to culture at large (Carroll, 1996).
Summary of Criticism of Cass’ Model
Carroll points out the presuppositions of a liberal, late 1970’s, middle class gay agenda in 
Cass’ developmental theory. The relevance to a twenty-first century view of non­
heterosexuality lies in the realization of just how little one can rely on biological, scientific, or 
culturally fixed positions of the subject matter of gender identity in the context of tackling the 
ethical issues or reorientation. The contrast between the view of our modern era, Western 
civilizations and that of classical Greece provides some perspective for the re-evaluation of 
those beliefs often held to be self evident.
The value of a critical review of Cass’ model is its provision of theoretical context for gay 
affirming therapies and the exploration of the impact of Cass’ work on clinicians who 
continue to use her schema and the assumptions underlying it in the provision of gay 
affirming therapies (Carroll, 1996). Likewise, Cass’ model offers a formula for the social and 
personal construction of a homosexual identity and provides some insights into an
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understanding of the popularity of conversion and reparative therapies aimed at 
deconstructing the same. The Western obsession with sexual orientation can be put in a 
clinical perspective. Bioethics offers the hope for a “point on the horizon” from which one 
can navigate these shifting clinical waters.
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Section V: Bioethics
With history, etiology, stakeholder position and theory review behind us it is appropriate 
now to view the broad landscape of issues relevant to the debate on sexual reorientation 
through the panoramic lens of bioethics. As noted in the introduction, whereas medical ethics 
is focused on the relationship between patient and provider, bioethics draws from a larger 
arena that includes philosophy as well as the social, psychological and political sciences. The 
various chapters in this section look at issues raised by the stakeholders in this debate.
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Chapter 15: Bioethics and Substituted Judgment
Any time the medical system is given the right to make decisions on behalf o f others, it is 
presumed to be with their best interests in mind. Likewise, there is a universal expectation 
that clinical decisions involving children, infants, and the unborn are made on their behalf by 
competent others. The others involved in decision making on behalf of children, infants, and 
the unborn are usually parents, but often also includes schools, public policy makers, health 
providers and others in society with a stake in the decision’s outcome. Clinical decisions to 
be made on behalf o f adolescents and incompetent adults can also present complex problems. 
Parties on both sides o f the ethical debate surrounding sexual reorientation have complained 
bitterly about who and how these decisions are made when the decision does not go their way. 
Substituted judgment is the process by which such decisions get made.
Substituted judgment addresses the issues o f competence, autonomy, and informed 
consent, which are frequently raised with sexual reorientation interventions and lie at the core 
o f many bioethical conflicts. Substituted judgment can be summarized as follows: I/we know 
better than you/them. In general, parents are presumed to know better than their children or 
dependent adolescents. In general, competent adult patients are presumed to know better than 
their health providers once adequately informed. In general, individual clinicians are 
presumed to know better than policy-makers, governmental agencies, and special interest 
groups. Substituted judgment speaks to the locus of ethical decision-making. Locations for 
these decisions may include policy makers, health providers, health consumers, religions, 
minority political activists, health service payers, parents, schools, and communities.
Parents and their Offspring
Public policy in most Western societies is to emphasize and reinforce the role and 
responsibility of parents for making informed decisions about the lives of their dependent 
offspring. These begin prior to conception with the choice of mate and birth control options 
and extend until the offspring is competent and independent. There are a number o f non- 
controversial situations in which public policy advocates intervention on behalf o f the child, 
such as prohibitions against third trimester abortions; interrupting and preventing childhood 
physical or sexual abuse; mandating some minimum o f education for school age children; 
prohibiting the abuses of child labor. Public policies that countermand a parent’s ‘rights’ can
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also be more controversial, including policies regarding genetic testing and fertility 
interventions, parental decisions, to withhold lifesaving medical interventions on religious 
grounds, and parental control over teenage access to birth control, abortion, sexual 
reorientation, and gay-affirming therapies.
The American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family Physicians 
have both issued policy statements against the provision of sexual reorientation interventions 
for adolescents, although the provision o f therapy for gender identity disorders in children and 
adolescents remains unaddressed.
Could policy makers believe that parents’ have less ability to make informed decisions 
about the sexual orientation of their offspring than about other medical interventions? It is 
certainly conceivable that religious beliefs which are strongly held by parents and less so by 
their dependent adolescents may be a source of family discord. Historically, parental shame 
can play a significant role in how decisions are made about sexual issues with regard to 
dependent adolescents (birth control, abortion, sexual reorientation).
Public policy has been to intervene when parental and adolescent decisions are in conflict 
and there are long-term consequences to the outcomes of these decisions. Many jurisdictions 
are willing to grant the adolescent decision-making powers regarding certain issues of 
sexuality prior to granting the adolescent full, autonomous independence from the parents 
(Rodman et al, 1984). For example, in many areas, a dependent adolescent can secure an 
abortion without parental consent while they cannot have their wisdom teeth or their appendix 
removed without parental consent. There is no consensus on whether or until when it is 
appropriate for a parent to deny homosexual teens access to gay-affirming therapy. There is 
also no consensus on if or until when a parent should be allowed to attempt to change their 
offspring’s sexual orientation.
The position of the gay and lesbian community is that the only appropriate response from a 
parent is to accept and support an offspring’s adjustment to their sexual orientation. On the 
other hand, many religious groups maintain that a parent is obliged to do everything possible 
to facilitate the development of a normal, healthy adult heterosexual identity in their 
offspring. Bioethics can help to resolve conflicts between parental goals and professional 
policy as well as conflicts between parental goals and adolescent goals.
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Social science and public policy research have suggested that after the age of 15 most teens 
are competent to make informed decisions about sexual issues (Rodman et al, 1984). This 
research was based on a study o f adolescents’ ability to fully participate in the informed 
consent process involving disease prevention, birth control, and abortion. The issues raised in 
sexual reorientation and gay-affirming therapies for adolescents share many of the same 
fundamental questions poised by adolescent heterosexuality: How will the decisions I make 
about my behavior influence who I am and who I will become? What are the personal, 
family, and social consequences of my decisions? What are my values? How do I reconcile 
my values with those of my religion, my family, my culture, and my peer group? This data 
substantiates the inclusion of adolescents in bioethical debate and formulation.
Providers and Policy Makers
Modem medicine has tended to move away from physician paternalism towards a  view of 
the patient and provider as partners in health care. The physician or health care provider is 
expected to be a technical resource for clinical information and skill and the patient is 
expected to make health care decisions on the basis o f personal needs, values, and goals.
The basic concept of medio-legal informed consent is flawed. During the provision of 
health care there are often factors beyond the patients’ control interfering with their ability are 
less able to make fully informed decisions. Pain, fear, shame, anxiety, or the physical and 
mental consequences o f a medical or social condition naturally threaten usual judgment. 
During such times, the clinical provider must resort to his or her own knowledge of how the 
patient would decide, or to consult previously written advanced directives or pre-identified 
decision makers (medical power of attorney) or work to facilitate patient’s own decision 
making. Community standards influence this sphere, as does the advice of an ethics 
committee. There are also situations in which public policy removes the responsibility o f 
decision-making from the clinician or the patient. For example, in many areas a physician is 
obligated by law to report any suspicion o f child abuse or neglect for further investigation. In 
other situations, professional policy makers provide guidelines and policy statements that do 
not carry any force of law but burden the provider with increased financial risk for clinical 
practice beyond ‘established guidelines’ or ‘community standards of care’. These situations 
clearly demonstrate public or professional concern surrounding the quality o f the decisions
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that providers make. Also o f concern is the provider’s religious or political beliefs and how 
those impact the treatment recommendations. There is controversy, also about exactly why 
this explosion o f professional policy making and guideline issuing regarding sexual 
reorientation has occurred in mental health. It has been alleged that the gay and lesbian 
communities are primarily behind the process (NARTH, 1991), which has called into question 
the appropriateness of allowing gay and lesbian politics to directly or indirectly dictate 
professional practice in mental health. There are additional suggestions that this population 
(struggling with ambivalence about sexual orientation) is vulnerable and in need of additional 
protection. The question really seems to be whose judgment is the most trustworthy? Patient, 
parent, clinician, professional organization, church, or socio-political movement?
There is no doubt that the answer sought, is not simple and will not be consistently 
predictable across all clinical scenarios. Because of the complexity involved, it is reasonable 
to be suspicious when religions, political groups, or policy-makers promote one all-inclusive 
broad sweeping solution for all such clinical questions. Many in the health professions look 
specifically to bioethics (instead of health policy makers) to formulate a path to a resolution 
for these complex questions.
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Chapter 16: Bioethics and Biotechnology
Stakeholders have expressed concern about research focused on the origins o f sexual 
orientation and the risk of future misuses of biotechnology for genetic screening and genetic 
manipulation of sexuality. A fixture in which sexual reorientation interventions become more 
efficacious could see a return of a generalized widespread belief that sexual orientation is a 
matter of choice for everyone. Improved efficacy o f sexual reorientation interventions would, 
predictably, increase pressure for non-heterosexuals to choose to change. These concerns 
appear throughout discussions of the future of sexual orientation research and reorientation 
interventions.
The dawn of the twenty-first century has witnessed the complete mapping of the human 
genome. The first ‘test-tube’ baby is an adolescent and human cloning is conceptually as well 
as technically feasible. The explosion of biomedical technology is both wondrous and 
frightening. Prenatal counseling and genetic screening are considered par for the course in 
Western societies. Pregnancies are routinely screened for common congenital disorders such 
as neural tube defects (spina bifida, anencephaly), chromosomal disorders such as trisomy 21 
(Down’s syndrome), Klinefelter’s and Turner’s syndromes, and familial disorders such as 
sickle cell and cystic fibrosis.
Bioethics as described by Kunkler (2001) is the study of value judgments relating to 
human conduct in the areas of biology and medicine. Advances in biotechnology are quickly 
surpassing not only existing legal and ethical guidelines that govern research, but also our 
understanding of its moral, social and religious implications. As a result, substantial pressure 
has been put on both governments and professional organizations to establish ground rules.
The protracted Bush administration deliberations o f 2001 over the use of U.S. federal 
money to fund embryonic stem cell research or whether to even permit such inquiry at all is 
evidence of the complexity of these issues. President Bush came out against human cloning, 
stating: “The administration supports a ban on the cloning of human beings by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer.” However, the administration does “ ... approve of the development o f cell 
and tissue-based therapies based on research involving the use of nuclear transfer or other 
cloning techniques to produce molecules, DNA, cells other than human embryos, tissues, 
organs, plants and animals.” U.S. Congress banned the use of federal money for stem cell 
research involving the destruction of a human embryo, but the National Institute of Health
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(U.S.A.) has sidestepped this law by supporting stem cell researchers so long as they 
themselves did not extract the cells from the embryo. Other concerns unleashed by the 
advances in our understanding o f the human genetic blueprint include:
• The ethics of human cloning, particularly when the technology is so incompletely 
understood.
• The desirability of allowing food products derived from cloned animals to be sold 
in U.S. markets before the full public health risks, if any, have been examined.
• The ethical dilemmas surrounding genetic screening and directed reproduction 
based on the social utility o f desired characteristics (ex: heterosexism).
• The dangers associated with xenotransplantation.
The ways in which we conceive ideas such as evolution and identity are being changed by 
new genetic breakthroughs. The debate even threatens to move beyond the issues o f stem cell 
research before important questions are fully answered. The techniques of somatic gene 
transfer, in which adult cells in the body are modified in order to cure disease without 
changing the basic substance of the genes passed on, and germline genetic engineering, 
banned in many countries because of its potential to allow the manipulation of fundamental 
characteristics such as personality and appearance, will add to an already confused public 
debate (Kunkler, 2001).
James Watson, the co-discoverer of DNA, and the former head of the National Institute of 
Health, and a Nobel laureate, asks: “If we could make better human beings by knowing how 
to add genes, why shouldn’t we? (p.430)” Others, such as Nobel laureate genetics professor 
Francois Jacob, express concern over science that has progressed to “where the point is no 
longer to heal someone but to modify him, to mold him.” He goes on to say “on no account is 
it for scientists to decide questions of this magnitude” (Kunkler, 2001, p.2). Bioethics and 
medical ethics, not science, are the setting for these debates.
Stem Cell Research
Because of its foreboding future impact, stem cell research strongly relates to bioethical 
considerations of sexuality. Should life be preserved at the expense of other life or is it wrong 
not to do everything in our power to find cures for debilitating diseases? Does the fact that 
many of these embryos, byproducts of fertility clinics’ efforts to help couples conceive, will
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probably be destroyed anyway alter the equation or is it just splitting moral hairs to allow this 
form o f ‘harvesting’ while prohibiting the creation of an embryo for the express purpose of 
destroying it, no matter what research purposes will be served? Do the answers change when 
the focus shifts from ‘finding cures for debilitating diseases’ to ‘gaining control over and 
predicting sexual orientation and behavior’?
Opponents o f embryonic stem cell research point to the uncertainty of the benefits to be 
derived and believe they do not mitigate the moral repercussions o f using human embryos for 
research (Kunkler, 2001). They also point to the promise of adult stem cell research, noting 
that the level of private funding for this field far surpasses that of embryonic stem cell 
research, resulting in the faster development of practical applications derived from their study. 
Research has also suggested that adult stem cells may be more versatile than previously 
thought. At any rate, claim opponents of embryonic stem cell research, even if adult stem 
cells are not as potent as embryonic stem cells, they will suffice for most practical 
applications. Also, the problem of tissue rejection may be more easily solved with therapies 
derived from adult stem cells, because the transplanted cells would carry the patient’s own 
genetic imprint (Kunkler, 2001).
Supporters o f embryonic stem cell research point to the greater flexibility o f stem cells at 
their most undifferentiated state. They also note that little would be known about adult- 
derived stem cells without the benefit o f research on embryonic stem cells. Most researchers 
in the field dismiss the idea that adult stem cells offer an easy way out. For example, finding 
the blood-forming stem cells in bone marrow is proving to be an enormous challenge 
(Kunkler, 2001). Many caution against making exaggerated statements about the drawbacks 
or benefits of either kind of research and stress that, since so little is yet known about how 
these cells develop into specific tissue, research on both types of cells is necessary. The 
Royal Society (2001) has considered the relative merits of research on adult and embryonic 
stem cells and concluded that conducting research on both types is essential, stating that: 
“adult and embryonic stem cell research are not alternative and both must be pursued. In all 
likelihood each will yield distinctive therapeutic benefits.” They further note that adult stem 
cells are “small in number and often hard to access ... an important issue that needs to be 
acknowledged is the fact that, with very few exceptions like bone marrow, adult stem cells 
may only be obtained from organs of very recently deceased individuals.”
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Human Cloning
Human cloning also promises impact upon the future of sexuality. It has generated 
significant public debate since Dolly (the sheep) was cloned in Scotland. Discussions have 
included cloning implications tied to issues of sexuality and sexual orientation.
To create a clone, researchers transfer the DNA from one cell into an egg cell 
that has been emptied of its own DNA, enabling the egg to ‘reset’ the gene 
expression of the injected genetic material. From there it grows into an embryo 
and, eventually, into a genetic duplicate o f the donor. In one variant known as 
‘therapeutic cloning’, a cell from a patient is cloned and then allowed to divide 
until it reaches a pre-embryonic stage, from which the stem cells that could be 
developed and used to replace damaged tissue without the risk o f rejection by the 
patient’s immune system can be extracted. While nearly all o f those doing 
research of this kind are careful never to work with embryos older than 14 days, 
critics maintain that the cells theoretically represent a potential for human life.
Many ethicists believe that no company should proceed with this kind of 
work, whether cloning with the intent o f harvesting stem cells or of allowing the 
embryo to develop to term, until there is some kind of public consensus. Despite 
ethical, technical, and legal concerns, some scientists are determined to forge 
ahead in their endeavors to clone a human being. Pro-cloning researchers claim 
that it may be easier to successfully clone people than other animals due to 
experience with growing human embryos in the laboratory for in-vitro 
fertilization. Others disagree vehemently, noting that the problems with cloning 
remain biological, not technical; the problem does not lie in getting embryos to 
survive in a Petri-dish, but rather, in the potential for unforeseen defects as the 
embryo develops.
Interestingly, all the commotion may be for naught, at least in a legal sense. 
Biotech companies, desperate for patients, as well as some academics, are 
beginning to ask: “Can the government really stop me from cloning myself?” 
Although the bills recently passed by the U.S. Congress would seem to settle the 
matter, some legal scholars say that attempts to prevent scientists from going 
ahead with human cloning, whether by the U.S. FDA or by the U.S. Congress, 
may have no basis in law (Kunkler, 2001, p.3).
For the gay, lesbian and queer communities there are two issues. Cloning as a route to 
conception speaks to traditional feminist thought about a ‘woman’s right’ (and that o f men) to 
control their reproductive choices. If and when conceptive cloning becomes readily available, 
research into sexual orientation outcomes will potentially provide a unique complement to the 
data already available on identical twins vis a vis environmental impact. Cloning for stem 
cells has the potential to advance research into the origins o f sexual orientation and, perhaps, 
to offer biotechno logic interventions to change orientation, if for example an immunologic or
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pheromone receptor hypothesis were to be proven correct. As we have seen, this could be a 
welcome or threatening prospect, depending on one’s point o f view.
Genetic Screening for Desired Traits
Many dream of screening out gayness as a genetic disorder. Should genetic disorders 
come to be viewed in the same negative light as transmissible or contagious diseases revealed 
by genetic testing they might have their wish the lesbigay community fears. The U.S. 
Congress’ Office of Technology Assessment (2001) defines genetic testing as “the use of 
specific assays to determine the genetic status o f individuals already suspected to be at high 
risk for a particular inherited condition” (Kunkler, 2001, p.4). The National Academy of 
Sciences (U.S.) (2000) defines genetic screening as the “systematic search of populations for 
persons with latent, early, or asymptomatic disease.” The danger of discrimination based on 
the contents of a person’s genetic profile is only one o f many issues with which bioethicists 
are grappling. Important questions about issues of privacy, self-determination, and 
intolerance also remain unanswered. Others are concerned that as a result o f some kind of 
cost-benefit analysis, individuals may be forced to submit to testing, losing the option of not 
knowing about potential genetic defects; they may be compelled to disclose them to others, or 
to forgo having children, thereby reducing the long-term medical costs to society, ‘in its best 
interest’. The fear is that this kind of thinking will result, in the words o f one bioethicist, in a 
“new eugenics based not on undesirable characteristics but on cost saving” (Kunkler, 2001, 
p.4). The dangers of isolation and the potential loss of insurance, education, and job 
opportunities for persons diagnosed with incurable and costly disorders, as well as potential 
clinical uses and abuses o f the new genetics, are all questions to be answered.
Ethicists point out the need for caution when discussing ‘designer genetics’. They also 
point to the differences between definitely having a disease and merely being at risk for 
developing one. At present, the degree to which a person is at risk for a particular disease is 
impossible to tell in all but a few specific cases.
In a current real life clinical example reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(Technology in the News, 1999), a couple bearing the genetic risk o f hemophilia for 50% of 
their male offspring chose to use state o f the art reproductive technology to ensure that they 
only produced female offspring. The process began with the collection of eggs and sperm
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from the parents, test-tube fertilization and the production o f 10 embryos. Once the embryos 
were at the ‘eight cell’ size, one cell was removed from each and genetically examined (the 
removal o f one cell from an ‘eight cell’ embryo is known to be o f little or no consequence to 
the eventual organism). Of the original 10 embryos, five were found to be male and were 
discarded because of the risk o f hemophilia. The remaining 5 female embryos revealed one 
with an increased risk of developing breast cancer, one with an increased risk o f developing 
colon cancer, and three with no increased risk for either disease. These last three were 
transferred to the mother’s uterus and one normal female infant was subsequently delivered. 
Curiously, at the time o f this procedure, there was the technology to differentiate the male and 
female embryos and identify genetic risks for colon and breast cancer but not to predict which 
of the male embryos were at risk for hemophilia and which were not.
If technology develops to the stage whereby procedures exist to predict a risk for breast 
cancer, colon cancer, and non-heterosexuality, the ethical questions will become even more 
complex: “Do I want a gay son or a straight daughter who is likely to need a mastectomy 
sometime before the age of 50?” The rights of the parents to control reproductive decision­
making, balanced against the rights of the embryo and those of society at large create an 
extremely complicated scenario. Imagine the situation whereby feminist-lesbians have to 
weigh the ‘right of a woman to choose’ (reproductive freedom) against the rights o f the gay, 
lesbian, and queer communities to pursue social equality and avoid future extinction by 
legislating against designer genetic screening for heterosexuality.
Attempting to predict the future evolution of reproductive biotechnology is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However, it is reasonable to assume that advances will continue 
exponentially. My personal prediction is that sexual orientation will be discovered to be a 
multi-factorial process subject to variable genetic and environmental control. In other words, 
a variety o f ‘sexual orientations’, behaviorally similar, will be discovered to have a range of 
genetic and environmental origins.
Opponents to research into the role of genetics in sexuality from within the gay, lesbian 
and queer communities emphasize that sexual orientation research is not value-neutral, 
questioning whether those who research sexual orientation can ever conduct their work in a 
value-neutral manner. Concern is also expressed about the prediction of sexual orientation in 
utero or in vitro, raising ethical implications surrounding the decision to destroy non-
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heterosexual embryos or to abort non-heterosexual fetuses. It is potentially difficult to 
support legislation preventing such events while simultaneously supporting individual 
‘reproductive choice/freedom’. Feminist lesbians may find themselves in the position of 
having to choose between loyalty to women and loyalty to the non-heterosexual community. 
Alternatively, some gay and lesbian parents might eagerly embrace the opportunity to choose 
heterosexual offspring. Knowing at first hand the social injustice associated with non­
heterosexuality, the decision is made on the basis of what is to their offsprings’ advantage at 
the expense of what may be best for their sub-culture/community. Similarly, many non­
heterosexuals believe that discovery of a biological process determining sexual orientation 
can only benefit the gay and lesbian community through normalizing non-heterosexuality, 
diminishing ‘efforts to change orientation’, and reducing the commonly held conservative 
belief that sexual orientation is chosen by people with diminished character, morality or 
values.
This chapter discloses in part the complicated issues surrounding the modem practice of 
genetic science. While proponents can point to hypothetical future benefits for millions who 
suffer from physically and socially debilitating states, opponents are deeply worried about the 
religious, ethical, and moral contradictions inherent in ending one potential life to benefit 
another or in manipulating and redefining the building blocks of human diversity, including 
sexual diversity. From an ethical standpoint both issues (right to life and right to sexual 
diversity) are important, in the context of this discussion, the implications for expanding 
versus narrowing sexual diversity is o f primary focus.
Opponents to research into the biological origins and mechanism of sexual orientation 
from within the gay, lesbian, and queer camps are concerned about potential future impact of 
such research. Lesbigay opposition to stem cell research regarding origins of sexual 
orientation gives the lesbigay the very strange bedfellow of the Christian “right to lifer.”
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Chapter 17: Bioethics and Religion
Two major stakeholders in the debate on sexual reorientation interventions are 
conservative and fundamentalist Protestant churches actively invested in the business of 
sexual reorientation interventions and the devoutly religious non-lesbigay non-heterosexual 
who requests reorientation. Religious freedom and tolerance are highly valued principles in 
the healthcare systems of America and Western Europe and therefore any professional policy 
statements must accommodate diversity of religious beliefs and value systems.
A sizable group of non-heterosexuals, despite having been shamed and branded as guilty 
by the churches in which they were raised, seek to maintain positions as respected members 
o f their congregations. Many experience their religious affiliations so intensely that they may 
perceive their sexuality and sexual orientation as being of secondary importance. Similarly, 
many heterosexuals with intense religious affiliations allow church doctrine to dictate their 
decisions and behaviors related to sexual issues (celibacy before marriage and after divorce, 
serial monogamy, access to divorce or annulment, etc.). For many unhappy, socially 
marginalized homosexuals, changing sexual orientation in lieu of abandoning their religion 
seems like a logical choice to make. In attempting to do so, many religious homosexuals turn 
to the Ex-Gay ministries or to the clinical reorientation intervention programs offered by some 
mental health professionals.
In contrast, many gays and lesbians describe chronic dissatisfaction with their religious 
upbringing. Haldeman describes an encounter with a gay man who believes that his church 
(Catholic) has, historically, been a powerful agent in the institutionalization of homophobia, 
and who maintains that until the church is willing to acknowledge him, he will stay away.
The subject likened continued church membership on the part of lesbians and gays to the 
situation of the spouse or partner who remains in an abusive relationship (Haldeman, 1994).
Religion and mental health have long had a complicated, sometimes collaborative, and 
sometimes competitive relationship. It is clear that the interests of religion and mental health 
intersect significantly, providing parallel vectors of insight and guidance as individuals strive 
to achieve and sustain quality, meaningful, coherent, and morally consistent lives. The 
relationship is further complicated by the diversity of religious practice, and changes in 
doctrine and practice over time as well as by the evolving research and clinical practice of 
mental health. Ethical concerns arise as competing moral claims come into play.
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Bioethics offers a congenial venue for adjudicating the competing, and sometimes 
contradictory, moral claims of religion, mental health, and lesbigay and queer communities.
It offers insights and practical guidance on topics ranging from the care of individual patients 
to the development of social and professional policy.
Religion and Sexuality
Much of the social psychology o f  classical Freudian theory identifies group formation as 
being rooted in the control of sexuality and dyadic intimacy. The social and cultural history 
of sexuality is largely a religious one (Parrinder, 1980). The gay, lesbian, and queer 
communities have accused the transformational ministries and Ex-Gay movements o f using 
‘coercive persuasion’ (brainwashing) in their efforts to change sexual orientation (NARTH, 
1991).
Brainwashing entered popular language during the cold-war era. Historically, it has been 
divided into two varieties. ‘European brainwashing’ describes the process for obtaining 
confessions of guilt from presumably innocent people (Somit, 1968), ‘Chinese brainwashing’ 
focuses upon efforts to change people’s total ideological orientation, typically with group 
situations where many are solicited as volunteers (Somit, 1968). Many religious cults, sects, 
and churches employ a combination of shame and ritual that embodies many aspects of 
coercive persuasion.
Hood et al (1996) summarize the components involved in coercive persuasion:
• Total control and isolation. Persons are isolated (individually or in small groups), 
under the absolute control of authorities.
• Physical debilitation and exhaustion. Persons are physically exhausted and debilitated. 
Causes can include constant interrogation and/or continual prodding from peers, as 
well as sleep and food deprivation. In extreme cases, physical torture and starvation 
may be used.
• Confusion and uncertainty. Personal belief systems and entire ideological orientations 
are challenged. Person’s uncertainty about their own fate is linked to uncertainty 
concerning their beliefs and values.
• Guilt and humiliation. A sense of guilt and personal humiliation (shame) is induced by 
a variety of techniques. All are directed at making a potential convert feel unworthy if 
he or she persists in maintaining present commitments.
• Release and resolution. An absolute framework provides only a single ‘out’. Suicide 
is prohibited. Only by compliance or full conversion can individuals gain release from 
the isolation, pain, guilt, and confusion induced in them by their persuaders.
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It is apparent that coercive techniques o f persuasion are seldom o f an ‘all or none’ nature. 
Hood believes that it is best to consider degrees of coercive persuasion, ranging from the 
extremes o f techniques applied to prisoners o f war, to the middle range examples o f draftees 
into the military, to the minimal extremes (religious summer-camps for teenagers or sexual 
reorientation retreats for young adults).
The process outlined above describes the most extreme techniques employed to change or 
reform firmly held beliefs (such as converting capitalists to communists or agnostics to a 
Jonestown style cult). The homosexuals who volunteer or are recruited to participate in 
sexual reorientation interventions bring to the process a long established, culturally reinforced 
sense of shame and guilt. Without the need to create shame and guilt where none previously 
existed, the amount of coercion required to ‘reform’ the thoughts of the already shamed and 
guilt-ridden homosexual is minimal.
Control and isolation through the prohibition of contact with known gays and lesbians who 
are ‘out’ and preferential contact with church members; social and emotional exhaustion by 
means of a heavy schedule o f social contact with church members (individual pastoral 
counseling, small groups, workshops, Bible studies and congregational activities); confusion 
and uncertainty about one’s ability to achieve happiness on Earth or Heaven in the after-life 
versus a life of misery followed by Hell in the absence of exclusive heterosexuality; guilt and 
shame for past and present homoerotic thoughts and behaviors; release and resolution 
promised for heterosexual thoughts and behaviors. All o f the above comprise the subtle 
persuasion of religion based sexual reorientation interventions.
Do such interventions qualify as brainwashing? Probably no more than do similar faith 
based interventions for disorderly youth or alcohol and drug addicts. Would the above meet 
the criteria for ‘coercive persuasion’ when applied to adolescents involuntarily? When escape 
is impossible and participation mandatory, perhaps it does.
Catholicism, like Judaism is renown for the role o f religious and moral guilt and shame. 
Likewise, Protestant faiths also rely on shame and guilt as tools to shape personal and social 
behavior. No discussion of sexual reorientation is complete without an in-depth exploration 
of the role o f shame and guilt in the decision to pursue changes in sexual orientation and 
sexual behavior.
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Chapter 18: Bioethics o f Sexuai Shame
What a chimera then is man! What a novelty!
What a monster, what a chaos, what a contradiction,
What a prodigy! Judge of all things, feeble earthworm,
Depository of truth, a sink o f uncertainty and error, 
the glory and the shame o f the universe.
Blaise Pascal, Lettres Provinciales.
Internalized homophobia is all about shame. Gay affirming therapies are all about pride. 
Shame must be explored as a motivator for sexual reorientation, as a by-product of 
unsuccessful reorientation interventions, as a phenomenon associated with relapse following 
quasi-successful interventions and as a clinical indicator for a referral for gay-affirming 
therapies. The impact of shame on the individual non-heterosexual as well as group shame 
must be examined as part o f this debate. What is the appropriate response of an individual 
clinician or the heath system to individual or group shame?
Shame: A Literary and Philosophical Background
Despite the debilitating effects of shame, only recently has it been considered a relevant 
focus of psychotherapy. Generations of therapists viewed shame as a source of resistance 
against nobler drives and feelings (Morrison, 1998). Helen Block Lewis, one of the first 
psychoanalysts to write extensively about shame, believed that shame overlooked in treatment 
(‘by-passed shame’) was a major cause of failure in psychotherapy (Lewis, 1971).
The Old Testament is full of references to shame, even in circumstances that are more
accurately said to represent guilt (Morrison, 1998). For example:
From our early days
Baal, god o f shame, has devoured
The fruits o f our fa ther’s labors,
their flocks and herd, their sons and daughters.
Let us lie down in shame, wrapped round by our dishonor,
For we have sinned against the Lord our God,
Both we and our fathers,
From our early days till now,
and we have not obeyed the Lord our God (Jeremiah 3:24-25).
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Unto thee they cried and were delivered:
In thee they trusted and were not put to shame.
But la m  a worm, not a man,
abused by all men, scorned by the people.
All who see me, jeer at me,
make mouths at me and wag their heads (Psalms 22:11).
Enlighten our eyes in thy Torah; 
attach our hearts to thy commandments;
Unite our heart to love and reverence thy name, 
so that we never be put to shame. (Sabbath Service)
The above quotations from the Old Testament and the Torah describe responses that play a 
central role in the experience o f shame; lying down, covering, and blushing. Morrison finds it 
interesting that, with the advent of Christianity and the New Testament, the emphasis is 
reversed and much greater attention is paid to guilt -  including some occasions when guilt is 
the ascribed emotion although shame would be more appropriate.
Great novelists have also explored shame as a crucial element o f the human condition. 
Shakespeare’s works are replete with shame, as when Lear rails against the injustice of his 
aging and his waning powers (Morrison, 1998). Dostoyevsky’s Notes from  the Underground 
is a chilling account o f self-abasement and degradation in which the narrator relates his many 
humiliations, as in the moment when Lia arrives and observes him as he shrieks 
uncontrollably at his servant (Morrison, 1998). In Anna Karenina, Tolstoy describes the 
shame felt by Anna and Levin as each reflects separately on memories and feelings 
experienced while they were alone, and the relief resulting from the dissipation of shame 
when they reenter their familiar environments (Morrison, 1998). In Hawthorne’s The Scarlet 
Letter, the emblematic ‘A’ that signifies Hester Prynne’s sexual transgression proclaims her 
shame outwardly, but Hester also bums from her own internal sense of weakness (Morrison, 
1998). In Eliot’s Middlemarch, Mr. Casabon suffers the shame of realizing that his social 
expectations are not to be readily satisfied, just as other characters in that monumental novel 
experience shame with their small, tightly knit community (Morrison, 1998).
Kafka’s novels are further studies in shame. In The Trial, Joseph K. tries to understand 
which are the failings that have caused him to be interrogated and in Metamorphosis, Gregor 
Samsa finds himself inexplicably transformed from a man into a despicable beetle (Morrison, 
1998). Melville’s Moby Dick, that gargantuan epic of good and evil, vengeance and
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obsession, also reflects Ahab’s rage against defeat and humiliation (Morrison, 1998). 
Faulkner’s Light in August portrays the shame of perceived inferiority, as Joe Christmas is 
troubled by his ancestry, which is partly black, and by his social and sexual inexperience 
(Morrison, 1998).
Philosophers have and do explore shame. George Hegel is concerned with self- 
consciousness and its significance in master-slave relationships, bondage, mastery, and 
submission -  obvious elements in the configuration of shame -  writing: “For the sense of 
shame bears evidence to the separation of man from this natural and sensuous fife. The beasts 
never get so far as this separation, and they feel no shame” (Hegel as quoted by Schneider, 
1977). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes how God views humankind: “He saw 
with eyes that saw everything; he saw man’s depths and ultimate grounds, all his concealed 
disgrace and ugliness. His pity knew no shame: he crawled into my dirtiest nooks” 
(Nietzsche, 1954). Nietzsche also defines liberation as “no longer being ashamed in front of 
oneself’ and laments “the darkening of the heavens over man has always increased in 
proportion to the growth of man’s shame before man (Nietzsche, 1882, 1887). Sartre (1956) 
notes the painful entwining of shame and self-identity:
“Consider for example shame ... it is a shameful apprehension of something 
and this something is me. I am ashamed of what I am. Shame therefore realized 
an intimate relation of myself to myself. Through shame I have discovered an 
aspect of my being ... I recognize that I am as the Other sees me. (p.23)”
In the writings of Hegel, Nietzsche and Sartre, one finds shared motifs and themes of 
shame: the eyes that perceive shame; disgrace, ugliness, and dirt; feeling shame in front of 
oneself (internal, private shame); feeling shame 4 of what I am’. Thus, we learn that shame is 
visible, dirty, can be solitary and private, and is about the self (Morrison, 1998). Morrison 
defines shame as:
“ ... that feeling o f self-castigation which arises when we are convinced that 
there is something about ourselves that is wrong, inferior, flawed, weak or dirty. 
Shame is fundamentally a feeling of loathing against ourselves, a hateful vision of 
ourselves through our own eyes -  although this vision may be determined by how 
we expect or believe other people are experiencing us. Generally this vision is 
accompanied by self-consciousness, and by a conviction of important failure that 
often generates a wish to hide or conceal. A common reaction to shame may be 
expressed as “I could have sunk into the ground” or, analogously, “I could have 
died!” The reference to death brings to mind a common synonym of shame -  
mortification. This definition of shame focuses on self-experience and thus
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contrasts with guilt, which tends to focus on a harmful action or omission, a deed 
that causes pain to another. As guilt generates confession and the goal of 
forgiveness, shame generates concealment and hiding, and the wish for 
acceptance (by self and others) (p. 103).”
As is evidenced by literature and philosophy, shame has evolved through the ages and 
is dependent on both culture and social status. Twentieth century feminist writers and 
philosophers have dedicated volumes to exploration of the origins and consequences of 
gender-based shame both through history and across cultures. Queer philosophers speak to 
sexual shame as a tool for control and manipulation of the masses, particularly as the 
power of the Church has begun to wane in modem and postmodern ages. Queer 
philosophers would argue that sexual shaming can never be tolerated and must be exposed 
as the tool for manipulation and control that it is.
Psychotherapy can become the setting for the generation as well as the resolution of 
shame. Although Freud touched upon the topic o f shame in his early theories of 
psychoanalysis, he never made of it a central focus. In fact, he was quite ambiguous in his 
treatment of shame, sometimes referring to it as a defense against sexuality and the basic 
drives (Freud, 1905), and at other times as a feeling and an affective experience (Freud,
1900).
Morrison suggests that one possible explanation for why shame is overlooked by 
psychotherapists is its contagious nature. In contrast to guilt (which has to do with harmful 
actions or thoughts against others), shame is difficult to encounter in another without recalling 
and even re-experiencing one’s own shame experiences. He posits that, since guilt inducing 
behavior is specific to a given person, it doesn’t usually reverberate with someone else’s 
experience. On the other hand, another person’s shame recalls our own feelings of failure, 
inferiority, and incompetence.
In psychotherapy the emergence of shame tends to generate a collusion of avoidance 
between the therapist and patient; both ‘avert the eyes’ in embarrassment as they turn away 
from shame to deal with more palatable problems such as depression, anger, anxiety, which 
do not so readily trigger evasion (Boucek, 1991; Morrison, 1989). Morrison emphasizes that:
“ ... shame is difficult to treat because, so often, it is difficult to find. We 
hide our shame behind guises o f anger, contempt, depression, denial or 
superiority. These guises or masks can be so compelling that therapists tend to 
treat only them, ignoring the underlying, core feeling of shame. But the
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therapist’s task is to remove the mask o f deception and expose shame, to speak of 
it directly and respectfully, and then to try to find ways to lift its burden through 
genuine self-acceptance (p.34).”
Cultural anthropologist M. B. Singer (1953) states:
“The prevailing criterion for distinguishing shame and guilt cultures has been 
the distinction between external and internal sanctions. If a culture depends 
primarily on external sanctions, it is considered to be a shame culture (p.49).”
Margaret Mead contends that internal sanctions represent internalized sources of 
conformity and authority that operate automatically, as part o f the individual’s character, 
citing guilt as a prime example (Piers & Singer, 1971).
Homosexuality and Shame
Case: Shaming as Abuse
Morrison offers a good clinical example of shame as abuse.
A patient, Edward, describes memories o f his father taunting him for being 
effeminate. A homosexual artist, Edward recalled constantly being made to feel 
that there was something wrong with him for being interested in ‘the pretty things 
that only girls are supposed to like’ and for not liking ‘boy things’. One 
particularly painful event occurred at a large party given for one of his relatives.
As he was greeting some cousins, his father suddenly pulled him into a comer of 
the room, saying: “Do you have to wave your hands around like that when you are 
talking? You embarrass the hell out of me when you do that!” His father, himself 
very shame sensitive, tormented his son for being ‘different’, for not being 
‘manly’. Not surprisingly, Edward is very ashamed about ‘the way he is’ and 
hides his homosexuality from his work associates for fear of being taunted and 
humiliated, as he so often was by his father (Morrison, 1998, p.l 14).
An emotionally or physically brutal environment precipitates chronic feelings o f shame; 
self-blame and shame become ingrained attempts to make sense out of being victimized 
(Morrison, 1998). Were Edward to request referral for possible sexual reorientation 
intervention, it would be important to fully explore the impact and origin o f Edward’s sexual 
shame prior to making a clinical recommendation. In this instance, sexual reorientation may 
not address the true issue to be resolved.
This case was selected to highlight the relationship between clinical formulation and 
choice o f intervention. For Edward, the clinical task is to first resolve the shame originating
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(1998) notes that as narcissism and an emphasis on ‘self have gained prominence in recent 
decades, shame inevitably takes its place as the dominant feeling of failure, inferiority, defect, 
and insignificance in the attainment of personally and culturally valued aspirations and ideals. 
Requests for referrals to sexual reorientation interventionists require that the clinician and the 
patient be willing to explore the importance of personal and cultural values and ideals.
Philosophers have considered the development of shame through parental misattunement 
and preoccupation, the role o f ideals and unreachable aspirations and the dominant part 
played by society in setting the stage for shame through poverty, racism, sexual abuse, 
harassment, addictions, and the stigmas of illness, homosexuality and aging (Morrison, 1998). 
Clinicians providing sexual reorientation must be able to explore sexual shame from these 
philosophical perspectives as well as diverse cultural perspectives as part o f the clinical 
evaluation.
Social theorist Lasch (1992) has written in favor o f shame, and against a social emphasis 
on self-esteem, which he sees as lowering personal standards and values leading to a  society 
of shamelessness. His is clearly a minority view in the twenty-first century (Morrison, 1998), 
although one shared by many who would recommend sexual reorientation indiscriminately 
and irresponsibly.
Morrison (1998) describes three means to productive healing and alleviation of shame. 
These include societal, individual, and psychotherapeutic changes, discussed below:
Societal
It has been often taught that certain repetitive social conditions promote shame. According 
to Morrison among other, these include:
... childhood sexual abuse, harassment, rape, poverty, racism, sexism, 
addictions, societal responses to homosexuality, and feelings about aging and 
illness. Some approaches to alleviating shame include attempts at social change, 
such as affirmative action, economic justice, equality in the work and market 
place, etc. Other approaches include efforts to change the subjective perception 
by disenfranchised groups and classes. Examples o f these include black power, 
feminism, Alcoholics Anonymous, the labor movement, Zionism, gay liberation, 
Gray panthers, etc. The distinction between societal and personal efforts cannot 
be made too rigidly, since the efforts o f the individual -  whether through 
psychotherapy or alone -  to become free of stigmas imposed by childhood trauma 
or cultural happenstance include both elements (Morrison, 1998, p.l 14).
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One important relationship between shame and society is the violence that unremitting 
shame and oppression engender. While violence can hardly be advocated as a useful way to 
resolve shame -  whether through domestic fights or social upheaval and riots -  the direct 
relationship between feelings o f passivity and shame and attempted resolution of these 
through action, aggression, and retaliation is well documented. Violence may well be the 
outcome when society fails to address or redress the inequities and humiliations within its 
purview, as occurred in the case of the Stonewall riots in New York City.
Individual
Morrison postulates that since shame represents feelings of failure, flaws, and inferiority -  
the gap between who we want to be and who we think (or fear) we are -  we become drawn 
toward individual approaches to easing shame’s affliction. The most compelling involve 
efforts to address the internal voice that ‘documents’ our shortcomings. We reflect on who it 
was that ignored, mocked, or abandoned us during childhood, and attempt to remind ourselves 
that such a self-vision is ancient, inaccurate, and not our own.
In addition to reworking the internal voices that remind us of our failures and inadequacies 
we also have the potential to reshape the ideals we believe in, which are largely beyond our 
capacity. It is common to suppose that one would be loved by the internal or fantasized 
‘other’ - if only certain attributes (intelligence, wealth, etc.) were present. When these goals 
or ideals inevitably prove unreachable, we torment ourselves with the failures and defects that 
accompany them -  the ‘malady o f the ideal’ (often occurs when success with efforts to change 
one’s sexual orientation become elusive). This dynamic mandates efforts at easing or 
lowering the standards of the ‘impossible dream’. On the other hand, in those instances where 
our shame comes from the impediments that we put in the way of our own potential success, 
we can work at removing barriers to goals and competencies that seem appropriate (often an 
essential component of gay affirming therapies). While most instances o f shame reflect 
voices that mock us, or create ideals that are unattainable, some efforts toward reaching 
specific attainable goals can generate pride and ease shame. Attempts at overcoming 
roadblocks to success are usually precluded by the very defenses and conflicts (often
3 Stonewall riots: landmark historic event that marks the beginning of the gay civil rights movement in America.
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including guilt) that have generated the problem in the first place. However occasionally, 
regaining previously developed skills can yield self-affirming results, (p. 201)
Psychotherapy
Morrison offered up the prior examples of individual tasks to ease shame. They are 
relevant to:
.. .the psychotherapy o f shame, with the help o f a skilled professional to help 
direct one’s efforts, and the potentially useful presence of transference feelings 
and insights in shaping them. The psychotherapist can help to alert the patient to 
the presence o f shame underlying feelings of distress, reactions of rage and 
contempt, etc. (assuming, of course, that the therapist is attuned to the importance 
and ubiquity of shame, and the various guises it assumes). The therapist can 
articulate the punitive, harsh, and condemnatory interior voices of figures from 
the distant past, whose criticism or lack of interest continues to shape negative 
convictions about the self. Therapy can help to recover memories of less harsh, 
more accepting and loving persons who may have been pushed to the background 
of the interior landscape, but whose affirming voices may help to counter self- 
imposed images of failure and unworthiness. Therapy can be used to alter 
aspirations and ideals unrelentingly beyond reach, and to overcome resistance 
against working at tasks that can be achieved to affirm potential competence 
(Morrison, 1998, p.215).
Such psychotherapies can be undertaken as a prelude to eventual sexual reorientation 
interventions or gay-affirming psychotherapies. In either case, it is very important to 
acknowledge sexual shame as an issue distinct from sexual behavior or orientation.
Implications for Sexual Reorientation Interventions
Both sexual reorientation interventions and gay affirming therapies share the goal of 
relieving shame and guilt. Sexual reorientation interventions work to strengthen internal 
heterosexuality and overt heterosexual behavior, resulting in improved self-esteem and the 
beginnings o f a sense of pride in one’s sexuality. Sexual reorientation providers would 
describe as a success an intervention that increases the quantity and quality o f heterosexual 
activity while diminishing or eliminating the homosexual behavior that is associated with 
shame and guilt. Alternatively, the gay affirming therapist works to relieve shame through 
the development o f self-acceptance and, eventually, pride in one’s non-heterosexuality.
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Religious groups offer ‘transformational ministries’ as an intervention to relieve the shame 
and guilt experienced by both religious and non-religious homosexuals. These interventions 
promise forgiveness, hope, support, and relief from hiding one’s struggle with the moral and 
social shame that is homosexuality. Gay, lesbian, feminist, and queer political groups attempt 
to relieve the shame experienced by homosexuals through social changes in legislation, 
media, popular opinion, public and professional policy changes. Examples include the 
removal o f homosexuality from the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual, changes to the professional policies and guidelines o f organized medicine 
to discourage or prohibit discrimination of patient access to care based on patient sexual 
orientation or sexual behavior, discrimination of provider access to training or professional 
memberships based on provider sexual orientation or sexual behavior, sexual reorientation 
interventions, initiatives in support of same-sex domestic partner laws for dependent health 
care coverage and the legitimization of same-sex unions, etc.
Clinicians involved in the practice of sexual reorientation must acknowledge and be able to 
tolerate an in depth look at the role o f shame and guilt for motivating requests to change one’s 
sexual behaviors or sexual orientations. The clinical literature suggests that both reorientation 
interventions as well as affirming interventions have both successes and failures. Relief o f 
shame is one way to compare and contrast treatment efficacy between such very disparate 
interventions as reorientation and affirming interventions. Another is to analyze initial 
characteristics evident between the successes and failures within a given intervention as well 
as between interventions. As described above, shame can serve as both an outcome measure 
(a way to quantify efficacy) as well as an initial clinical descriptor (with predictive powers). 
Shame and sexual orientation is a field of study that warrants further clinical research.
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Chapter 19: Bioethics and Psychiatry
The evolution o f professional ethics in psychiatry and psychology has followed the larger 
trends in Western health care. Among health professionals, the pull towards paternalism is 
perhaps the strongest for psychiatrists because of the intense dependency and vulnerability o f 
psychiatric patients combined with the omnipresent monitoring for impairments in judgment 
and competence required by mental health practice. The mental health providers that offer 
sexual reorientation interventions are major stakeholders in this debate, any discussion must 
look at their ethical past, present and future.
The Declaration of Madrid
The World Psychiatric Association’s (WPA) Declaration of Madrid, adopted in 1996, was 
endorsed by the American Psychiatric Association five years later, but not, according to Alan 
Stone (2002), without much-needed qualifications. The Declaration o f Madrid was supposed 
to deal with ethical guidelines for psychiatrists, but in fact its standards have more to do with 
law and legal reasoning than with medicine and traditional medical ethics (Stone, 2002). The 
American Psychiatric Association and its Council on Psychiatry and Law successfully pressed 
for the qualifications. Stone notes that, especially in America, the law has dramatically 
transformed the domain o f psychiatric ethics. The dramatic shifts in psychiatric ethics over 
the last three decades have left many practitioners anxious about legal consequences and 
eager for concrete standards of care and professional guidelines to follow.
The Declaration o f Madrid is filled with loans from American law and couched in legal 
terms without any apparent recognition of the legal consequences, worries Stone. The first 
standard calls on psychiatrists worldwide to provide treatment in ‘the least restrictive setting’, 
a phrase taken directly from the American constitutional doctrine which was the rallying cry 
of the civil libertarian movement that brought down the walls of American state hospitals in 
the 1970s. Stone believes that it was legal rhetoric that destroyed psychiatric institutions 
without creating alternative systems of care, a process that highlights the risk of placing 
professional ethics and bioethics entirely in the realm of public policy and law.
Most of what the WPA now adopts as ‘ethical standards for psychiatric practice’ were, in 
fact, forced by lawyers on American psychiatrists and physicians. Stone notes that ‘informed 
consent’ was an idea thrust on a reluctant American medical profession by judges dealing
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with cases o f malpractice and negligence. Any medical historian will confirm that 40 years 
ago medical students in America and elsewhere were still taught not to tell patients that they 
had cancer! Stone believes that subsequent generations of doctors have made informed 
consent and patient autonomy the core o f their ethics, without recognizing that these 
principles were imposed on them by the courts rather than derived from a tradition o f medical 
ethics or practice. Stone’s concern is that the language of Madrid’s third ethical standard 
could have been taken from Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F2d 772 (DC Cir 1972), the 
benchmark decision on informed consent. The Declaration of Madrid makes the patient “a 
partner by right in the therapeutic process” and imposes on the doctor the “duty ... to provide 
the patient with relevant information so as to empower the patient to come to a rational 
decision according to his or her personal values and preferences.” This is certainly an 
important ideal for all physicians, but it is also one that poses practical problems for 
psychiatry.
There are some who insist that every patient entering psychotherapy must be told as a 
matter o f informed consent what the scientific evidence of the proposed psychotherapy is, in 
comparison to that of medication for the same condition, as well as the likely outcome if no 
intervention is made. Stone is concerned as to the implementation of the ethical ideal of 
informed consent when the patient is floridly psychotic and in urgent need of care.
Stone asserts that the Declaration of Madrid has no foundation in traditional medical 
ethics, as evidenced by the failure to mention the ancient injunctionprimum non nocere (first, 
do no harm). Which is actually understood to mean “above all, don’t do more harm than 
good.” He worries about how the modem psychiatrist can proceed when the least restrictive 
environment available carries a substantial risk o f harm.
This shift away from medical ethics towards legal precedent in psychiatric bioethics may 
reveal a weakness in organized psychiatry’s ability to evolve ethics that are applicable to 
twenty-first century mental health care. If the events resulting from the WPA’s Declaration of 
Madrid are symptomatic o f an inherent instability or insufficiency of ethical philosophy in 
psychiatry, it seems incumbent upon all psychiatric professionals to critically evaluate the 
ethical guidelines propagated by organized psychiatry and organized mental health.
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Postmodern Psychiatry
In the March 2001 issue of the British Medical Journal, psychiatrists Patrick Bracken and 
Philip Thomas outlined a “new positive direction for the theory and practice in mental 
health.” This movement has been dubbed postpsychiatry (also known as postmodern 
psychiatry) and it is notable that many o f its aims are broadly shared with Queer Theory. It is 
responsible for a number of recommendations relevant to the debate on sexual reorientation 
interventions:
• A rejection of “faith in the ability of science and technology to resolve human and 
social problems.”
• A rejection o f “the medical control o f coercive interventions.”
• A rejection o f “the emphasis on the individual’s circumstances and traits in 
understanding psychiatric disorders.”
Braken and Thomas emphasize that psychiatry must move beyond its modernist 
framework to engage with government proposals and the growing power of service users. 
These tasks are problematic for American psychiatry given the excursions of the legal and 
political system into the professional arena over the last four decades. Braken and Thomas 
view postmodemity as providing an opportunity for doctors to redefine their roles and 
responsibilities, particularly appropriate for a field that has most recently been subject to 
redefinition by consumer groups, political groups and courts.
Bracken and Thomas provide a unifying framework for these particular proposals by 
referring to the roots o f modem psychiatry in the European Enlightenment and its resulting 
characteristics (Radden, 2001). Each tenet, according to Radden, derives from an aspect of 
the ‘postmodernist’ rejection of Enlightenment concepts, categories, and methodology. 
According to contemporary historians influenced by Foucault, the Enlightenment, with its 
emphasis on reason and rationality, led not only to the social exclusion o f the mad as 
unreasonable, but also to their role as objects of study and treatment using rational scientific 
methods (Radden, 2001). The Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the individual subject, 
invited a ‘de-contextualizing’ o f mental disorder, emphasizing disorders of individuals, not 
products o f social, cultural or economic forces. Radden (2001) notes that with this theoretical 
background, the thematic unity o f postpsychiatry becomes clear.
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If  we reject the Enlightenment focus on the isolated individual with its 
adherence to methodological individualism, then we lose confidence in any appeal 
to individual circumstances and traits to explain and understand psychiatric 
disorder. If  we reject the normative dualism which contrasts rationality with 
irrationality or unreason, we lose faith not only in rational scientific method with 
its (technologic) tools, but also in a perceived underpinning of coercive 
psychiatry, the scientific authority and moral warrant for imposing treatment 
against the patient’s wishes (Bracken & Thomas, 2001, p.2).
According to Radden, the new agenda for mental health care dictated by postpsychiatry 
places emphasis on context (“social, political and cultural realities should be central to our 
understanding of madness”); on group, rather than individual, responses to disorder (this 
includes acknowledgement of the social and economic causes of mental disorder as well as 
networking and self-help, client group approaches to treatment); and an ethical orientation 
(rather than “the idea that science should guide clinical practice”). Recommendations are not 
detailed fully, but they include an approach with more sensitivity to cultural variation and 
values in treatment (Radden, 2001).
Radden worries that this new agenda, however appealing and desirable, is derived from 
overstated postmodernist theorizing and dangerously open to misinterpretation. Braken and 
Thomas appeal to Muir Gray’s characterization of the priorities of today’s society to which all 
in health care must be responsive - concern about values as well as evidence; preoccupation 
with risks as well as benefits; and the rise in prevalence of the informed patient. Radden 
notes that the informed risk evaluations made by the patient in contemporary health care 
settings are possible on the one hand thanks to information about risks and benefits provided, 
in part, through science and technology and on the other because of an acknowledgement of 
the patient’s (rational) autonomy as a value to be honored.
It is worth bearing in mind that postmodern psychiatry may carry the same threat as Queer 
Theory in terms of risk for destabilization of group and individual identities. Braken and 
Thomas ask how appropriate Western psychiatry is for cultural groups who value a spiritual 
ordering of the world and an ethical emphasis on the importance of family and community. 
Queer and essentialist theory, with their Foucaultian heritage, inevitably force psychiatric and 
mental health policy makers to re-examine policy making practices which address the social 
goals o f specific bourgeois sub-cultures in twenty-first century Western society at the expense 
o f sub-cultures marginalized by virtue of size, value-system, religious beliefs or non-Western
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origins. It is exceedingly difficult to provide policy guidelines that address and respect both 
the bourgeoisie and the marginalized in the diversified societies o f North America and 
Western Europe. This argues for a locus o f ethical control between the patient and clinician 
instead of within professional organizations.
Value-Sensitive Therapy
Value sensitive therapy highlights the importance of the individual practitioner and patient 
in the evolution o f ethical decisions. Essential to the process of psychotherapy is the 
assumption that, at some point, both patient and therapist will share a perception of what is 
wrong, what needs to be corrected, and how the therapist can assist in effecting the repair. 
Heilman and Witztum (1997) note that behind this fundamental cognitive assumption is 
another supposition: that both the patient and the therapist hold a common value orientation 
with respect to what would be a satisfactory resolution of the distress that has brought the 
patient to the therapist. When patient and therapist do not share common values, the therapist 
must create a strategy for the two to find some common cultural ground on which to meet in 
order to enable them to ‘speak some common language’.
Heilman and Witztum note that in most cases, the patient must learn to accept the standard 
metaphors of illness and therapy. Moreover, he or she is also often required to accept the 
therapist’s “judgements concerning the desirability and advisability o f various courses of 
action (p.4).” Sometimes, as has been argued in the literature on the development of 
‘culturally sensitive’ mental health training (particularly in the context of therapists from the 
dominant culture treating those of a minority culture), it calls for the mental health 
professional to reframe their diagnosis and try to perceive the reality o f the situation not just 
through the therapist’s explanatory framework but also through the prism o f the patient’s 
complex of cultural metaphors (Bilu et al, 1994; Crapanzano, 1973; Kleinman, 1980). The 
decision to provide or withhold a referral to a sexual reorientation interventionist requested by 
a patient requires the clinician to look at and assess the similarities and differences in the 
value systems held by the patient and the clinician:
When the divide across which the therapy occurs defines different cultural 
realities but also contradictory and mutually exclusive values, a cognitive 
understanding of difference may be insufficient. The therapist must also pursue a 
therapeutic strategy that is sensitive to the patient’s values, even when this seems
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to oppose commonly accepted therapeutic approaches, so that the patients do not 
emerge from the encounter having been healed and also ‘converted’ to a new set 
of values that undermine a sacred or social order that matters deeply to them.
Perhaps nowhere do these issues become clearer than in the case of an encounter 
between a secular therapist, trained in modem therapeutic methods, and a 
religious patient, bonded to a traditional community o f believers whose heritage 
and folkways are incongruent with the values and cultural assumptions shared by 
most psychotherapists (Heilman & Witztum, 1997, p.12).
To be value-sensitive, of course, is not to be value-free. As Bergin, and before him Max 
Weber assert, a totally “value-free approach is impossible” (Heilman & Witztum, 1997, p. 12). 
Value sensitivity requires clinical sophistication and expertise that cannot easily be translated 
into public policy or professional standards. The following case is quoted in full from 
Heilman and Wiztum because it illuminates well the complexity and importance of value 
sensitivity in clinical practice.
Case Study: The Homosexual Rabbi
Rabbi Eliezer was a 52-year-old, Haredi4 man from Jerusalem with a severe 
appearance. A product of the yeshiva world, he excelled in Torah scholarship and 
became a Rosh Yeshiva. He was married and father to five children, ranging in 
age from an 18-year-old daughter to a 25-year-old son. Suffering from 
impotence, Rabbi Eliezer first visited an urologist. Finding no organic reason for 
the problem, the urologist referred him for a psychiatric consultation.
During the intake interview, Rabbi Eliezer kept his features tightly controlled 
most of the time. In response to probing questions, he revealed that his impotence 
emerged about four months after his youngest daughter’s wedding. Describing 
the wedding, he spoke glowingly of his new son-in-law. He became animated and 
his severe features visibly softened as he characterized the young man as an 
outstanding rabbinical student (standard praise used to describe young males (so- 
called b’nai torah) -  especially by someone who is Rosh Yeshiva.) But then, he 
went beyond this characterization and declared that his new son-in-law was a 
handsome lad, making use o f a Biblical phrase (Sam. I 16:12), ‘adonee v ’yefay 
einaim v 'toy roeey’ (ruddy with beautiful eyes and good-looking), an expression 
used to describe the legendary King David. Although couched in Scriptural 
language, the use of this sort of description in reference to a young man’s physical 
appearance is unusual in the world of Haredi rabbis. These are simply not 
qualities that are expected to feature prominently in a rabbi’s assessment, even of 
his son-in-law. This is because the rabbi is supposed to be concerned with the 
young man’s interior, his mind, his learning -  but definitely not his body. If  he
4 Haredi: a strict, conservative Jewish sect prominent in New York City and Jerusalem.
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shows any concern for his appearance, it would normally be something that 
referred to his modesty or humble dress. But Rabbi Eliezer focused on the young 
man’s physical beauty.
After additional probing, he further revealed that he was extremely fond of 
the young man. In the world o f the Haredim, where all marriages are arranged, 
this young man had been put forward by a matchmaker. However, when Rabbi 
Eliezer met him, he was very much taken with the boy and strongly encouraged 
his daughter to accept the match and embrace the marriage. And, indeed, the 
daughter acceded to her father’s wishes, which were not at odds with her own.
After the wedding, the young couple lived for three months near the bride’s 
parents. During this time, Rabbi Eliezer often found himself daydreaming about 
his new son-in-law. As he described these visions, he said he dreamt that he was 
sitting studying Torah with the young man, an activity in which he often engaged 
in actuality. He also dreamt about the young man at night. He denied that these 
dreams were erotic in any way, but admitted that they were quite clear and 
focused on the young man.
When asked, he claimed he had never had such dreams before in his life. As 
for his own sons, he would only say that he was an extremely strict father to them, 
perhaps -  he admitted -  too strict. Conversely, he claimed he was too lenient and 
forgiving towards his daughters.
A computation of the age of his children and his own age reveals that Rabbi 
Eliezer did not marry until the age of 27, which is most unusual in the Haredi 
world in which males usually marry between the ages of 18 and 22. To have wed 
at 27 suggests that Rabbi Eliezer had such difficulties in finding a mate that the 
matchmakers could not ‘sell’ him in the marriage market. When asked to account 
for his late marriage, he explained that ‘no girl was good enough for him’, and 
therefore he had rejected many of the potential brides. Finally, his father grew ill 
and revealed that his continuing status as a single man was deeply disturbing. Just 
at that point, he received an offer from America for a wife, which he accepted.
For many years his sex life was, according to him, quite satisfactory, and in 
fact he fathered five children. His wife later confirmed that she had no complaints 
about his sexual behavior until the onset of his impotence which came when, four 
months after their wedding, the daughter and son-in-law followed a common 
Haredi practice and moved to another city where they had found an apartment 
they could afford and where the young man found habilitation as a student in a 
kollel. During the month following their departure, Rabbi Eliezer said that he 
longed powerfully for the young man. He also became sexually impotent at this 
time.
It is important to note that the rabbi did not himself make an explicit 
connection between the two events. Indeed, he ignored any possible linkage 
between them. Instead, he worried that he had somehow sinned -  though 
precisely how he could not say -  and that this was the reason this grievous illness 
had come upon him. Although he suspected a religious root to his problem, he 
had not discussed the possible nature o f his sins with any other rabbis because he 
considered his affliction to be intimate and embarrassing.
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Later, when Rabbi Eliezer’s wife came for her interview with the therapist, 
she inquired as to whether there could be an association between her husband’s 
condition and the departure of the young man, who, as everyone knew, the rabbi 
adored. Tentatively broaching the subject in a subsequent interview, the therapist 
asked Rabbi Eliezer if  he had encouraged his daughter to marry the young man in 
order to ‘acquire’ him for himself though the medium of his daughter. Rabbi 
Eliezer nodded in affirmation, believing himself to be admitting his wish to 
acquire the son-in-law as a student and disciple rather than the presence of any 
illicit desires.
The Therapist’s Dilemma
According to the therapist’s evaluation, this was a case of latent, repressed 
homosexuality, something that probably contributed to the patient’s earlier 
inability to find any woman good enough for him to marry. Sensing his erotic 
feelings for his son-in-law, Rabbi Eliezer had perhaps become overwhelmed and 
frightened by his own homosexual desires and, having lost the young man, found 
that his libido had become totally inhibited. Alternatively, the impotence could be 
explained as an effort on the rabbi’s part to ‘punish’ himself for his forbidden 
desires and appetites, thus eliminating the possibility of all potential sexual 
satisfaction. Finally, his impotence might be explained as a self-inflicted ‘brake’ 
or inhibitor preventing his desires from driving him toward an act of sexual 
satisfaction (either homosexual or masturbatory, both of which were strictly 
prohibited) that he would always regret. Whatever explanation one accepts, each 
one has, as its precipitating factor, the latent homosexual desire for the young man 
- a desire that is totally incompatible with Rabbi Eliezer’s Haredi religious and 
cultural values, which view homosexuality as an abomination.
In fact, the problems from which Rabbi Eliezer suffers might be alleviated by 
a therapy leading to his recognition and ultimate acceptance of his homosexual or 
bisexual character. However, while this might solve the problem o f his 
impotence, it would also ban him forever from the only world and set o f values he 
has ever known and leave him completely isolated. Ironically, he would be even 
further from his love object by virtue of this disclosure and life change than he 
already was. Even if he were not to express his homosexuality but simply admit 
it, the revelation would have the same culturally disruptive and emotionally 
burdensome effects (Heilman & Witztum, 1997, p.9).
The therapist in this situation is confronted by a dilemma. Should he reveal to the rabbi his 
apparent homosexual or bisexual nature, or should he help the rabbi to suppress or sublimate 
it so that he can continue to live in the sexually regulated and highly structured Haredi world 
where no variations on the basic monogamous heterosexual union are tolerated or even 
legitimately contemplated? In value terms, what is good and what is bad? The answer is far 
from clear.
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Clearly, therapists are, in some ways, agents o f social and cultural order, and 
their decision regarding what strategy to take is affected not only by the desire to 
make the patient well, but by a judgment as to which world and value system the 
patient should participate in in order to be well. What constitutes wellness in San 
Francisco is very different from the form it takes in the Haredi neighborhoods of 
Jerusalem where Rabbi Eliezer had made his life. Hence therapy requires a clear 
sense of where in the world the patient is being sent when he gets well. The 
therapist must therefore not only cure the patient but also relocate him into one 
world or another. That decision must be made in cooperation with the patient and 
in such a way that will not cure the illness only to leave the patient a socially 
crippled individual and cultural loner (Heilman & Witztum, 1997, p. 10).
In this case, the psychiatrist dealt with the symptoms focally by the use of medication and 
relaxation techniques and intentionally avoided giving a psychodynamic interpretation of the 
symptoms that would allow the rabbi to face the underlying issues of his sexuality. In brief, 
he decided not to share his own knowledge and insights with Rabbi Eliezer, telling his wife 
that it was not a good idea to explore the reasons for his impotence too deeply -  a restriction 
which she was able to accept (the notion that there are some matters which should not be 
explored too deeply is well rooted in Haredi life which emphasizes the restriction o f free 
inquiry) (p. 10).
Ironically, the rabbi himself began to reach some insights into the sources of 
his problem and himself raised the possibility o f his homosexuality, which he 
immediately denied, adding that if it were true, he would kill himself in such a 
way that no one would know he had committed suicide. The therapist concluded 
that this was a thinly disguised way in which to ratify his value-sensitive 
approach. The rabbi was confirming that he did not want to know or have 
confirmed suspicions of his homosexuality. He would, he indicated, rather deal 
with the symptoms than the root cause. With a value-sensitive response, the 
therapist tried to provide the treatment the culture and the patient wanted. This 
turned out to be a successful approach (Heilman & Witztum, 1997, p. 13).
Heilman and Witztum presented this case as one of three to illustrate that it is not always 
possible for the ‘value-neutral’ therapist to seek a ‘pure’ cure. They emphasize that the 
responsibilities of the mental health professional include not only helping patients to resolve 
their particular psychological distress, but also to consider their wider values and cultural 
interests. This remains especially important when these values or cultural interests are 
incongruent with the therapist’s values or cultural interests or with the classic professional 
stance of value-neutrality or even when, because of immediate distress, the patient is 
temporarily oblivious of the threat that their therapy poses to their own deeply held values.
The most recent trend in American mental policy development around sexual orientation 
both overtly and covertly articulates the value system of the gay, lesbian, and queer 
communities, often to the exclusion o f other perspectives. It is often viewed as politically 
incorrect to in any way acknowledge the legitimacy o f any system (cultural or religious) with 
heterosexist values. The case o f Rabbi Eliezer explicitly demonstrates the clinical risks 
associated with a broad all inclusive public health policy that would mandate gay affirming 
therapy as the only appropriate intervention. Any efforts to directly acknowledge or to 
develop a ‘gay identity’ for Rabbi Eliezer would have been a clinical misadventure with 
negligent and inexcusable risks. Value sensitivity rejects clinical decision-making based 
solely on political correctness or the provider’s individual value system and highlights the 
importance o f clinical decisions being tied to the individual clinical situation of the patient, 
his culture, and his environment.
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SECTION VI: BIOETfflCAL ANALYSIS
This thesis has attempted, so far, to describe and present clearly the ethical questions raised 
by the public and professional debate surrounding sexual reorientation interventions, the 
stakeholders in the ethical debate and their issues* The ethical issues have been explored from 
biomedical, psychiatric, religious, philosophical, lesbigay, and queer perspectives. Two 
primary issues lie at the core o f this debate, the first is the location where ethical decisions are 
resolved and the second is how the ethical decisions are resolved. The options for the location 
include: 1) resolution between the individual clinician and patient, 2) formulation o f a unified 
professional standard of practice across all the disciplines that are involved in the provision of 
sexual reorientation interventions, 3) a legislated public policy derived from input from the 
various stakeholder groups in society that supercedes any ethical attempts to resolve the 
matter otherwise. How the ethical debate is resolved largely depends on where the resolution 
attempt occurs, and who is involved, but any resolution must be able to reconcile conflicts 
between fundamental ethical principles such as autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice; as well as clarifying the intentional and unintentional misconceptions and distortions 
inherently associated with any public debate.
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Chapter 20: Postmodern Bioethics as a Comprehensive Final Analysis
A comprehensive final analysis for this research thesis that looks into the bioethical 
questions surrounding the provision of sexual reorientation interventions is complete upon 
resolution of the following questions:
1. What are the reoccurring bioethical principles raised in response to sexual reorientation 
interventions?
2. Can sexual reorientation interventions be bioethically provided?
3. When should professional organizations for health providers generate policy statements 
related to the provision of sexual reorientation interventions?
4. Can professional organizations for health providers construct a bioethically sound 
policy on the provision o f sexual reorientation interventions that applies to all 
professions and all patients, all the time?
5. Who is best prepared to resolve bioethical issues surrounding sexual reorientation 
interventions?
6. Is there one right answer, if not, why not?
Towards this end, the theories surrounding the potential origins o f homosexuality are 
explored at length; especially those rooted in the psychoanalytic and psychodynamic tradition 
(Freudian), as these continue to inform sexual reorientation interventions currently available. 
Less time has been spent in the exploration of Skinnerian behavioral modification programs 
and learning theory as these treatment modalities for sexual reorientation have largely been 
abandoned in the America and Western Europe and now are primarily of historic interest. It 
however remains notable that a number of prominent clinical behavioralists who wrote 
prolifically in support o f behavioral modification interventions for sexual reorientation early 
in their careers have towards the end of their careers formally reversed their position in the 
clinical literature and argued against the use of behavioral modification. Their reason for 
abandoning behavioral modification intervention for sexual reorientation is due to inadequate 
long-term efficacy. The philosophical work on identity and identity acquisition by Cass is 
explored in detail and is part of the landscape upon which Queer theorists re-engage the 
endless debate, o f free will versus determinism and nature versus nurture as applied to the 
socially and politically marginalized sexualities. What becomes clear is that homosexuality is
197
different between the sexes, across cultures, and across historical time frames. What also 
becomes clear is that many non-mental health professionals tend to have trouble acting in 
accordance with the express tenet that homosexuality and other non-heterosexual sexualities 
have both multiple origins and multiple presentations. This essential tenet is decidedly 
postmodern.
Postmodern Bioethics
At the heart o f postmodern bioethics lies the denial that there are objective bioethical rules 
available for philosophers or health-care practitioners to uncover. It argues against any hope 
for an ethical resolution of the public debate surrounding sexual reorientation interventions. 
This view is explored in depth by postmodern bioethicists such as Englehardt (1996), who has 
suggested that rational communication about moral issues is no longer possible in a world full 
of diverging views, and that neither is there any widely accepted moral authority. On the 
surface, the public and professional debate surrounding sexual reorientation has been so 
fraught with irrational communication that one might endorse Engelhardt’s bleak view and 
state that professional policy makers will never be able to construct a bioethically sound 
policy on the provision o f sexual reorientation interventions. The data from the model of 
Campbell and EUggs (1982) identifies a number o f problems with the way in which policy 
statements on sexual reorientation have been constructed by professional organizations, most 
problematic o f which is that bioethics has taken a back seat to the active promotion o f social 
and political agendas.
Engelhardt observed that standards in ethics and bioethics have been sought “in the content 
of moral thought (e.g. in intuitions), in the form of moral reasoning (e.g. in the idea of 
impartiality or rationality), or in some external objective reality (e.g. in the consequences of 
actions or the structure of reality).” Tong (1997) offered the following:
For example, I ‘know’ that my intuitions are right because my community 
thinks they are. I ‘know’ that I am rational because my community thinks I am. I 
‘know’ which consequences are good because my community identifies them as 
such. And I ‘know’ what is natural because my community labels it so. The 
problem, then, is that my community is not also that o f someone else and vice 
versa. Therefore, when we disagree with each other about the rightness or 
wrongness of an action, we will not be able to appeal to everyone’s intuition, 
conception o f rationality, notion of good consequences, or conception of natural
acts. Instead, we will be forced to rely on our own moral perceptions as filtered 
through the conventional principles o f our own community (p. 79).
Englehardt maintains that in a postmodern society there are only two conventional 
principles that everyone can invoke irrespective o f their ‘home base’, the principle o f  
permission (respect for autonomy) and the principle o f beneficence. Both of which are 
ammenable to rational discussion.
The first o f these is totally formal and without specific moral content. All the 
principle of permission tells us is that in a secular pluralistic society, authority for 
resolving moral disputes “can be derived only from the agreement of the 
participants, since it cannot derive from rational argument or common belief. 
Therefore, permission or consent is the origin of authority, and respect of the right 
of the participants to consent is the necessary condition for the possibility o f  
moral community.” Morality cannot be morality unless it concerns itself with 
“the achievement of good and the avoidance o f harm.” Granted, one person’s 
good may be another’s harm. Nevertheless, even in a secular, pluralistic society, 
we all have to be committed to pursuing good and avoiding harm in one way or 
another (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 19).
It is not entirely clear that the professional organizations at hand have requested and 
secured consent from either patients or professionals to assume the authority for resolving the 
moral disputes that arise around the subject of sexual reorientation. It is clear that none of 
these organizations can claim anywhere near to 100% membership from the profession they 
report to represent. It is unclear if any o f these organizations presented ever requested or 
received formal endorsement of their policy statements from their membership. And in terms 
of a public endorsement (permission) to resolve this moral conflict, it is a far stretch o f the 
imagination to believe the social contract between the public and the health professions gives 
professional organizations the power to preempt a bioethical discussion of sexual 
reorientation between a given patient and his clinician.
According to Engelhardt, postmodern medicine is the only type currently possible.
Christian Science ‘medicine’, Jehovah’s Witness ‘medicine’ and Roman Catholic ‘medicine’ 
all carry moral weight because a community of believers endorses them as a bioethical system 
and is prepared to live by their values. However, the medical profession cannot survive as a 
‘balkanized set of incompatible fiefdoms.’ Despite his initial hopelessness, Engelhardt asserts
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that for modem medicine, permission (autonomy) and beneficence are ethical tenets well 
understood and readily accessible to both patients and clinicians.
The broader model o f Campbell and Higgs is described in this thesis because it opens the 
discussion up to a wide range of bioethical and ethical principles with an emphasis on the 
rational organizing and structuring of discussion with an exploration of what has been said as 
well as what has gone unsaid. The model o f Campbell and Higgs is a powerful tool in that it 
can accommodate the exploration o f specific issues of an individual patient or the global 
agendas of social groups.
Principlists
Western health professionals are most familiar with a bioethic popularized in medicine 
by the principlists. Much o f the debate on sexual reorientation interventions within the 
medical profession has been in the language of the principlists such that no bioethical 
exploration of sexual reorientation is complete without an exploration of such. Tong 
summarizes the principlists as follows:
Aware of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of both inductivism and 
deductivism, the so-called principlists urge a move between particular judgments 
on the one hand and general norms on the other. They see their primary task as 
the continual calibration of the balance between these two poles o f moral 
decision-making so that they fit together and reinforce each other. Revealing 
what has been interpreted as a greater affinity to deductivism than to inductivism, 
principlists usually undertake this complex process of moral calibration by 
attending first to the general-norm pole of moral reasoning and then to the 
particular judgment pole o f moral reasoning (hence the name ‘principlists’).
From the viewpoint o f the principlists, the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice are in continuous competition for our 
moral attention. We respond to these principles because each represents a cluster 
o f crucial values embedded in our ‘common morality’ -  that is, the morality that 
pervades our culture. When we make a moral decision about a particular 
situation, we are asked to determine rationally which of these values we are bound 
to follow. To the extent that our decision meshes with the content of our common 
morality, as developed over decades or even centuries, we can be confident that it 
is right. However, since our common morality is not an a priori set o f rigidly 
ranked absolute principles, true for all times and in all places, but an evolving 
social institution, our decision may be right even if it departs somewhat from our 
common morality. After all, morality does not evolve by itself; rather, its 
progress depends on the wisdom and courage of moral agents to challenge it 
occasionally (p.21).
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The principles o f autonomy and justice resonate with fundamental Western morals, 
whereas the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence hark back to the ancient 
Hippocratic injunction to act always in the best interests of the patient and, at the very least, to 
do no harm (Tong, 1997). The language of the principlists is found throughout modem 
medicine, modem bioethics and sexual reorientation discussions. It is the language that 
clinicians will use to explore, understand, interpret and discuss bioethical issues with their 
patients and their professional peers.
Those groups in support of sexual reorientation interventions such as NARTH argue the 
principles o f autonomy and beneficence, while those opposed most often argue the principles 
of justice5 and non-maleficence6. Beauchamp and Childress (1996) maintain that it is 
precisely because these principles are so familiar to medicine that professionals rely on them 
automatically to make judgments about what should or should not be done in particular 
situations.
Despite the enormous appeal o f principled approaches to bioethics, they have been 
challenged by a variety of critics. Strict deductionists like Clouser and Gert (1990) fault 
Beauchamp and Childress for offering individuals what they regard as a ‘potpourri’ of 
principles. They claim that Beauchamp and Childress simply borrow the principle o f 
beneficence from Mill, the principle of autonomy from Kant, the principle o f justice from 
Rawls, and the principle of non-maleficence from Gert, and present the resultant blend as if it 
were an integrated and unified theory, when nothing could be further from the truth. They 
also claim that Beauchamp and Childress encourage moral agents to ‘mix and match’ the 
principles of bioethics as they please, “as if one could sometimes be a Kantian and sometimes 
be a Utilitarian and sometimes something else, without worrying whether the theory one is 
using is adequate or not (p.28).” According to Clouser and Gert (1990), whenever two or 
more principles conflict in these situations, decision-makers are left to their own intuition. 
This state of affairs pushes the principlists into the waiting arms of relativists, who are only 
too eager to exclaim that there is no ‘right’ way to resolve a conflict between principles.
From the perspective of inductivists, principlists such as Pellegrino, Thomasma, 
Beauchamp, and Childress, are to be commended for the extent to which they leave
5 Justice: the bioethical principle to do what is right and/or moral.
6 Non-maleficence: the bioethical principle to minimize harm to the patient.
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professionals a measure of moral space within which to exercise their individual powers of 
judgment. Nonetheless, principlists can be considered lacking, either for awarding the role of 
principles in biomedical decision-making a privileged position or for underestimating just 
how susceptible principles are to ‘interpretation’ -  that is, to distortion, manipulation, and the 
general vagaries of human communication.
Holmes (1990) suggests that the choice of principles is simply the result o f our personal 
predilections. Thus, Holmes charges that whatever a bioethicist claims about the universality 
or rationality o f his principles, “what happens in practice is that he simply chooses a favorite 
theory and, with the unwitting help of fudge factors, arrives at a ‘solution’ that he knew to be 
intuitively acceptable in the first place (p. 123).” A dispassionate assessment of the public 
debate on sexual reorientation tends to support Holmes’ view.
Bioethical Analysis of Sexual Reorientation Interventions
Following the framework for ethical analysis advocated by Campbell and Higgs, thus far 
have been identified the issues at stake, and whom they impact as well as the variety of ways, 
both direct and indirect, in which the stakeholders are affected. Morally relevant facts, 
fictions, beliefs, and hypotheses have been explored with an eye towards elucidating the 
perspectives and purposes of the relevant players in this debate. Campbell and Higgs provide 
for an exploration of the motivations that drive the bioethical discussion. The principlists 
(Beauchamp, Childers, Thomasma, and Pellegrino) worry less about what motivates the 
stakeholders than which principles are used to pursue their ends.
Who has gone unheard?
There is no voice from the unborn offspring aborted during pregnancy, those discarded 
prior to implantation or experimented on between fertilization and prior to implantation. This 
is a bioethical dilemma of twenty-first century genetics and fertility technology. Given the 
powerful shame in many parts of Western society, which is associated with non­
heterosexuality as compared to other aspects of individuality potentially under the control of 
biogenetic technology, the potential for misuse and/or abuse of technology is real. It is 
foolish to under estimate the power of shame.
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Children who have undergone interventions for gender identity disorder have very little 
voice. Their parents hold the power to consent or refuse medical, psychiatric, and 
psychological interventions. The literature does not report any feedback from adults or 
adolescents who underwent interventions for childhood gender identity disorder in the past.
If  we are to hear directly from these children, this is likely to occur as they enter adolescence 
or adulthood. Their voice remains unheard, either because of a paucity o f  numbers (volume 
too low) or because they have no comment (silent) or perhaps because no one is listening (no 
audience). Those that do speak out approach the subject from either a clinical perspective 
(outcome studies and technical applications) or from a philosophical perspective (gender 
dichotomy vs. gender fluidity). In either case they do not speak on behalf of the patients 
themselves.
Non-heterosexual adolescents as a group are particularly difficult to listen to or collect data 
on given the kaleidoscope of pressures they experience from family, church, school, peers, 
and self. Adolescence is a period of transition for all aspects of sexuality including sexual 
orientation and is often marked by being ‘in the closet’ with some in their environment and 
‘out o f the closet’ with others. Both a private and public sexual identity and orientation are 
being developed.
Closeted homosexuals, non-lesbigay identified homosexuals, and the successfully 
converted or reoriented group can be equally difficult to fully assess. The shame associated 
with non-heterosexuality tends to dampen the collective and individual voices of these people. 
Long-term outcome studies with these groups have been often exceedingly difficult because 
of their intention to be reassimilated into a heterosexual majority as inconspicuously as 
possible. Those who participate in such studies find that their sexuality and motivation for 
participation come under harsh, often unwelcome scrutiny.
Medical and mental health professionals who do not practice sexual reorientation or gay- 
affirming psychotherapy but who take notice of the trend towards professional policy making 
driven by political agendas, also seem to have very little voice in the debate. Explanation for 
this muted voice include perhaps the professional risks associated with being politically 
incorrect or perhaps professional isolationism7 or perhaps professional apathy.
7 Isolationism: refers to the American political climate 1931-1939 associated with the delay in entry into World 
War II. “Not my business” thinking.
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Misinformation, Language and Conceptual Distortions
It is clear that a number of controversial or unfounded declarations have been made by gay 
and lesbian groups to discredit sexual reorientation efforts. These mantras include:
• Sexual orientation is genetically determined and fixed prior to birth.
• No sexual reorientation intervention has ever been successful.
• Research proves that sexual reorientation therapies never work.
• Homosexuality is not an accepted diagnosis, therefore it is unethical to treat it.
• Sexual reorientation interventions are unethical because they never work and they cause a 
risk o f depression and suicide in the participants.
• The availability of sexual reorientation interventions promotes homophobia and hate 
crimes.
• Research on sexual orientation is unethical
• People who request or participate in sexual reorientation are homophobic.
The NARTH (representing sexual reorientation therapists), religious groups, and 
transformational ministries have made a variety of equally inflammatory and unsupported 
declarations, including:
• Homosexuality causes depression, addiction, suicide and AIDS.
• Sexual orientation can be readily changed.
• Homosexuality is an addiction.
• Sexual reorientation interventions have been successful for tens o f thousands.
• Conversion to heterosexuality brings happiness.
• There exists a gay and lesbian political conspiracy.
• American psychiatry and psychology are controlled by gay and lesbian politics.
• Sexual reorientation prevents AIDS, suicides, addictions, and depression.
• Homosexuality is a psychological disorder.
• Homosexuality as a diagnosis for a psychopathological state (disease) was removed 
because o f political pressure, not clinical rationale.
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All of the above statements contain both a grain of truth with distortion evident o f political 
agenda. Talk of political conspiracies and unethical professionalism fuels the flames o f a 
social and political debate required to reconcile civil rights, civil equality and the social safety 
of a marginalized group with particular religious and cultural values.
When health providers are exposed to the above rhetoric, it is incumbent upon the 
individual professional to have enough presence of mind to be able to separate the political 
agendas from the clinical issues. Arguments like, ‘it’s not a disease, therefore it’s unethical to 
try to treat it’ become diluted when one examines the list o f non-diseases and non-disorders 
that medicine and mental health offer interventions such as: cosmetic surgeries, treatments for 
mild acne, birth-control, marriage counseling. It is naive to become dogmatic on this point 
and believe the issue can be resolved with this line of thinking.
Statements about the success or futility o f sexual reorientation interventions all depend on 
how one defines clinical success or failure. Many proponents of sexual reorientation 
interventions would view the shift o f a bisexual to solely heterosexual intimate contacts or the 
successful shift to elective celibacy by a homosexual as acceptable outcomes, while 
opponents would not. Opponents would only view a case as a success when a person 
transitions from a sustained history of homosexual behavior and internal erotic life (fantasy, 
arousal) to a sustained history of heterosexual behavior and erotic interest with the elimination 
of all traces of homosexual behavior or internal same-sex erotic life.
Opponents criticize the current state o f research into sexual reorientation interventions as 
having study design flaws that render the results useless. However, studies on the outcomes 
of clinical psychotherapy have sustained similar criticism. Other than some reasonably well 
designed studies in cognitive-behavioral therapy, bereavement counseling and time-limited 
psychotherapies, most of the evidence for supportive, psychodynamic, and psychoanalytic 
therapies for various diagnostic pictures are anecdotal case studies or small series. 
Psychotherapy is exceedingly difficult to study formally, using strict research criteria. The 
vast bulk of subject matter and the focus of clinical psychotherapy do not have any rigorous 
clinical outcome research to support the use of psychotherapy. However, therapists abound 
and are willing to explore virtually any issue within the setting of a fifty-minute 
psychotherapy hour.
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Opponents speak of the risk of depression and suicide associated with failed attempts at 
sexual reorientation, citing this as a clear contraindication. However, there is no clinical data 
that correlates failed reorientation with subsequent depression and/or suicide; there is no clear 
evidence that such a risk is any higher than with other form of elective psychotherapy. 
Psychoanalysis and psychodynamic psychotherapies often anticipate worsening anxiety and 
depression during the course of treatment and view this as an essential part of the treatment 
and as integral to the risks and benefits of the process that must be weighed by the clinician 
on an individual patient-by-patient basis. If  the risk of suicide or depression were found to be 
predictably increased following sexual reorientation interventions, that might argue against 
the provision o f these services by religious and allied health professionals and in support of 
restricting them to those with formal mental health training. Of course, prohibiting the 
provision of sexual reorientation interventions by any professionals could result in a  scenario 
reminiscent of the back-alley abortions in America prior to the U.S. Supreme Court case Roe 
v. Wade8.
The American Psychiatric Association has the largest gay, lesbian, and bisexual caucus of 
any of the member specialties of the American Medical Association, largely composed of 
psychiatrists. The American Psychological Association and the National Association of 
Social Workers both have large, vocal gay and lesbian caucuses. Even the most conservative 
group in American mental health, the American Psychoanalytic Association, has acquired a 
very prominent and vocal gay and lesbian task force in the course of the last two decades. 
American mental health has been very attentive to its gay, lesbian, and bisexual members 
since the 1973 picketing of the American Psychiatric Association’s national meeting by gay 
and lesbian political groups and the HIV/AIDS health crisis of the 1980s.
The removal of homosexuality from the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual received 
national coverage at the time and it continues to be a source of discussion and interest. The 
public impact was to dramatically change how Americans (both heterosexual and 
homosexual) viewed homosexuality. The consequences of removing the diagnosis from the 
APA’s DSM  for medicine and mental health was less dramatic. Patients continued to make 
requests (for both gay-affirming and sexual reorienting interventions) and treatments 
continued to be offered, regardless of diagnostic entity. Research into the origins o f  sexual
8 Roes v. Wade is the 1973 U.S. Supreme Court care that legalized abortions throughout American.
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orientation has also continued. Because o f its impact on reducing social shame and 
facilitating social justice, the decision by the APA to remove homosexuality, although 
politically motivated, appears both socially beneficial and just, with a minimal down side for 
the medical profession. A few continue to question the rationale for the removal of 
homosexuality from the DSM  when other orientations (paraphilias and fetishes) and gender 
disorders remain. Are these other groups (paraphilias, fetishes, and gender disorders) any less 
deserving of the positive social benefits that come from de-stigmatizing their sexuality, 
particularly those paraphilias that are ‘victimless’? The question of how equipped medicine is 
for making these political and social decisions remains. Is it medicine’s responsibility? Has 
society placed this within medicine’s purview? It is clear that the issues cannot be settled by 
re-definition as if there were conclusive proof with which to solve an individual’s problems.
Bioethical Analysis of the Professional Policies
A critical review of current professional policy statements articulated by the American 
Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association, American Psychoanalytic 
Association, National Association of Social Workers, American Counselors’ Association, 
American Pediatrics Association, and the American Association of Family Physicians reveals 
a strong emphasis on the principles of non-maleficence, justice, and autonomy (informed 
consent). The risk of harm manifest by anxiety, depression and suicide (non-maleficence) has 
been accused of being somewhat exaggerated in some professional statements. The issues of 
justice raised in these professional statements emphasize gay and lesbian social goals and 
perspectives and tend to ignore the role of religion in sexuality and the social status o f non- 
lesbigays. Issues of autonomy focus almost exclusively on the provision of informed consent, 
including gay-affirming principles, while ignoring the issues o f autonomy raised by a Western 
tradition o f religious tolerance.
On final analysis it is clear that some of the professional organizations have come close to 
striking a bioethically balanced position statement (either intentionally or unintentionally). 
While other groups are more strongly attached to a goal of promoting a specific social or 
political agenda on behalf o f a “group” within the culture at the ethical expense of others. It is 
clear that a policy could be engineered to be bioethically balanced if it recognized the 
diversity o f values, views, and morality and at the same time placed the ultimate bioethical
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responsibility with the patient and clinician instead of the professional organization or worse 
the legislature/judiciary. However, this is either not the goal of some organizations or to do so 
would undermine the primary political or social goal that has driven the development o f a 
policy statement in the first place.
Engelhardt levels heavy criticism at any ethics consultant who seeks to represent his or her 
own bioethical vision as canonical. Likewise, I remain critical o f any professional 
organization that reports to have developed an all-encompassing omni-applicable policy 
statement that relieves the patient and the clinician of any bioethical responsibility. The 
subject matter of sexual orientation and reorientation is too complex and the future 
technologies too obscure to adopt policy statements that are unable to evolve with the 
technology and the society or to be tailored to individual circumstances.
A Model Policy for Professional Organizations
First and foremost, a model professional policy or guideline statement would ideally 
address all four of the historically grounded, non-universal, co-equal principles that govern 
bioethics:
“Beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing benefits 
against risks and costs), non-maleficence (a norm for avoiding causing harm), 
autonomy (a norm representing the decision-making capacities of autonomous 
individuals) and justice (a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs 
fairly)” (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p.223).
Beauchamp and Childress suggest that most Westerners currently accept these principles 
as part o f their common morality. That these principles are well accepted and readily 
understood by all, they provide a common language for the in-depth discussion described by 
Campbell and Higgs, and are readily accessible to individual clinicians and their patients.
Secondly, such a model would also consciously address each of the bioethical principles 
from the perspectives o f both lesbigay and queer politics as well as that of conservative 
Christian fundamentalism, as both groups have strongly invested interests in the outcomes and 
consequences of such policies. Organized medicine and mental health have a fiduciary 
responsibility to both groups, as legitimate health care consumers.
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Thirdly, such a model would fully acknowledge the cognitive skills and powers o f 
judgment of the individual clinician in guiding the individual patient through the task of the 
adjudication of conflicts between two or more principles as they apply to his or her life 
situation and value system. There are no ‘cookbook’ answers; policies that suggest otherwise 
are naive.
Lastly, such a model would acknowledge the current limitations and anticipate the future 
evolution of our understanding of the origins of human sexual orientation and sexual 
reorientation interventions. Otherwise, such a policy would rapidly become obsolete in an era 
of exponential biotechnological leaps.
The Campbell and Higgs model has revealed a number o f discrepancies between the policy 
statements o f various groups and illuminated some political agendas embedded in the policies. 
As the motivations of the authors o f these policies come under scrutiny, the benefits of a 
model policy statement on sexual reorientation for all the professions become ever more clear.
On final analysis a postmodern bioethically sound policy statement applicable to any of the 
professional organizations would:
1. acknowledge the diversity o f values and morality inherent in a multi-cultural 
religiously tolerant Western society,
2. highlight autonomy and beneficence as two primary principles for bioethical 
discussion,
3. acknowledge justice and non-maleficence as contributory principles for discussion and 
exploration, and
4. place the responsibility for this discussion and eventual bioethical resolution within the 
framework of clinician-patient relationship.
5. Be dynamic in allowing for change.
Two Principlist Models for the Individual Clinician
The struggle for the individual professional faced with resolving a clinical situation with 
conflicted and competing bioethical principles is loyalty to all of these premises. Whereas the 
Campbell and Higgs model for ethical exploration readily lends itself to group discussion and
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collaboration on issues o f policy, the following principlist models offer a focused and 
efficient route for the individual clinician struggling with the specifics o f an individual case.
Not all principlists agree with Beauchamp and Childress (1996) that the principles of 
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice are, in the abstract, equal, and that 
therefore, in cases of conflict, the winning principle cannot be declared in advance o f critical 
deliberations. Pellegrino (1993) argues that beneficence is the paramount principle in health 
care. It is his belief that health-care providers must remain focused on the patient’s good or 
professional practice will degenerate. Pellegrino does not believe that autonomy and justice 
should play just as large a role in health care as beneficence and its correlate, non­
maleficence, have traditionally played. He worries that too much autonomy is just as bad as 
too little, claiming that in the form of patients’ rights and privacy, autonomy sometimes 
“overrides good medical judgment, encourages moral detachment on the part of the physician, 
and even works against the patients’ best interests” (Pellegrino, 1993). Pelligrino also worries 
that, as inequities in the distribution o f health care widen and anxieties about the cost of health 
care increase, appeals to justice may require physicians “to become agents primarily of fiscal 
or social purposes rather than the patient.”
Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) argue that conflicts in bioethics are not conflicts among 
the “four principles” but within the meaning of the patient’s good. They describe the four 
components of the patient’s total good as follows:
The patient’s first good is his ultimate good -  vision, purpose, or being (e.g.
God) that grounds the meaning of his existence. The patient’s second good is his 
autonomy in general, the moral power that enables him to act as an independent 
decision-maker. The patient’s third good is manifested in the particular decisions 
he makes. Depending on his fundamental values, it is up to him as an 
autonomous person to decide what kind of intervention he desires. The patient’s 
fourth good is a very special one. It derives from the fact that, as a result o f 
admittedly unfortunate circumstances, the patient has an opportunity to develop a 
particularly intimate relationship with his clinical provider. This bond has a long 
history and is rooted in the ends and goals o f medicine: Can the healer make the 
patient well? I f  not, the healer should admit his limits (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 
1993).
Of these four goods, the first, according to Pellegrino and Thomasma, is the one to which 
the other three must always defer. Thus, for example, if a provider believes that a 
homosexual in crisis about his sexual behavior should be referred for gay-affirming therapy,
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but the patient does not want to submit to treatment because the quality o f his religious life is 
more important to him than the quality o f his sexual life, then the physician must defer to the 
patient’s wishes. In short, the patient’s beliefs about what ultimately makes life worth living 
must guide the provider’s actions.
Pelligrino and Thomasma (1990) maintain that when principles conflict, beneficence must 
rule. Thus, in the case of the adolescent patient who seeks an intervention for an ego-dystonic 
sexual orientation, the good o f the patient must remain paramount in discussing treatment. If 
the health provider believes that he can provide effective treatment of the adolescent in ways 
that offer more long-term benefits than burdens, then he should provide the treatment 
(beneficence). It should not matter if the adolescent’s parents want to withhold it (autonomy). 
Nor does it matter if society wants to reduce homophobia and improve the social status of 
non-heterosexuals (justice).
In contrast to Pellegrino and Thomasma, Beauchamp and Childress (1996) offer a different 
way to handle the above case -  a way that does not depend on automatically privileging the 
principle o f beneficence but on developing W. D. Ross’ rule for handling conflicts among 
principles. Ross (1930) proposes that when conflicting principles suggest different courses of 
action, people should perform the action that yields “the best balance o f right over wrong.” 
Beauchamp and Childress go a step further in suggesting that when one wishes to reject one 
principle in favor of another, not one but five requirements must be met:
• Better reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm than on the infringed norm 
(for example, if  persons have a right, their interests typically deserve a special place when 
balancing them against the interests o f persons who have no comparable right).
• The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect o f achievement.
• No morally preferable alternative actions can be substituted.
• The form o f infringement selected is the least possible, commensurate with achieving the 
primary goal of the action.
• The agent seeks to minimize the negative effects of the infringement.
Thus, following the Beauchamp and Childress model, if in the name of justice a physician 
decides to violate both beneficence and autonomy by not providing a referral to a sexual 
reorientation interventionist requested by a religiously conscientious adolescent patient, one 
must be relatively certain that: (1) the adolescent does not have a right to the intervention 
(incompetent by virtue of age or mental/emotional maturation); (2) homophobia (the moral 
objective to sexual reorientation interventions) will clearly be reduced in the community and
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the social status o f non-heterosexuals enhanced by withholding sexual reorientation 
intervention in this patient (justice will be well served); (3) gay-affirming therapy or other 
alternatives have been explored and are either contraindicated, unavailable, or competently 
declined; (4) nothing short of withholding sexual reorientation interventions will reduce 
homophobia in the community or enhance the social status o f non-heterosexuals (only way to 
serve justice); (5) the physician must strive to resolve the crisis o f sexual orientation while 
actively supporting the patient and parents.
The decision to use Pellegrino and Thomasma’s model or the Beauchamp and Childress 
model is one for the individual clinician. Both scenarios provide a reasoned approach 
applicable to many clinical situations. Both are cognitively and conceptually accessible to 
practicing clinicians. Both are well grounded in a shared biomedical ethic accessible to 
discussion and collaboration by both philosophers and health professionals.
Despite the criticism o f the inductivists and deductivists, principlists such as Beauchamp 
and Childress stress that their emphasis on principles, rules, obligations, and rights is not to be 
interpreted as a rejection of ethic’s other elements. On the contrary, they embrace these other 
elements as crucial to the project of ethics:
Often what counts most in moral life is not consistent adherence to principles 
and rules, but reliable character, moral good sense, and emotional responsiveness. 
Principles and rules cannot fully encompass what occurs when parents lovingly 
play with and nurture their children, or when physicians and nurses provide care 
and comfort. Our feelings and concern for others lead us to actions that cannot be 
reduced to the following of principles and rules (Beauchamp & Childress, 1996,
p.181).
According to Beauchamp and Childress, the fact that principles are excellent tools to use in 
sorting through a moral dilemma does not mean that they are the only tools available. Nor 
does it mean that principles are the most important ingredient in a person’s moral life. On the 
contrary, Beauchamp and Childress believe that the key to being moral “is a developed 
character that provides the inner motivation and strength to do what is right and good.” To 
this end I have offered two models for the individual clinician to choose from, as both 
accommodate the moral professional. The model for professional organizations is provided as 
the avenue that leads the individual clinician to a bioethical model without a predetermined 
bioethical conclusion.
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The Final Analysis
Since 1972, the mental health professions have been assessing and reassessing the status of 
non-heterosexuality in mental health. During the last three decades, homosexuality has been 
conceptualized as a disorder, a possible disorder (ego-dystonic homosexuality), and most 
recently, as neutral as it relates to the mental status o f an individual (Rubenstein, 1995).
In the last decade there has been the emergence within the American mental health system 
of opposition to any form of clinical intervention to attempt a change of the sexual orientation 
from homosexual to heterosexual. Davison (1976), Martin (1984) and Haldeman (1994) are 
just few of those that have suggested that psychotherapeutic efforts to change sexual 
orientation are unethical. Opposition movements stress that reorientation interventions are 
ineffective and unethical. Professional organizations from mental health, family medicine, 
and pediatrics have passed resolutions to address these bioethical concerns.
If  any conclusions can be drawn from the literature, it is that changes in sexual orientation 
are possible both independent of and following clinical interventions. Arguments from 
Martin (1984) and Haldeman (1994) that there are no empirical studies which support the idea 
that sexual reorientation interventions can produce desired changes, are lacking by virtue of 
omitting a number o f significant reports and the failure to examine the outcomes o f many 
studies which have demonstrated change (Throckmorton, 1998). Inconsistent rates o f change 
are more likely related to lack of systematic research in this field, than to a hypothesized 
inability for humans to meaningfully change sexual orientation.
While some sexual reorientation providers believe homosexuality to be a developmental 
deficit, it clearly is not necessary to believe homosexuality is a disorder for the provider to 
offer intervention or for the patient to accept or benefit from the intervention. There are 
numerous elective medical and psychotherapeutic interventions routinely available for 
physical, mental and emotional states that are neither per se pathological nor problematic. In 
fact, the psychiatry, psychology and the counseling professions have traditionally held that 
one does not need to have a disorder in order to profit from psychotherapy or counseling. 
Clearly, if a client requests an intervention, offering it would not require the provider to view 
the patient as mentally ill.
All o f the mental heialth professions in America have adopted language to require that the 
ethical practitioner should not discriminate against patients due to their sexual orientation. It
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is notable that banning sexual reorientation interventions would require these same 
professionals to discriminate against those clients that want to change. Many clients that want 
to change their sexual orientation will likely meet the DSM criteria for Sexual Disorder-Not 
Otherwise Specified which includes several descriptors, one of which is “persistent and 
marked distress about sexual orientation” (ApA, 1994). A decision to actively discriminate 
against patients with a specific diagnosis seems clearly counter intuitive.
All o f the mental health organizations have language that describes the ethical professional 
as one who “will actively attempt to understand the diverse cultural backgrounds of their 
patients.” If  professional organizations actively discredit sexual reorientation interventions, 
they may be implying that sexual arousal is more vital than any conflicting personality 
variable or moral conviction. Such a position is difficult to defend in a postmodern, culturally 
diverse society.
Thockmorton (1998) reminds counselors to be “aware of their own values, attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviors and how these apply in a diverse society, and avoid imposing their 
values on patients.” Thockmorton asks, what does it say to clients when sexual reorientation 
is opposed. To clients who want to explore the option for change, it means that their wish is 
diminished, not to be taken seriously. For individuals who are morally opposed to 
homosexuality as a lifestyle, it mean that the professions have denigrated their moral 
convictions. For the individuals who have successfully changed, it means that the professions 
have criticized their accomplishments. Referral to another provider is the most appropriate 
response for a professional who can not reconcile the patient’s goals with their own skills and 
values.
Throckmorton shrewdly notes that while there has been a movement to oppose sexual 
reorientation, there has been no movement to avoid the disruption of an individual’s religious 
convictions. Barret and Barzan (1996) ’write concerning spirituality and the gay experience 
that “assisting gay men and lesbians to step away from external religious authority may 
challenge the professional’s own acceptance of religious teachings (p. 8). They suggest that 
“most professionals will benefit from a model that helps them understand the difference 
between spiritual and religious authority” (Barret and Barzan, 1996). I believe this subject 
and its bioethical implications has not been well explored by professional training.
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I agree with Throckmorton (1998) who suggests that the opponents to sexual reorientation 
interventions must demonstrate that no patients have benefited from any procedures or that 
any benefits are too costly in some objective way to be pursued, even if they work. This 
burden of proof has not yet been met. Policies that limit patient access to desired care based 
on ethical grounds should always require similarly high standards, in the absence o f rampant 
and profound social injustice.
Since the birth of bioethics, the field has struggled with the question o f which is the 
superior ethical approach; one that applies overarching rules and guidelines to all ethical 
problems, or one that grants ethical leeway to decision makers based on their assessment of a 
specific problem (Tong, 1996). Professional organizations that generate policy statements are 
eager to apply overarching rules and promote guidelines that intentionally diminish the room 
for discussion between patient and professional and between professional peers. This path 
has proven ethically problematic.
In this scenario I agree with the principlists who believe it is the task of bioethicists to 
move between the principles and cases, sensitively calibrating them to each other in a way 
that is loyal to the moral history from which they both emerge (Tong, 1997). I believe that in 
today’s complex health system serving culturally diverse populations each clinician must be 
able to function as a bioethicist with respect to his own patients and professional 
organizations must both acknowledge and emphasize that role for individual clinicians.
Although the principlists insist that the process is a rational one, inductivists stress that the 
idea o f rationality, like all ideas, depends on culture for its ever-shifting meaning and that we 
cannot therefore eliminate moral intuitions from the realm of biomedical ethics. To that end, 
the patient must also be called to participate collaboratively in the role o f his or her own 
bioethicist along with the clinician.
The past, present, and future of sexual reorientation interventions cannot be explored 
without encountering intensely debated philosophical, ethical, and bioethical dilemmas. The 
recent proliferation of policy statements and ethics guidelines from professional organizations 
on the subject of sexual reorientation interventions have not been received without some 
alarm and opposition within the mental health community. Again, we see a conflict between 
a collection o f overarching rules and guidelines from professional groups to apply to all
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sexual reorientation interventions versus a contextual decision-making process between the 
individual professional and individual patient.
On the surface, one can view these proclamations from organized medicine as well 
intended, well reasoned attempts to relieve individual professionals from the burden o f 
contemplating these complex ethical issues on a case-by-case basis when they arise in the 
clinical setting. Another view suggests that these professional statements represent a  form of 
social and political advocacy on the behalf of queer and lesbigay communities. Neither the 
public nor the professions have endowed these professional organizations with the role of 
“Societal Conscious” to be the arbiter of societal morality.
This thesis has explored the ways in which these proclamations by professional 
organizations are lacking in terms of uniformity and bioethical content and are suspicious in 
terms of motive. Recommendations to resolve these deficits have been offered. Following 
the principlist’s tradition, this thesis also offers two models for the individual professional to 
tackle specific cases in clinical practice.
It is clear that sexual reorientation interventions have been and can continue to be offered 
within a bioethically and morally sound framework. Gay and lesbian groups have argued the 
interventions to be of no benefit (beneficence), potentially dangerous (non-maleficence), 
promoting homophobia and socially unjust (justice), and as a consequence incapable of being 
provided with informed consent (autonomy). Aside from the issue of coercion with teens and 
children, none the arguments hold up under scrutiny.
It is clear that professional organizations are ill prepared to weather the bioethical storm 
that follows attempts to generate one overarching omni-applicable policy on sexual 
reorientation. It is also clear that any policy generated will be at any given time ahead o f the 
discussion in some communities and lagging behind the discussion in other communities, and 
forever ill prepared to deal with evolving biotechnologies. When forced to generate a policy, 
these organizations must address the needs and interests o f all parties on both sides o f the 
debate and always place the responsibility for resolving bioethical issues in the lap o f  the 
individual professional and the specific patient.
It is also clear that professional organizations must acknowledge that there is rarely one 
right answer for every patient or every community. The exception being that interventions 
that are coercive must always be avoided. There are no instances where sexual reorientation
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can be viewed as an emergency life-saving intervention, which means full informed consent is 
always required. It is clear that for any currently available treatment to be effective, it 
requires the willing participation of the patient. It is my strong view that until there is clear 
and convincing evidence of uniform safety and efficacy with children and adolescents, no 
treatments should be performed on under age patients without the minor’s express and clearly 
not coerced endorsement.
The principles o f beneficence and non-maleficence are shown to be critical issues for 
resolution by the individual professional and his or her patient to accomplish informed 
consent. Are there legitimate benefits experienced by some patients following a course o f 
sexual reorientation intervention? Absolutely, there are. Can these potential benefits 
outweigh the risks to social justice and risk for short-term and long-term harm? Absolutely, 
they can. Are there risks associated with gay affirming therapies? Absolutely, there can be. 
Are there benefits associated with gay affirming therapies? Absolutely, there can be. What is 
the social impact of gay affirming therapies on community morality or religiosity? Little or 
none, I believe. What is the social impact o f sexual reorientation therapies on the progress of 
the gay, lesbian and bisexual social movement? Little or none, I believe. Is there one right 
answer in a postmodern world? No.
It is my view o f the medical tradition, that every clinical professional has a responsibility 
to their patient to bioethically reason through the specific individual issues raised on a case- 
by-case basis, and that no amount o f professional guidelines and policy statements from 
organized medicine can relieve the practitioner of that responsibility. To this end, this thesis 
has illuminated the process without dictating the outcome for the individual patient and in the 
process resolved the bioethical questions raised at the beginning of this analysis.
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